508 U.S. 520, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1993)
In April 1987 the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation organized under Florida law in 1973 whose president is Ernesto Pichardo, leased land in Hialeah, Florida, and announced plans to build a house of worship, school, cultural center, and museum at which members would practice Santeria.1
Santeria originated in nineteenth-century Cuba as a fusion of Yoruba traditions and Roman Catholicism.2 It centers on animal sacrifice performed by cutting the carotid arteries, after which the animals are usually cooked and eaten except in healing and death rituals.3 The announcement prompted the Hialeah City Council to convene an emergency public session on June 9, 1987.4
At that session residents and council members voiced strong opposition to Santeria practices.5 The council then adopted Resolution 87-66 declaring opposition to religious acts inconsistent with public morals, peace, or safety and passed Ordinance 87-40 incorporating Florida's animal-cruelty statute that criminalizes unnecessary or cruel killing of animals.6
After the Florida attorney general issued an opinion that ritual animal sacrifice other than for food consumption violated state law, the council in August 1987 adopted Resolution 87-90 opposing ritual animal sacrifice.7 In September 1987 the council enacted three further ordinances.8 Ordinance 87-52 barred possession of animals with intent to use them for ritual sacrifice except by licensed food establishments.9 Ordinance 87-71 directly prohibited any person from sacrificing an animal within city limits.10 Ordinance 87-72 restricted slaughter of animals to properly zoned slaughterhouse premises while exempting small-scale commercial hog and cattle operations.11
The Church and Pichardo filed suit against the city and its officials in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.12 They alleged that the ordinances violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause.13 After granting summary judgment to the individual defendants on immunity grounds, the district court conducted a nine-day bench trial on the remaining claims and entered judgment for the city.14 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion.15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.16
Whether the City of Hialeah's ordinances prohibiting animal sacrifice violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?17
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids laws that discriminate against religious beliefs or regulate conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons.18 A law failing neutrality or general applicability must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored to advance that interest.19
Yes. The ordinances were enacted after the Church announced plans to practice Santeria in Hialeah.20 Council members and officials expressed animus toward the religion during the emergency session.21 The ordinances defined sacrifice and imposed possession and zoning restrictions that singled out religious ritual killings while exempting secular ones such as food slaughter and pest control.22
The ordinances violate the Free Exercise Clause because they are not neutral or generally applicable and fail strict scrutiny.23
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice O'connor
Justice Blackmun joined the opinion of the Court except as to Part II.24 He emphasized that the ordinances were enacted with the purpose of suppressing the Santeria religion.25 This is shown by the emergency public session held in direct response to the Church's announcement, the hostile and derogatory remarks made by council members and residents, and admissions by the city attorney and animal control officer that the goal was to prevent the Church from opening in the city.26
He would hold the ordinances subject to strict scrutiny on that basis alone because they single out religious conduct for discriminatory treatment while permitting analogous secular conduct.27 The ordinances are therefore invalid under the Free Exercise Clause.28
Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
Justice Scalia joined Parts I, II, III, and IV of the Court's opinion.29 He agreed that the ordinances at issue here are not neutral and not of general applicability.30 He wrote separately to express his view that the test for neutrality and general applicability set forth in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990), is the correct test for evaluating laws that burden religious practices.31
The Smith test requires that a law burdening religious practice must be neutral and of general applicability.32 If the law is not neutral or not of general applicability, it must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored to advance that interest.33 He rejected any distinction for hybrid claims involving both free exercise and other constitutional rights.34 He noted that the ordinances fail even under that framework because they target Santeria through purpose and underinclusion.35
Justice Souter joined Parts I, II, III, and IV of the Court's opinion.36 He agreed that the ordinances at issue here violate the Free Exercise Clause because they are not neutral and not of general applicability.37 He wrote separately to express his view that the compelling interest test should be applied in all cases in which a law burdens religious practice.38
He criticized the Smith test as inconsistent with the text, history, and tradition of the Free Exercise Clause.39 He stated that the ordinances fail strict scrutiny on the facts because the city has not demonstrated a compelling interest in prohibiting the Church's practices and the ordinances are not narrowly tailored.40
Whether the ordinances are neutral and of general applicability?41
A law lacks neutrality if its object is to suppress religious conduct.42 This may be shown by text, operation, legislative history, and statements of officials.43 A law lacks general applicability if it imposes burdens only on religious conduct while exempting substantial comparable secular conduct.44
No. The ordinances use terms like sacrifice and ritual in ways that target Santeria.45 Their operation prohibits almost exclusively religious animal killings while exempting food, sport, pest control, and small commercial slaughter.46 The record of the June 1987 emergency session and subsequent resolutions reveals the city's object was to prevent the Church from practicing its faith.47
The ordinances are neither neutral nor generally applicable.48
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
Justice Scalia agreed the ordinances are not neutral because they were enacted with the purpose of suppressing Santeria.49 They are not generally applicable due to numerous secular exceptions.50 He stressed that the Smith test requires only formal neutrality and general applicability as conditions for avoiding strict scrutiny.51
Subjective legislative motive is not the proper inquiry under the First Amendment because the Clause prohibits laws that have the effect of singling out religious practice for special burdens.52
Justice Souter agreed the ordinances fail neutrality and general applicability on the facts of targeted enactment and underinclusion.53 He argued that the Clause requires substantive neutrality that would demand exemptions even from formally neutral laws when they burden religious exercise.54 The present case illustrates the need to reexamine Smith in a future appropriate case because the tension in free-exercise jurisprudence should be resolved when squarely presented.55
The ordinances burden religious practice through purpose and underinclusion, confirming they are not neutral or generally applicable under any definition of those terms.56
Whether the ordinances advance interests of the highest order and are narrowly tailored if they fail neutrality or general applicability?57
When a law is not neutral or generally applicable it must advance interests of the highest order and be narrowly tailored.58 Underinclusion that leaves substantial secular conduct unregulated while prohibiting religious conduct shows the asserted interests are not compelling and the means are not the least restrictive.59
No. The city's interests in public health and preventing animal cruelty are not compelling.60 The ordinances permit equivalent or greater risks from uninspected food slaughter, hunting, euthanasia, and restaurant waste while banning only religious sacrifice.61 Narrower regulations on disposal or humane methods would achieve the interests without prohibiting the central Santeria practice.62
The ordinances do not advance compelling interests through narrowly tailored means and therefore fail strict scrutiny.63
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice O'connor
Justice Blackmun would hold that any law targeting religious practice ipso facto fails strict scrutiny because it is not precisely tailored to a compelling interest.64 The ordinances here are both overinclusive and underinclusive relative to the asserted interests in health and animal welfare.65 This confirms they cannot survive even under the majority's formulation because a law that discriminates against religion as such automatically fails strict scrutiny under Sherbert v. Verner.66
The underinclusion demonstrates that the asserted interests are not pursued with genuine commitment when secular conduct poses comparable or greater risks.67