431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
In early 1973, Mrs. Inez Moore received a notice of violation from the city of East Cleveland.1 The notice stated that her grandson John Moore, Jr., was an illegal occupant of her home. It directed her to comply with the housing ordinance.2
Mrs. Moore lived in her East Cleveland home together with her son Dale Moore, Sr., and her two grandsons Dale Moore, Jr., and John Moore, Jr. John came to live with her after his mother's death when he was less than one year old.3 When she failed to remove John from the home, the city filed a criminal charge against her.4
Mrs. Moore moved to dismiss the charge.5 She claimed that the ordinance was constitutionally invalid on its face.6 Her motion was overruled.7 Upon conviction she was sentenced to five days in jail and a $25 fine.8
The East Cleveland ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family.9 The ordinance defined family to include only a husband or wife of the nominal head of the household, unmarried children of the head or spouse provided they have no children residing with them, a parent of the head or spouse, or not more than one dependent child of the head or spouse along with that child's spouse and dependent children.10
The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction after giving full consideration to her constitutional claims.11 The Ohio Supreme Court denied review of the case.12 The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of her appeal.13
Whether the East Cleveland housing ordinance that limits occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family as narrowly defined violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?14
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.15 When a city undertakes such intrusive regulation of the family, neither Belle Terre nor Euclid governs; the usual judicial deference to the legislature is inappropriate.16
Yes. The East Cleveland ordinance intrudes upon choices concerning family living arrangements protected by the Constitution when it prohibits Mrs. Moore from living with her grandson John Moore, Jr., the child of her deceased daughter, while permitting a grandmother to live with a son's child.17 Mrs. Moore lived in her East Cleveland home together with her son Dale Moore, Sr., and her two grandsons Dale Moore, Jr., and John Moore, Jr., after John came to live with her following his mother's death when he was less than one year old. The ordinance defines family to include only a husband or wife of the nominal head of the household, unmarried children of the head or spouse provided they have no children residing with them, a parent of the head or spouse, or not more than one dependent child of the head or spouse along with that child's spouse and dependent children.18
The city seeks to justify the ordinance as a means of preventing overcrowding, minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and avoiding an undue financial burden on the school system, yet the ordinance serves those goals only marginally at best because it permits any nuclear family with multiple licensed drivers and cars while forbidding the extended family arrangement presented here.19 The ordinance is an arbitrary and irrational regulation that bears no close relation to the city's stated goals.20
The ordinance violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.21
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan joined the plurality opinion.22 He wrote separately to emphasize that the East Cleveland ordinance represents an unprecedented intrusion into the privacy of the home and the sanctity of the family.23 The ordinance dictates which family members may live together.24 He underscored that the rights of family association are not limited to the nuclear family.25 Extended families have played a vital role in American society, particularly among minority groups and the poor.26 The Constitution must protect the right of grandparents to live with their grandchildren.27
Brennan noted that the line drawn by the ordinance displays a depressing insensitivity toward the economic and emotional needs of a very large part of society.28 The extended family pattern remains a vital tenet of our society.29
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment on the ground that the East Cleveland ordinance is unconstitutional because it is arbitrary and capricious.30 It bears no rational relationship to the city's legitimate interests in controlling population density and traffic congestion.31 He framed the critical question as whether the ordinance is a permissible restriction on the appellant's right to use her own property as she sees fit.32 He concluded that there is no precedent for an ordinance which excludes any of an owner's relatives from the group of persons who may occupy his residence on a permanent basis.33
Stevens observed that the line drawn by the city between a grandmother living with the children of her son and a grandmother living with the children of her daughter is irrational.34 Such a distinction cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny under the standard preserved in Euclid and Nectow.35
Joined by Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stewart dissented on the ground that the East Cleveland ordinance is a reasonable exercise of the city's police power that does not violate any fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause.36 He argued that the right to live with one's grandchildren is not a fundamental liberty interest.37 The Constitution does not prohibit a city from limiting occupancy of dwellings to members of a single nuclear family.38
Stewart maintained that the plurality opinion expands the concept of substantive due process beyond its proper bounds.39 The existence of the variance procedure is particularly persuasive evidence that the ordinance is not arbitrary or irrational.40
Justice White dissented on the ground that the East Cleveland ordinance is a valid exercise of the city's authority to regulate land use.41 It is rationally related to the legitimate governmental interests of preventing overcrowding, reducing traffic congestion, and preserving the quality of the public schools.42 He contended that the plurality's decision represents an unwarranted interference with the legislative process.43
The Constitution does not give the federal courts authority to second-guess the wisdom of local zoning decisions.44 White concluded that the interest in residing with more than one set of grandchildren does not call for heightened protection under the Due Process Clause.45 The ordinance does not infringe upon any constitutionally protected right.46
Chief Justice Burger dissented on the ground that it was unnecessary to reach the difficult constitutional issue.47 Appellant's deliberate refusal to use a plainly adequate administrative remedy provided by the city should foreclose her from pressing constitutional objections to the zoning ordinance.48 He argued that considerations of federalism and comity, as well as the finite capacity of federal courts, support requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies.49 The traditional justifications for the exhaustion principle point toward its application here.50
Burger emphasized that the policies underlying the exhaustion doctrine are reinforced when constitutional issues are present because an agency may resolve the matter on nonconstitutional grounds.51