424 U.S. 1 (1976)
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in 1974, limits individual contributions to any single candidate to $1,000 per election with an overall annual limit of $25,000 per contributor, caps independent expenditures relative to a clearly identified candidate at $1,000 per year, imposes overall spending ceilings on candidates and political parties for federal campaigns, requires political committees and candidates to register and file detailed quarterly reports disclosing contributions above $10 and $100 thresholds along with expenditures, establishes the Federal Election Commission to administer and enforce the statute, and creates a system of public funding for presidential nominating conventions, primary campaigns, and general elections through taxpayer checkoffs under Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code.1
Plaintiffs who filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia included a candidate for the Presidency, a United States Senator seeking re-election, a potential contributor, the Committee for a Constitutional Presidency—McCarthy '76, the Conservative Party of the State of New York, the Mississippi Republican Party, the Libertarian Party, the New York Civil Liberties Union, Inc., the American Conservative Union, the Conservative Victory Fund, and Human Events, Inc.2
The defendants were the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives in their official capacities as ex officio members of the Commission, the Commission itself, the Attorney General, and the Comptroller General.3 Jurisdiction was invoked under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 2201, and 2202 and section 315(a) of the Act, 2 U.S.C. § 437h(a) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the major provisions.4
The district judge denied a three-judge court and transmitted the case to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which entered an order deeming the case preliminarily certified under the special review provision.5 The Court of Appeals remanded the case en banc to the district court to identify constitutional issues, take additional evidence, make findings of fact, and certify questions back to the court of appeals.6 On remand the district judge adopted extensive findings of fact and returned the augmented record.7 The court of appeals then sustained the legislation in large part, finding a clear and compelling interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process.8 The Supreme Court granted review on the certified constitutional questions arising from the Court of Appeals decision.9
Whether the contribution limitations imposed by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in 1974, violate the First Amendment?10
Contribution limitations impose only marginal restrictions on the contributor's ability to engage in free communication.11 A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support.12 Such limits are closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms when justified by the substantial governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption.13
No. The $1,000 per candidate and $25,000 annual aggregate ceilings in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 as amended in 1974, applied to the plaintiffs including a presidential candidate, a senator seeking re-election, and minor-party organizations such as the Libertarian Party and the Conservative Party of the State of New York, serve the governmental interest in preventing actual and apparent quid pro quo arrangements without preventing candidates from amassing resources necessary for effective advocacy, as the ceilings require only that funds be raised from a greater number of persons.14
The contribution limitations do not violate the First Amendment.15
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Justice White concurred in the approval of the contribution limitations.16 He viewed them as a reasonable means of preventing corruption spawned by large financial contributions.17 The ceilings also serve to equalize the relative ability of all voters to affect electoral outcomes by muting the voices of affluent persons.18
This approach avoids the dangers of large contributions without unduly burdening protected speech because the limits leave ample room for independent expression and volunteering.19 He stressed that the expenditure limitations are a reasonable means of preventing corruption and equalizing the relative ability of all voters to affect electoral outcomes while the contribution limits achieve similar goals with less intrusion on speech.20
Justice Rehnquist dissented from the approval of the contribution limitations.21 He concluded that the ceilings chill protected First Amendment activity.2223 The provisions are not narrowly tailored to serve the asserted governmental interests in preventing corruption.24
He stressed that the ceilings chill protected First Amendment activity and are not narrowly tailored to serve the asserted governmental interests in preventing corruption.25 The limits operate as a direct restriction on the ability of citizens to associate with candidates of their choice through financial support.26
Whether the expenditure limitations imposed by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in 1974, violate the First Amendment?27
Expenditure limitations impose direct and substantial restraints on the quantity of political speech.28 They restrict the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.29 Virtually every means of communicating ideas in modern society requires the expenditure of money.30 Such limits cannot be sustained under the exacting scrutiny applicable to core First Amendment rights of political expression.31
Yes. The $1,000 independent expenditure ceiling relative to a clearly identified candidate, the limits on a candidate's personal expenditures from family resources, and the overall campaign expenditure ceilings in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 as amended in 1974, applied to the plaintiffs including Human Events, Inc., the American Conservative Union, and candidates for federal office, place substantial and direct restrictions on protected political expression that the governmental interests in preventing corruption and equalizing resources cannot justify.32
The expenditure limitations violate the First Amendment.33
Related opinions on this issue
Justice White dissented from the invalidation of the expenditure ceilings.34 He concluded that they constitute a reasonable means of preventing corruption.3536 The ceilings also serve to equalize the relative ability of all voters to affect electoral outcomes.37
This approach addresses the dangers of unlimited spending in federal campaigns.38 He emphasized that the expenditure limitations are a reasonable means of preventing corruption and equalizing the relative ability of all voters to affect electoral outcomes while the contribution limits achieve similar goals with less intrusion on speech.39
Justice Rehnquist joined the invalidation of the expenditure ceilings.40 He concluded that the ceilings chill protected First Amendment activity.41 The provisions are not narrowly tailored to serve the asserted governmental interests in preventing corruption. He stressed that the ceilings chill protected First Amendment activity and are not narrowly tailored to serve the asserted governmental interests in preventing corruption.
