Also known as: laws of general applicability · generally applicable law · generally applicable laws · neutral law of general applicability
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A statute or regulation that applies uniformly to all persons or conduct within its scope without regard to religious motivation.
Logan Lane was fired from his job after ingesting peyote during a religious ceremony. State officials denied his unemployment claim under a criminal prohibition that applied to every resident regardless of faith. The denial stood because the prohibition operated as a law of general applicability.
Lucas purchased beachfront lots intending to build homes. A state statute later barred all construction on the parcels to protect the shoreline. The statute applied equally to every owner and therefore qualified as a law of general applicability.
In 1986, petitioner David H. Lucas purchased two residential lots on the Isle of Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina, for $975,000. He intended to construct single-family homes on the parcels, which at the time were zoned for such use and required no building permit for development. No portion of the lots qualified as a critical area under then-existing coastal zone legislation. Subsequently, in 1988, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act. The legislation established a baseline and prohibited construction of occupable improvements seaward of a line drawn 20 feet landward of that baseline, directly affecting Lucas's parcels by barring any permanent habitable structures. Lucas filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas alleging that the Act's restrictions effected a taking of his property without just compensation. Following a bench trial, the court determined that the prohibition rendered the lots valueless and ordered the state to pay just compensation in the amount of $1,232,387.50. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the trial court's judgment. It accepted the legislature's findings that new construction threatened public resources and concluded that a regulation designed to prevent serious public harm could not constitute a taking. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision.
View caseA city denied a permit to expand a church building under a zoning ordinance that limited all structures in the historic district. The ordinance contained no religious carve-outs and applied to every property owner alike.
St. Peter Catholic Church was built in 1923 in Boerne, Texas. Its structure replicates the mission style of the region's earlier history. The church seats about 230 worshippers, a number too small for its growing parish. Some 40 to 60 parishioners cannot be accommodated at some Sunday masses. To meet the needs of the congregation, the Archbishop of San Antonio gave permission to the parish to plan alterations to enlarge the building. A few months later, the Boerne City Council passed an ordinance authorizing the city's Historic Landmark Commission to prepare a preservation plan with proposed historic landmarks and districts. Under the ordinance, the commission must preapprove construction affecting historic landmarks or buildings in a historic district. Soon afterwards, the Archbishop applied for a building permit so construction to enlarge the church could proceed. City authorities, relying on the ordinance and the designation of a historic district which they argued included the church, denied the application. The Archbishop brought this suit challenging the permit denial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The complaint contained multiple claims, but to this point the litigation has centered on RFRA and the question of its constitutionality. The District Court concluded that by enacting RFRA Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court certified its order for interlocutory appeal and the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding RFRA to be constitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and now reverses. Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith. RFRA prohibits government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. Unless the government can demonstrate that the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, it must also show that the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The Act applies to all federal and state law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the enactment of RFRA.
View caseFederal law required local sheriffs to perform background checks before handgun sales. The requirement bound every sheriff in every state without exception for local officials.
In 1993 Congress amended the Gun Control Act of 1968 by enacting the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which directed the Attorney General to create a national instant background-check system by November 30, 1998, and imposed interim requirements on firearms dealers and chief law enforcement officers until that system became operational. Under the interim scheme a dealer proposing to transfer a handgun had to obtain a sworn Brady Form from the purchaser, verify the purchaser's identity, forward notice and a copy of the form to the CLEO of the purchaser's residence, and wait five business days before completing the sale unless the CLEO notified the dealer that the transfer would not violate the law. Jay Printz, CLEO for Ravalli County, Montana, and Richard Mack, CLEO for Graham County, Arizona, filed separate federal actions challenging the constitutionality of the interim provisions that required CLEOs to perform background checks and related tasks. In each case the district court held that the obligation imposed on CLEOs was unconstitutional but severable from the remainder of the Act, leaving in place a voluntary background-check system. The Ninth Circuit consolidated the appeals and reversed, holding that none of the Brady Act's interim provisions violated the Constitution. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseState law required appointed counsel for every indigent defendant on a first appeal. The rule applied across all criminal cases without regard to the defendant's religious beliefs.
Bennie Will Meyes and William Douglas were jointly tried and convicted in a California court on an information charging them with thirteen felonies including robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and assault with intent to commit murder. A single public defender was appointed to represent both men. The defender moved for a continuance at the start of trial, citing the complexity of the case, his daily handling of different defenses, and a conflict of interest between the defendants. The motion was denied. The defendants dismissed the defender and renewed their motions for separate counsel and a continuance, but these requests were also denied. A jury convicted both defendants on all thirteen counts, and each received a prison term. Meyes and Douglas appealed as of right to the California District Court of Appeal. That court affirmed their convictions. They then petitioned the California Supreme Court for further review, but the petitions were denied without a hearing. The defendants requested the assistance of counsel on appeal to the District Court of Appeal. The court denied their requests after reviewing the record and concluding that appointment of counsel would serve no useful purpose. The defendants were indigent at the time of these requests. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the case.
View caseA statute prohibited disclosure of illegally intercepted communications by any person who obtained them. The prohibition reached every broadcaster and publisher without regard to the content's religious character.
In the fall of 1992 and spring of 1993 the Pennsylvania State Education Association engaged in collective-bargaining negotiations with the Wyoming Valley West School District board. Petitioner Anthony Kane was president of the local union. Petitioner Gloria Bartnicki served as the union's chief negotiator and a teacher in the district. On the evening of May 15, 1993, Bartnicki used a cellular telephone in her car to call Kane. During the conversation they discussed the status of the negotiations, the possibility of a strike, and the board's offer of a three-percent raise. Kane suggested that if the board did not increase its offer the union should reject it and go on strike. He made statements about blowing off front porches and doing work on some of the board members. Bartnicki responded that they would have to do some nasty things. An unidentified person intercepted and recorded the cellular telephone conversation using an electronic device. The unknown interceptor gave the tape to respondent Jack Yocum, president of a local taxpayers' organization that had been critical of the union's demands. Yocum in turn gave the tape to respondent Frederick W. Vopper, a radio talk show host operating in the area. On May 31, 1993, Vopper played the tape of the intercepted conversation on his public affairs talk show. He played the tape again on August 23, 1993, during a news broadcast on a local television station. The same day the Wilkes-Barre Times Leader published a transcript of a portion of the tape. Bartnicki and Kane filed suit against Vopper, Yocum, and other media defendants seeking damages under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act. After discovery the District Court granted the petitioners' motion for summary judgment as to liability. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA law loses general applicability when it contains a system of individualized exemptions that officials may grant for secular reasons but withhold for religious ones. Once such discretion exists, the government must satisfy strict scrutiny before denying a religious exemption.
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No. A medical exemption addresses objective physical risks rather than personal belief and therefore does not necessarily render the rule non-general. The key inquiry remains whether the exemption mechanism allows case-by-case secular relief while denying comparable religious relief.
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The Free Exercise Clause does not require an exemption. The government may enforce the rule against religious objectors so long as the rule remains neutral on its face and generally applicable in operation.
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Discretionary exemptions convert the policy into one that is not generally applicable. Strict scrutiny then applies, requiring the government to show a compelling interest pursued through the least restrictive means.
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…consistently held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a “valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).” United States v. Lee , 455 U. S. 252, 263, n. 3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring…