Privileges or Immunities Clause (Fourteenth Amendment)
/priv-uh-LEJ-iz or im-YOON-ih-teez klawz (for-TEENTH uh-MEND-muhnt)/·constitutional clause
Also known as:Privileges or Immunities Clause · Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause · P or I Clause · Privileges and Immunities Clause
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional provision in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment that prohibits any state from abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. It safeguards certain rights incident to national citizenship against state interference.
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How its tested
Common Examples
6
New Resident Welfare Benefits
Paige Porter moved from State A to State B for a new job. State B's welfare statute capped benefits for residents of less than one year at the amount they would have received in their prior state. Paige applied for full benefits and was denied. The denial triggered review under the clause because it treated newly arrived citizens differently from longer-term residents in accessing a state program tied to the right to travel.
Out-of-State Bar Admission
Pierce Patterson, licensed in State A, sought admission to the State B bar without establishing residency. State B's rule required one year of in-state residence before admission. Pierce challenged the requirement after denial. The clause applied because the rule discriminated against nonresidents seeking to practice law, a common calling, without a substantial justification.
Pilar Pena, a State C attorney, applied for reciprocal admission in State D. State D required nonresidents to maintain a local office and pay higher fees. Pilar was rejected. The clause governed the claim because the residency-linked conditions burdened her ability to pursue the profession on equal terms with residents.
Self-Incrimination Protection
Peter Park, a State E resident, was subpoenaed in State F and invoked the privilege against self-incrimination. State F sought to compel testimony under its own narrower rule. The clause supplied the basis for applying the federal standard to the state proceeding.
Malloy v. Hogan378 U.S. 1 (1964)
In November 1959, Harold Malloy was arrested during a gambling raid in Hartford, Connecticut, on charges related to pool selling. He pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor, receiving a sentence of one year in jail and a five-hundred-dollar fine, with the jail term suspended after ninety days followed by two years of probation.
Approximately sixteen months later, Malloy was subpoenaed to appear before a referee appointed by the Superior Court of Hartford County to investigate alleged gambling and other criminal activities in the county. During the inquiry, he was questioned about the circumstances of his 1959 arrest and conviction, including the identity of his employer, who paid his fine and bondsman, the tenant of the apartment where he was arrested, and whether he knew a man named John Bergoti. Malloy refused to answer any of these questions, asserting that his responses might tend to incriminate him.
The Superior Court adjudged Malloy in contempt and ordered him committed to prison until he answered the questions. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors affirmed the contempt adjudication, holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege was unavailable in state proceedings and that Malloy had not properly invoked the state constitutional privilege. Malloy then sought federal habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, which was denied, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutional questions presented.
Pablo Perez sued State G officials in federal court after they conducted an unlawful search of his home. The officials claimed sovereign immunity barred the action. The clause supported treating the officials as persons subject to suit for constitutional violations.
Monroe v. Pape365 U.S. 167, 174
On October 29, 1958, at approximately 5:45 a.m., thirteen Chicago police officers entered the apartment of James Monroe and his family without a search warrant or arrest warrant. The officers roused the Monroes from bed using flashlights and forced them at gunpoint to stand naked in the living room while ransacking every room, emptying drawers, and ripping mattress covers. Detective Pape struck Mr. Monroe several times with his flashlight and called him "nigger" and "black boy." Other officers hit and kicked several of the children and pushed them to the floor.
Mr. Monroe was then taken to the police station and detained on open charges for ten hours. During this period he was interrogated about a murder, exhibited in lineups, and not permitted to call his family or attorney, although he was not brought before a magistrate despite their availability. He was released without any criminal charges being filed against him.
The complaint alleged that these actions occurred under color of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs, and usages of Illinois and Chicago, and that the City had no rules or controls over its police officers, permitting them to act without restraint. The Monroes claimed deprivations of rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and sought compensatory and punitive damages from the officers and the City.
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment.
Portia Price relocated to State H and applied for public assistance. State H imposed a one-year waiting period before full eligibility. Portia was denied benefits during that period. The clause controlled the challenge because the waiting period penalized the exercise of the right to travel between states.
Does the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause protect the right to travel?
Yes. The clause protects newly arrived residents from being treated differently from longer-term residents with respect to benefits tied to the right to travel between states.
Supporting sources
Can states impose residency requirements on bar admission under the clause?
No. Residency requirements that discriminate against nonresidents seeking to practice law violate the clause unless the state shows a substantial justification beyond speculative concerns about competence or availability.
Supporting sources
Does the clause apply to corporations?
No. A corporation is not a citizen within the meaning of the clause, so it does not protect corporate entities from state discrimination in the same manner as natural persons.
Supporting sources
, as a whole , makes the Bill of Rights applicable to the States. This would certainly include the language of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause
, as well as the Due Process
Clause
. : For a more thorough exposition of my views against this approach to the Due Process