Also known as: least-restrictive · least restrictive means · least restrictive alternative · LRA
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A constitutional standard requiring that a law burdening a fundamental right or classifying on the basis of a suspect trait advance a compelling governmental interest through the least intrusive effective means available.
A federal statute requires commercial websites to verify users are adults before displaying sexually explicit material and imposes criminal penalties for noncompliance. Parents can install filters on home computers to block such content. A court invalidates the statute because the government did not prove that filters would fail to protect minors as effectively.
A state denies unemployment benefits to a worker who quits after her employer schedules her for Saturday shifts that conflict with her religious observance. The worker shows the denial burdens her sincere religious practice. A court holds the state must grant an exemption because no compelling interest justifies refusing the accommodation.
A city ordinance prohibits ritual animal sacrifice while permitting other forms of animal slaughter for food. A religious group whose practices require the banned rituals challenges the law. A court strikes down the ordinance because the city failed to show that a total prohibition is necessary to advance its stated public-health goals.
In April 1987 the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation organized under Florida law in 1973 whose president is Ernesto Pichardo, leased land in Hialeah, Florida, and announced plans to build a house of worship, school, cultural center, and museum at which members would practice Santeria. Santeria originated in nineteenth-century Cuba as a fusion of Yoruba traditions and Roman Catholicism. It centers on animal sacrifice performed by cutting the carotid arteries, after which the animals are usually cooked and eaten except in healing and death rituals. The announcement prompted the Hialeah City Council to convene an emergency public session on June 9, 1987. At that session residents and council members voiced strong opposition to Santeria practices. The council then adopted Resolution 87-66 declaring opposition to religious acts inconsistent with public morals, peace, or safety and passed Ordinance 87-40 incorporating Florida's animal-cruelty statute that criminalizes unnecessary or cruel killing of animals. After the Florida attorney general issued an opinion that ritual animal sacrifice other than for food consumption violated state law, the council in August 1987 adopted Resolution 87-90 opposing ritual animal sacrifice. In September 1987 the council enacted three further ordinances. Ordinance 87-52 barred possession of animals with intent to use them for ritual sacrifice except by licensed food establishments. Ordinance 87-71 directly prohibited any person from sacrificing an animal within city limits. Ordinance 87-72 restricted slaughter of animals to properly zoned slaughterhouse premises while exempting small-scale commercial hog and cattle operations. The Church and Pichardo filed suit against the city and its officials in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They alleged that the ordinances violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. After granting summary judgment to the individual defendants on immunity grounds, the district court conducted a nine-day bench trial on the remaining claims and entered judgment for the city. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA city denies a special-use permit for a proposed group home for people with intellectual disabilities while granting permits for comparable facilities such as nursing homes. The applicant demonstrates the denial rests on irrational fears rather than legitimate concerns. A court orders issuance of the permit because the city cannot justify the differential treatment under equal-protection standards.
In July 1980, respondent Jan Hannah purchased a building at 201 Featherston Street in Cleburne, Texas. Hannah intended to lease the property to Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC) for use as a group home. The home would house thirteen mentally retarded men and women under constant staff supervision. The building contained four bedrooms and two baths, and CLC planned to add a half bath while complying with all applicable state and federal regulations for an Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded. The site lay in an R-3 Apartment House District. The city's zoning ordinance permitted apartment houses, boarding houses, hospitals, and nursing homes in that district without special permission. However, the ordinance required a special use permit, renewable annually after a public hearing, for hospitals for the insane or feeble-minded. The city classified the proposed group home as a hospital for the feeble-minded and informed CLC that a permit was required. After a public hearing, the City Council voted three to one to deny the application. CLC and its prospective residents filed suit in federal district court against the city and its officials. They alleged that the ordinance and its application discriminated against the mentally retarded in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court upheld the ordinance and the denial. It found that the council's decision was motivated by the residents' mental retardation yet rationally related to legitimate interests such as neighborhood safety and property values. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that mental retardation is a quasi-suspect class and that the ordinance was invalid both facially and as applied. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the equal protection issues raised by the zoning ordinance and its application to the proposed group home.
View caseA city refuses a building permit to enlarge a church because the proposed expansion would violate a recently enacted historic-preservation ordinance. The church shows the ordinance was enacted after the city learned of the expansion plans. A court finds the application of the ordinance violates applicable standards because less burdensome alternatives exist to preserve historic character.
St. Peter Catholic Church was built in 1923 in Boerne, Texas. Its structure replicates the mission style of the region's earlier history. The church seats about 230 worshippers, a number too small for its growing parish. Some 40 to 60 parishioners cannot be accommodated at some Sunday masses. To meet the needs of the congregation, the Archbishop of San Antonio gave permission to the parish to plan alterations to enlarge the building. A few months later, the Boerne City Council passed an ordinance authorizing the city's Historic Landmark Commission to prepare a preservation plan with proposed historic landmarks and districts. Under the ordinance, the commission must preapprove construction affecting historic landmarks or buildings in a historic district. Soon afterwards, the Archbishop applied for a building permit so construction to enlarge the church could proceed. City authorities, relying on the ordinance and the designation of a historic district which they argued included the church, denied the application. The Archbishop brought this suit challenging the permit denial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The complaint contained multiple claims, but to this point the litigation has centered on RFRA and the question of its constitutionality. The District Court concluded that by enacting RFRA Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court certified its order for interlocutory appeal and the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding RFRA to be constitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and now reverses. Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith. RFRA prohibits government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. Unless the government can demonstrate that the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, it must also show that the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The Act applies to all federal and state law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the enactment of RFRA.
View caseFederal law requires disclosure of contributors to minor political parties even when those parties demonstrate a reasonable probability of harassment. The parties argue that disclosure chills participation. A court upholds the requirement because disclosure serves the governmental interest without imposing unnecessary burdens.
The least restrictive means test applies only when a law is subject to strict scrutiny because it burdens a fundamental right or classifies on the basis of a suspect trait. Content-neutral regulations receive intermediate scrutiny and need only avoid burdening substantially more speech than necessary.
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No. The government must show that available alternatives would be ineffective at achieving the compelling interest. The existence of a less burdensome option is not enough if that option would leave the interest unprotected.
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Under RLUIPA a prison regulation that substantially burdens religious exercise must be the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. This statutory standard is stricter than the constitutional baseline applied to free-exercise claims after Smith.
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No. Commercial-speech regulations need only a reasonable fit between the substantial interest and the means chosen. The government is not required to adopt the least restrictive means.
…objector “is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest,” Lee, supra , at 257-258, or represents “the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest,” Thomas, supra , at 718. See, e. g., Braunfeld, supra , at 607; Sherbert, supra , at 406; Yoder, supra , at 214-215; Roy , 476 U. S., at…