95 U.S. 714 (1878)
In February 1866, J.H. Mitchell obtained a judgment in an Oregon circuit court against Neff for less than $300 in an action for attorney services.1
At that time, Neff resided outside Oregon, received no personal service of process, and made no appearance in the case.2 The judgment was entered by default following constructive service by publication as authorized by the Oregon Code for non-resident defendants possessing property within the state.3
The Oregon Code also provided for attachment of a non-resident's property in money actions.4 No such attachment occurred with respect to the land at issue.5 Instead, after the judgment, an execution issued, leading to a levy on the land and its sale at a sheriff's auction.6
Pennoyer purchased the property at that sale and received a sheriff's deed.7 Separately, in 1866, the United States issued a patent to Neff for the same tract of land under the Donation Law of Oregon, which Neff valued at $15,000.8 Neff then brought suit against Pennoyer in the circuit court to recover possession of the premises based on his patent title.9
The lower court held the Oregon judgment invalid because of deficiencies in the affidavits used to obtain the publication order and to prove publication occurred.10 The Supreme Court of the United States granted review to consider the validity of the state court judgment and the resulting sheriff's sale.11
Whether an Oregon circuit court acquired jurisdiction to enter a personal judgment against a non-resident defendant who received only constructive service by publication and made no appearance?12
No. The established facts establish that Neff resided outside Oregon when Mitchell commenced the action.15 Neff received no personal service and entered no appearance.16 The land was never attached or otherwise brought under the court's control before judgment.17 The default judgment therefore rested solely on publication and could not bind Neff personally or authorize the later execution sale.18
The Oregon circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the personal judgment against Neff.19
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Hunt dissented on the ground that a sovereign State must necessarily have such control over the real and personal property actually being within its limits, as that it may subject the same to the payment of debts justly due to its citizens.20 He maintained that whether the property of such non-resident shall be seized upon attachment as the commencement of a suit which shall be carried into judgment and execution, upon which it shall then be sold, or whether it shall be sold upon an execution and judgment without such preliminary seizure, is a matter not of constitutional power, but of municipal regulation only.21 To say that a sovereign State has the power to ordain that the property of non-residents within its territory may be subjected to the payment of debts due to its citizens, if the property is levied upon at the commencement of a suit, but that it has not such power if the property is levied upon at the end of the suit, is a refinement and a depreciation of a great general principle that, in his judgment, cannot be sustained.22
Whether defects in the affidavits supporting an order of publication and proof of publication may be raised collaterally to challenge the validity of a default judgment?23
Defects in affidavits required for an order of publication or proof of publication may not be attacked collaterally; such defects must be raised by direct appeal or other direct proceeding.24
No. The established facts show that the lower court invalidated the judgment on affidavit deficiencies.25 Yet the Supreme Court held that any such procedural irregularities in obtaining the publication order could be corrected only on direct review and furnished no basis for collateral impeachment of the judgment.26
Defects in the affidavits could not be raised collaterally to invalidate the judgment.27
Whether a state court judgment rendered without personal service or prior attachment of property may authorize a subsequent execution sale of the non-resident defendant's land?28
A personal judgment entered without personal jurisdiction or prior attachment of the defendant's property within the state is void and cannot support an execution sale of that property.29
No. The established facts demonstrate that no attachment occurred before judgment.30 The land first became connected to the case only through post-judgment levy.31 The judgment itself was entered without personal service or appearance.32 Consequently the execution sale conveyed no valid title to Pennoyer.33
The judgment could not authorize the execution sale of Neff's land.34
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Hunt rejected any constitutional distinction between attachment at the outset and levy after judgment.35 He argued that once the state provides reasonable notice and an opportunity to defend, its power to apply the non-resident's local property to citizen debts remains intact regardless of the precise sequence of seizure.36 That a State can subject land within its limits belonging to non-resident owners to debts due to its own citizens as it can legislate upon all other local matters seems to him very plain.37
He was not willing to declare that a sovereign State cannot subject the land within its limits to the payment of debts due to its citizens, or that the power to do so depends upon the fact whether its statute shall authorize the property to be levied upon at the commencement of the suit or at its termination.38
Whether substituted service by publication alone suffices to subject a non-resident's property to a money judgment when no attachment occurred at the outset of the action?39
Substituted service by publication alone, without attachment or equivalent seizure bringing the property under court control at the commencement of the action, is insufficient to subject a non-resident's property to a money judgment.40
No. The established facts confirm that the Oregon action proceeded solely on publication without any pre-judgment attachment of the land.41 Neff was a non-resident who received only constructive service and entered no appearance. Under the governing rule, jurisdiction over property requires that it be brought within the court's control through attachment or equivalent process before judgment.42 Publication without that step leaves the court without authority to adjudicate even the property interest, so the subsequent execution sale conveyed no valid title.
Publication alone without initial attachment did not suffice to subject the land to the money judgment.43