561 U.S. 1 (2010)
In 1998 two United States citizens and six domestic organizations, including the Humanitarian Law Project, its president Ralph Fertig, Tamil physician Nagalingam Jeyalingam, and five nonprofit groups dedicated to the interests of persons of Tamil descent, filed suit in the Central District of California challenging the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §2339B.1
The plaintiffs asserted that they wished to provide support for the humanitarian and political activities of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the form of monetary contributions, other tangible aid, legal training, and political advocacy, but that they could not do so for fear of prosecution.2
The Secretary of State designated the PKK and the LTTE as foreign terrorist organizations in 1997.3 The PKK was founded in 1974 with the aim of establishing an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey.4 The LTTE was founded in 1976 for the purpose of creating an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka.5
The district court found that both groups engage in political and humanitarian activities, while the government presented evidence that both have also committed numerous terrorist attacks, some of which harmed American citizens.6 The litigation had a complicated twelve-year history. The district court initially dismissed the suit for lack of standing, but the Ninth Circuit reversed.7
After the parties cross-moved for summary judgment, the district court entered a permanent injunction in plaintiffs' favor on vagueness grounds regarding the terms "personnel" and "training."8 The Ninth Circuit affirmed.9 Further proceedings followed congressional amendments in 2001 and 2004 that added the term "service," defined "training" and "expert advice or assistance," and clarified the knowledge requirement and the scope of "personnel."10
On remand the district court consolidated the actions and granted partial relief to plaintiffs on vagueness grounds.11 The Ninth Circuit affirmed in 2009, holding that the terms "training," "expert advice or assistance," and "service" were vague as applied because they continued to cover constitutionally protected advocacy.12 The government petitioned for certiorari. Plaintiffs filed a conditional cross-petition. The Supreme Court granted both petitions in 2009.13
Whether the material-support statute should be interpreted to require proof that a defendant intended to further a foreign terrorist organization's illegal activities?14
The material-support statute, 18 U.S.C. §2339B(a)(1), makes it a federal crime to “knowingly provid[e] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.”15 Congress chose knowledge about the organization’s connection to terrorism, not specific intent to further its terrorist activities, as the necessary mental state for a violation.16 The sections immediately surrounding §2339B refer to intent to further terrorist activity, but §2339B does not.17
No. The statutory text specifically describes the type of knowledge required: knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization or has engaged in terrorist activity.18 Plaintiffs' interpretation is inconsistent with the text and would require revising the statute rather than interpreting it.19 In the established facts, the plaintiffs' proposed training and advocacy activities are subject to the knowledge requirement as written, not a specific intent requirement.20
The material-support statute should not be interpreted to require proof that a defendant intended to further a foreign terrorist organization's illegal activities.21
Whether the material-support statute, 18 U.S.C. §2339B, is unconstitutionally vague as applied to plaintiffs' proposed activities of training, expert advice or assistance, service, and personnel?22
A conviction or punishment fails to comply with due process if the statute or regulation under which it is obtained fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited.23 A statute may also be impermissibly vague if it is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.24 A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.25
No. The statutory terms at issue are clear in their application to plaintiffs' proposed conduct, which includes training the PKK on how to use international law to resolve disputes, teaching the LTTE how to petition the United Nations and other bodies for relief, and engaging in political advocacy on behalf of the PKK and LTTE.26 Plaintiffs' activities fall comfortably within the scope of the terms “training,” “expert advice or assistance,” and “service.”27 A person of ordinary intelligence would understand that the terms encompass these activities.28 Congress has increased the clarity of §2339B's terms by adding narrowing definitions, and §2339B's knowledge requirement further reduces any potential for vagueness.29
The material-support statute, 18 U.S.C. §2339B, is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to plaintiffs' proposed activities of training, expert advice or assistance, service, and personnel.30
Whether the material-support statute violates the First Amendment freedom of speech as applied to plaintiffs' proposed activities?31
The First Amendment does not prohibit Congress from imposing restrictions on material support to designated foreign terrorist organizations.32 The Government has a compelling interest in prohibiting material support to such organizations.33 That interest is especially strong in the context of preventing terrorism.34 The statute is carefully drawn to cover only material support, and not pure speech or association.35 The statute does not prohibit independent advocacy.36 It prohibits coordinated support to designated groups.37
No. The Government's interest in combating terrorism is an urgent objective of the highest order.38 Whether foreign terrorist organizations meaningfully segregate support of their legitimate activities from support of terrorism is an empirical question.39 Congress rejected plaintiffs' position on that question when it enacted §2339B, finding that foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.40 The record confirms that Congress was justified in rejecting plaintiffs' view.41
The PKK and the LTTE are deadly groups.42 It is not difficult to conclude, as Congress did, that the taint of their violent activities is so great that working in coordination with them or at their command legitimizes and furthers their terrorist means.43 Material support meant to promote peaceable, lawful conduct can be diverted to advance terrorism in multiple ways.44 The record shows that designated foreign terrorist organizations do not maintain organizational firewalls between social, political, and terrorist operations, or financial firewalls between funds raised for humanitarian activities and those used to carry out terrorist attacks.45
The material-support statute does not violate the First Amendment freedom of speech as applied to plaintiffs' proposed activities.46
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Ginsburg And Justice Sotomayor
Justice Breyer dissents, arguing that the Court today upholds a criminal statute that violates the First Amendment.47 The statute prohibits the provision of material support or resources to the PKK and the LTTE, which have been designated as terrorist organizations.48 The plaintiffs wish to provide support to such organizations in the form of legal advice and training on how to use lawful, peaceful means to achieve their goals.49
In his view, the statute as applied to plaintiffs violates the First Amendment's free speech and free association guarantees.50 The Government has not shown that the speech and association at issue pose a sufficient threat of harm to justify the statute's application.51 The activities proposed by plaintiffs are entirely lawful and peaceful.52 They involve advocacy for human rights and the use of international legal mechanisms to resolve disputes.53 The Government has not demonstrated that such activities will materially aid the unlawful activities of the designated groups.54 The statute, as interpreted by the Court, sweeps too broadly. It criminalizes speech and association that should be protected under the First Amendment.55 He would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.56
Whether the material-support statute violates the First Amendment freedom of association as applied to plaintiffs' proposed activities?57
The material-support statute does not penalize mere association with a foreign terrorist organization but prohibits the act of giving foreign terrorist groups material support. Any burden on freedom of association caused by preventing support to designated foreign terrorist organizations, but not other groups, is justified for the same reasons that apply to the free speech challenge.58
No. The statute does not prohibit being a member of one of the designated groups or vigorously promoting and supporting the political goals of the group.59 What §2339B prohibits is the act of giving material support.60 Plaintiffs want to do the latter.61 Any burden on plaintiffs' freedom of association in this regard is justified for the same reasons that the Court rejects their free speech challenge.62
It would be strange if the Constitution permitted Congress to prohibit the forms of speech that constitute material support, but did not permit Congress to prohibit that support only to particularly dangerous and lawless foreign organizations.63
The material-support statute does not violate the First Amendment freedom of association as applied to plaintiffs' proposed activities.64
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Ginsburg And Justice Sotomayor
Justice Breyer dissents from the Court's rejection of the freedom of association claim.65 He argues that the statute as applied to plaintiffs violates the First Amendment's free association guarantees.66 The Government has not shown that the association at issue poses a sufficient threat of harm to justify the statute's application.67
The activities proposed by plaintiffs are entirely lawful and peaceful. They involve advocacy for human rights.68 The Government has not demonstrated that such activities will materially aid the unlawful activities of the designated groups.
The statute sweeps too broadly by criminalizing protected association.69 He would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.