365 U.S. 167, 174
On October 29, 1958, at approximately 5:45 a.m., thirteen Chicago police officers entered the apartment of James Monroe and his family without a search warrant or arrest warrant.1 The officers roused the Monroes from bed using flashlights and forced them at gunpoint to stand naked in the living room while ransacking every room, emptying drawers, and ripping mattress covers.2 Detective Pape struck Mr. Monroe several times with his flashlight and called him "nigger" and "black boy."3 Other officers hit and kicked several of the children and pushed them to the floor.4
Mr. Monroe was then taken to the police station and detained on open charges for ten hours.5 During this period he was interrogated about a murder, exhibited in lineups, and not permitted to call his family or attorney, although he was not brought before a magistrate despite their availability.6 He was released without any criminal charges being filed against him.7
The complaint alleged that these actions occurred under color of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs, and usages of Illinois and Chicago, and that the City had no rules or controls over its police officers, permitting them to act without restraint.8 The Monroes claimed deprivations of rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and sought compensatory and punitive damages from the officers and the City.9
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.10 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment.11
Whether the complaint alleges that Chicago police officers acted under color of state law when they entered petitioners' home without warrants, forced family members to stand naked during a search, and detained one petitioner for ten hours without charges?12
The phrase 'under color of' any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 includes misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.13
Yes. The officers were Chicago police officers acting in their official capacity when they conducted the warrantless search and detention of the Monroe family.14 The complaint alleges they acted under color of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs, and usages of Illinois and Chicago.15 This conduct falls within the established meaning of the statute, which reaches official conduct even if it violates state law, as the officers were clothed with state authority during the early morning entry, search, and ten-hour detention.16
The complaint states a cause of action against the individual officers under § 1983.17
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan concurred in the result reached by the Court.18 He agreed that the complaint states a cause of action against the individual police officers under the Civil Rights Act.19 Harlan emphasized that the policy of stare decisis required adherence to the construction of the phrase under color of law established in United States v. Classic and Screws v. United States.20
He could find no justifying indication in the legislative history of the 1871 statute that would warrant a departure from those precedents.21 Harlan noted that the legislative history was inherently ambiguous when applied to isolated abuses of state authority.22 He concluded that the prior interpretation should stand to avoid unsettling the law in this important field.23
Justice Frankfurter dissented from the holding that the officers acted under color of state law.24 He argued that the actions were not under color of state law within the meaning of the Act because the officers were acting in excess of their authority and in violation of state law.25 Frankfurter maintained that the Civil Rights Act was not intended to provide a federal remedy for every wrongful act of a state officer.26
He contended that the Act was designed to reach only conduct sanctioned by state authority in some form.27 Frankfurter would have affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in full.28
Whether a municipal corporation is a person subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of constitutional rights?29
The word 'person' in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not include municipal corporations because the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 shows that Congress did not intend to impose liability on municipalities.30
No. The City of Chicago is a municipal corporation, and the legislative history demonstrates that Congress eliminated the word corporation from the bill and rejected the Sherman amendment that would have imposed liability on municipalities.31 The complaint alleges no policy of the City authorizing the officers' conduct but rather a failure to have controls, which does not subject the City to liability under the Act.32
The complaint must be dismissed as to the City of Chicago.33
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan agreed with the result that the City of Chicago is not liable under the Act.34 He did not agree with the Court's interpretation of the legislative history of the 1871 Act.35 Harlan believed that the common law of municipal immunity should not be lightly disregarded.36
He concluded that Congress did not intend to abrogate that immunity in the Civil Rights Act.37 Harlan joined the opinion of the Court on this point while differing on other aspects of the reasoning.38
Justice Frankfurter agreed that the action cannot be maintained against the City of Chicago.39 He would have affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in full, including the dismissal as to the City.40 Frankfurter dissented from the opinion of the Court on the broader construction of the statute but concurred in the result as to municipal liability.41
He maintained that the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act.42