521 U.S. 898 (1997)
In 1993 Congress amended the Gun Control Act of 1968 by enacting the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which directed the Attorney General to create a national instant background-check system by November 30, 1998, and imposed interim requirements on firearms dealers and chief law enforcement officers until that system became operational.
Under the interim scheme a dealer proposing to transfer a handgun had to obtain a sworn Brady Form from the purchaser, verify the purchaser's identity, forward notice and a copy of the form to the CLEO of the purchaser's residence, and wait five business days before completing the sale unless the CLEO notified the dealer that the transfer would not violate the law.1
Jay Printz, CLEO for Ravalli County, Montana, and Richard Mack, CLEO for Graham County, Arizona, filed separate federal actions challenging the constitutionality of the interim provisions that required CLEOs to perform background checks and related tasks.2 In each case the district court held that the obligation imposed on CLEOs was unconstitutional but severable from the remainder of the Act, leaving in place a voluntary background-check system.3
The Ninth Circuit consolidated the appeals and reversed, holding that none of the Brady Act's interim provisions violated the Constitution.4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Whether the interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act commanding state and local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers and to perform related tasks violate the Constitution?5
The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.6 It matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary.7 Such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.8
Yes. The Brady Act's interim provisions require CLEOs such as Printz and Mack to perform background checks by making a reasonable effort within five business days to determine whether receipt or possession of the handgun would be unlawful by checking available state, local, and national records.9 These requirements command state executive officers to administer a federal regulatory program in violation of the principle that the Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.10 The provisions apply directly to state officers in their official capacities without consent or compensation and are therefore unconstitutional.11
The interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act are unconstitutional.12
Related opinions on this issue
Justice O’Connor joined the Court’s opinion but wrote separately to emphasize that the decision does not preclude the Federal Government from enlisting state officers through voluntary cooperation or incentives.13 The Federal Government may encourage the States to adopt and enforce federal standards by offering financial incentives or by preempting state law, but it may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.14 The Brady Act’s background check provisions are invalid because they command state and local officials to participate without consent.15
Justice Thomas joined the Court’s opinion but wrote separately to note that the Second Amendment may provide an additional basis for invalidating the Brady Act.16 The Act infringes on the right of the people to keep and bear arms by imposing burdensome regulations on the purchase of firearms.17 The Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms, and the Brady Act’s waiting period and background check requirements burden that right, providing further support for the conclusion that the Act is unconstitutional.18
Joined by Souter, Ginsburg, And Breyer, Jj.
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the Tenth Amendment does not prohibit the Federal Government from requiring state officials to perform ministerial tasks in aid of federal law.19 Historical practice demonstrates that state officials have long assisted in the enforcement of federal law.20 The Commerce Clause gives Congress broad power to regulate the interstate market in firearms, and the Brady Act is a permissible regulation of that market that does not violate principles of federalism.21
The Court’s reliance on New York v. United States is misplaced because the Brady Act does not require state legislatures to enact any law.22
Justice Souter joined Justice Stevens’ dissent.23 The Court’s decision unduly restricts Congress’s ability to enlist the assistance of state and local officials in the enforcement of federal law.24 The Constitution does not prohibit such cooperation.25
The Framers anticipated that state officials would assist in the implementation of federal law. The Court’s rigid rule against commandeering ignores this history and threatens the effective operation of the federal government.26 In his separate writing, Justice Souter explained that the most straightforward reading of The Federalist No. 27 authorizes the National Government, when exercising an otherwise legitimate power, to require state auxiliaries to take appropriate action, and that this reading is supported by No. 44 and consistent with Nos. 36 and 45.27
Joined by Stevens, J.
Justice Breyer joined Justice Stevens’ dissent.28 The Brady Act represents a cooperative effort between the Federal Government and the States to address the serious problem of handgun violence.29 The Act does not violate the Tenth Amendment.30
It is a reasonable and temporary measure that imposes only minimal burdens on state officials.31 The Court’s decision invalidating the Act will hinder efforts to keep firearms out of the hands of criminals and the mentally ill.32 Comparative experience from other federal systems supports local implementation of central law.33