Also known as: middle level review · middle-level scrutiny · intermediate scrutiny · intermediate review
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A standard of judicial review positioned between rational-basis review and strict scrutiny. The government must demonstrate that a classification serves an important objective and that the means chosen are substantially related to that objective.
Miles Montgomery and Maria Morales jointly owned their home. A state statute designated the husband as head of household and permitted him alone to sell the property. Maria challenged the statute after Miles sold the home without her consent. The court applied middle-level review and invalidated the law because the gender classification lacked an important objective substantially advanced by the means chosen.
Meridian Motors operated a cable system that carried local broadcast stations. A federal regulation required carriage of those stations on designated channels. Meridian challenged the rule as burdening its speech. The court applied middle-level review and upheld the regulation after finding it advanced important interests unrelated to speech suppression without burdening substantially more speech than necessary.
Melissa Mills sought admission to a state military academy that excluded women. The academy defended the single-sex policy as preserving its distinctive educational method. The court applied middle-level review and struck down the policy because the state failed to supply an exceedingly persuasive justification substantially related to an important objective.
Monica Morgan gave birth to a child outside marriage. State law imposed a six-year limit on paternity actions brought on behalf of nonmarital children while allowing marital children to seek support indefinitely. Morgan challenged the limit. The court applied middle-level review and invalidated the statute because it was not substantially related to the state's interest in preventing stale claims.
Mason McCarthy held copyrights in early twentieth-century musical works. A federal statute extended the term of existing copyrights by twenty years. McCarthy challenged the extension as exceeding congressional power. The court considered an equal-protection claim embedded in the challenge and upheld the statute.
In 1998 Congress enacted the Copyright Term Extension Act, which extended the duration of all federal copyrights by twenty years. For works created by identified natural persons the new term runs from creation until seventy years after the author's death. For anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works made for hire the term is ninety-five years from publication or one hundred twenty years from creation, whichever expires first. The statute applied these extended terms both to copyrights already in existence and to works created after its effective date. Petitioners are individuals and businesses whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have gone into the public domain. They filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declaration that the extension of existing copyrights exceeded Congress's power under the Copyright Clause and violated the First Amendment. On cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings the district court entered judgment for the Attorney General. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. A majority of the panel upheld the statute against both challenges, while Judge Sentelle dissented in part on the Copyright Clause issue. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the extension of existing copyrights exceeds Congress's power under the Copyright Clause and whether the extension violates the First Amendment.
View caseMeredith Maxwell sought a permit to carry a handgun in public for self-defense. A local ordinance limited such permits to persons demonstrating a special need. Maxwell challenged the ordinance. The court rejected middle-level review for the Second Amendment claim and held that regulations must instead be consistent with historical tradition.
The District of Columbia generally prohibits the possession of handguns. It is a crime to carry an unregistered firearm, and the registration of handguns is prohibited. Wholly apart from that prohibition, no person may carry a handgun without a license, but the chief of police may issue licenses for one-year periods. District of Columbia law also requires residents to keep their lawfully owned firearms unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device unless they are located in a place of business or are being used for lawful recreational activities. Respondent Dick Heller is a D.C. special police officer authorized to carry a handgun while on duty at the Federal Judicial Center. He applied for a registration certificate for a handgun that he wished to keep at home, but the District refused. He thereafter filed a lawsuit in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia seeking, on Second Amendment grounds, to enjoin the city from enforcing the bar on the registration of handguns, the licensing requirement insofar as it prohibits the carrying of a firearm in the home without a license, and the trigger-lock requirement insofar as it prohibits the use of functional firearms within the home. The District Court dismissed respondent's complaint. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, construing his complaint as seeking the right to render a firearm operable and carry it about his home in that condition only when necessary for self-defense. The Court of Appeals directed the District Court to enter summary judgment for respondent. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseGender classifications and classifications based on illegitimacy receive middle-level review. The government must show that the classification serves an important objective and that the means are substantially related to that objective.
Supporting sources
Middle-level review requires an important governmental objective and a substantial relationship between means and end. Strict scrutiny demands a compelling interest and narrow tailoring. Middle-level review is less demanding and more likely to sustain a classification.
The government bears the burden of showing an important objective that is genuine rather than hypothesized and that the classification is substantially related to achieving that objective without relying on overbroad stereotypes.
Supporting sources
Yes. Content-neutral regulations of speech are subject to middle-level review. The government must demonstrate that the regulation advances important interests unrelated to the suppression of speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary.
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A gender classification can survive if the government supplies an exceedingly persuasive justification showing that the classification is substantially related to an important objective and does not rest on archaic stereotypes.
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…holding attempted by RFRA. Even assuming RFRA would be interpreted in effect to mandate some lesser test, say, one equivalent to intermediate scrutiny, the statute nevertheless would require searching judicial scrutiny of state law with the attendant likelihood of invalidation. This is a considerable congressional intrusion into the…