Whether the disclosure and reporting requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in 1974, violate the First Amendment?42
Disclosure and reporting requirements, though they may impinge on privacy of association and belief, survive exacting scrutiny when there is a substantial relation between the governmental interests in informing the electorate, deterring corruption, and detecting violations and the information required to be disclosed.43 The requirements are not overbroad as applied to minor parties absent a showing of harassment.44
No. The registration, recordkeeping, and quarterly reporting provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 as amended in 1974, requiring disclosure of contributions above the $10 and $100 thresholds and expenditures by political committees and candidates including the New York Civil Liberties Union and the Mississippi Republican Party, directly serve the substantial governmental interests in providing information to voters and enforcing contribution limits without a showing on this record of the focused harassment present in NAACP v. Alabama.45
The disclosure and reporting requirements do not violate the First Amendment.46
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Burger dissented from the approval of the disclosure requirements as applied to small contributions.47 He concluded that the low thresholds of $10 and $100 are irrationally low.4849 The thresholds deter participation by rank-and-file citizens.50
They lack any relation to the goal of preventing corruption.51 The burdens on associational privacy outweigh the minimal public interest served by disclosure of such modest amounts.52 He emphasized that the disclosure scheme is impermissibly broad and violative of the First Amendment as it relates to reporting contributions in excess of $10 and $100.53
Justice Rehnquist dissented from the approval of the disclosure requirements.54 He concluded that they chill protected First Amendment activity.5556 The provisions are not narrowly tailored to serve the asserted governmental interests.57
The requirements impose substantial burdens on minor parties and independent candidates without adequate justification.58 He stressed that the ceilings chill protected First Amendment activity and are not narrowly tailored to serve the asserted governmental interests in preventing corruption.
Whether the public financing provisions for presidential campaigns in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in 1974, are consistent with the Constitution?59
Public financing of presidential campaigns is a valid exercise of congressional power under the General Welfare Clause.60 It does not violate the First Amendment when it facilitates communication by candidates with the electorate and frees candidates from the rigors of fundraising.61 It does not invidiously discriminate under the Fifth Amendment when eligibility formulae are based on demonstrated public support and are less burdensome than ballot-access restrictions.62
Yes. The system of public funding for presidential nominating conventions, primary campaigns, and general elections through taxpayer checkoffs under Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 as amended in 1974, applied to major-party, minor-party, and new-party candidates including the Committee for a Constitutional Presidency—McCarthy '76, provides matching funds and entitlements based on prior vote totals or demonstrated support without preventing any candidate from appearing on the ballot or any voter from casting a ballot.63
The public financing provisions are consistent with the Constitution.64
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun dissented in part from the upholding of the public financing provisions.65 He concluded that they discriminate against minor parties and independent candidates.6667 The eligibility formulae and funding levels violate the First and Fifth Amendments.68
The scheme disadvantages candidates who lack major-party support without sufficient justification.69 He emphasized that these provisions discriminate against minor parties and independent candidates in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments.70
Chief Justice Burger dissented from the approval of the public financing provisions.71 He concluded that they constitute an impermissible intrusion by the Government into the traditionally private political process.7273 The scheme interferes with the voluntary associations that have long characterized American elections.74
It substitutes public funding for private choice in ways that distort the electoral marketplace.75 He emphasized that the system for public financing of Presidential campaigns is an impermissible intrusion by the Government into the traditionally private political process.76
Whether the method of appointing members to the Federal Election Commission under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in 1974, violates the Appointments Clause?77
Officers of the United States who exercise significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States must be appointed in the manner prescribed by the Appointments Clause.78 Congress may not vest the appointment of such officers in itself or its officers because the Clause by clear implication prohibits Congress from appointing officers who execute the laws.79
Yes. The method of appointing the six voting members of the Federal Election Commission under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 as amended in 1974, with two appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate upon recommendations of party leaders, two by the Speaker of the House upon recommendations of party leaders, and two by the President subject to confirmation by both Houses, violates the Appointments Clause because the Commission exercises rulemaking, enforcement, and civil litigation powers that can be performed only by Officers of the United States appointed by the President with Senate confirmation or by heads of departments or courts of law.80
The method of appointing members to the Federal Election Commission violates the Appointments Clause.81