372 U.S. 353 (1963)
Bennie Will Meyes and William Douglas were jointly tried and convicted in a California court on an information charging them with thirteen felonies including robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and assault with intent to commit murder.1 A single public defender was appointed to represent both men.2 The defender moved for a continuance at the start of trial, citing the complexity of the case, his daily handling of different defenses, and a conflict of interest between the defendants.3 The motion was denied.4 The defendants dismissed the defender and renewed their motions for separate counsel and a continuance, but these requests were also denied.5 A jury convicted both defendants on all thirteen counts, and each received a prison term.6
Meyes and Douglas appealed as of right to the California District Court of Appeal.7 That court affirmed their convictions.8 They then petitioned the California Supreme Court for further review, but the petitions were denied without a hearing.9
The defendants requested the assistance of counsel on appeal to the District Court of Appeal.10 The court denied their requests after reviewing the record and concluding that appointment of counsel would serve no useful purpose.11 The defendants were indigent at the time of these requests.12
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the case.13
Whether a state may deny appointed counsel to an indigent defendant on his first appeal as of right from a criminal conviction after an independent examination of the record determines that counsel would be of no value to the defendant or the court?14
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that an indigent defendant receive the assistance of counsel on his first appeal as of right from a criminal conviction.15 This is because the kind of appeal a person is afforded cannot constitutionally hinge upon ability to pay for counsel.16
No. Bennie Will Meyes and William Douglas were indigent defendants convicted of thirteen felonies.17 They requested appointed counsel for their first appeal as of right to the California District Court of Appeal.18 The court denied the request after reviewing the record and concluding that appointment of counsel would serve no useful purpose.19 This forced the defendants to proceed without the benefit of briefs or argument that a non-indigent appellant would receive.20
The procedure thereby drew an unconstitutional line between rich and poor.21
A state may not deny appointed counsel to an indigent defendant on his first appeal as of right, after an independent examination of the record determines that counsel would be of no value to the defendant or the court.22
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Clark dissented on the ground that Griffin v. Illinois addressed only the obligation to furnish a record and did not control appointment of counsel on appeal.23 He emphasized that California had provided a procedure requiring appellate courts to make an independent investigation of the record and to appoint counsel only when it would be advantageous to the defendant or helpful to the court.24 Clark noted that the overwhelming percentage of in forma pauperis appeals are frivolous and that appointing counsel in every case would impose an intolerable burden, rendering the majority's requirement an unnecessary and wasteful gesture.25
Joined by Justice Stewart
Justice Harlan dissented on the ground that the Equal Protection Clause is not apposite because the state does not discriminate between rich and poor as such but instead classifies cases according to whether they have merit.26 He argued that the case should be judged solely under the Due Process Clause and that California's screening procedure, which guarantees a full appeal on the merits with a statement of reasons even when counsel is denied, provides adequate appellate review.27 Harlan further observed that the procedure resembles the screening of certiorari petitions in the Supreme Court itself and that the Constitution does not require appointment of counsel for every indigent appellant.28