473 U.S. 432, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985)
In July 1980, respondent Jan Hannah purchased a building at 201 Featherston Street in Cleburne, Texas.1
Hannah intended to lease the property to Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC) for use as a group home.2
The home would house thirteen mentally retarded men and women under constant staff supervision.3
The building contained four bedrooms and two baths, and CLC planned to add a half bath while complying with all applicable state and federal regulations for an Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded.4
The site lay in an R-3 Apartment House District.5
The city's zoning ordinance permitted apartment houses, boarding houses, hospitals, and nursing homes in that district without special permission.6
However, the ordinance required a special use permit, renewable annually after a public hearing, for hospitals for the insane or feeble-minded.7
The city classified the proposed group home as a hospital for the feeble-minded and informed CLC that a permit was required.8
After a public hearing, the City Council voted three to one to deny the application.9
CLC and its prospective residents filed suit in federal district court against the city and its officials.10
They alleged that the ordinance and its application discriminated against the mentally retarded in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.11
The district court upheld the ordinance and the denial.12
It found that the council's decision was motivated by the residents' mental retardation yet rationally related to legitimate interests such as neighborhood safety and property values.13
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that mental retardation is a quasi-suspect class and that the ordinance was invalid both facially and as applied.14
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the equal protection issues raised by the zoning ordinance and its application to the proposed group home.15
Whether mental retardation constitutes a quasi-suspect classification requiring heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause?16
The Equal Protection Clause presumes legislation valid if rationally related to a legitimate state interest, with wide latitude for social and economic classifications.17 Heightened scrutiny applies to race, alienage, national origin, and gender because those factors seldom relate to legitimate interests and reflect prejudice unlikely to be rectified politically.18 Courts decline to extend heightened scrutiny to age or mental retardation where distinguishing characteristics are relevant to state interests and legislative responses demonstrate no continuing antipathy.19
No. Mental retardation involves a reduced ability to cope with everyday life that states may legitimately consider in zoning decisions.20 The history of discrimination against the mentally retarded has prompted extensive federal and state legislation that provides rights to community living and integrated education.21 That legislative response belies any presumption of continuing prejudice that would require intrusive judicial oversight.22 Therefore the classification receives only rational-basis review.23
Mental retardation does not constitute a quasi-suspect classification requiring heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.24
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Brennan And Blackmun
Justice Marshall would recognize mental retardation as a quasi-suspect classification.25 The retarded have endured a lengthy history of purposeful discrimination that includes segregation, compulsory sterilization, and categorical exclusion from public schools.26 That history parallels the worst excesses of Jim Crow.27
The retarded lack political power in the sense that requires judicial protection, and they possess an immutable characteristic unrelated to ability to participate in society.28 Classifications burdening them therefore demand searching review to ensure they substantially further important governmental interests rather than rest on stereotypes.29
Whether the city's zoning ordinance is facially invalid under the Equal Protection Clause because it requires a special use permit for group homes for the mentally retarded?30
Under rational-basis review, legislation is sustained if the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.31 The mentally retarded may be treated differently because their group characteristics are relevant to zoning concerns such as density and neighborhood compatibility.32 An ordinance requiring permits for hospitals for the feeble-minded and similar facilities is therefore not facially invalid merely because it singles out the retarded for special treatment.33
No. The ordinance's permit requirement for hospitals for the feeble-minded and similar facilities is a rational means of addressing the reduced ability of the mentally retarded to function independently.34 The requirement ensures appropriate placement consistent with the state's legitimate interest in providing for their care.35 The classification itself does not create a presumption of invidious discrimination.36
The city's zoning ordinance is not facially invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.37
Whether the city's denial of a special use permit for the proposed group home at 201 Featherston Street violated the Equal Protection Clause as applied?38
Even under rational-basis review, a classification fails if its relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.39 Government may not give effect to private biases or unsubstantiated fears when the proposed use poses no special threat to legitimate interests different from other permitted uses such as boarding houses or nursing homes.40
Yes. The denial rested on negative attitudes of nearby property owners, fears of harassment by schoolchildren, concerns about a flood plain, doubts about legal responsibility, and the number of residents.41 The district court found that identical uses by non-retarded persons would be permitted without a permit.42 The record revealed no rational basis for believing the supervised group home would pose any unique hazard to property values, safety, or neighborhood serenity.43
The city's denial of a special use permit for the proposed group home at 201 Featherston Street violated the Equal Protection Clause as applied.44
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice
Justice Stevens concurs in the judgment that the denial rests on irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded.45 The fears expressed at the hearing were based on stereotypes rather than evidence that the proposed group home would have a detrimental effect on the neighborhood.46 An impartial lawmaker could not logically believe that the classification serves a legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to the disadvantaged class.47
The ordinance withholds an important community-living benefit without justification.48 Such prejudice cannot constitute a legitimate basis for governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause.49
Joined by Justices Brennan And Blackmun
Justice Marshall concurs in the judgment that the ordinance is invalid as applied because it excludes the retarded from establishing group homes essential to community integration.50 The exclusion rests on vague generalizations and irrational fears.51 He dissents from the as-applied remedy, arguing that the overbroad presumption singling out the feeble-minded should be struck down on its face.52
The city must then enact a narrowly tailored ordinance rather than forcing future applicants to confront the same standardless discretion of local officials.53