Also known as: impeachment informations · impeachment evidence · Giglio material
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Evidence offered to undermine a witness's credibility at trial. Such evidence includes proof of bias, prior convictions, or inconsistent statements and must be disclosed when material to guilt or punishment under due process standards.
Iris Irons testified for the prosecution in a fraud trial. Defense counsel cross-examined her about membership in a professional group whose internal guidelines encouraged members to shield clients from liability findings. The trial court allowed the questions because evidence of bias is always relevant to credibility.
Isabella Ingram faced trial on drug charges. After the court denied her motion to exclude a prior conviction, she elicited the conviction herself on direct examination to reduce its impact. On appeal she could not challenge the ruling because she had introduced the evidence preemptively.
Isaiah Ishikawa negotiated a plea agreement in a conspiracy case. Prosecutors withheld information that could have impeached a key government witness. The court upheld the plea because the Constitution does not require disclosure of impeachment information before a defendant enters a guilty plea.
After immigration agents found 30 kilograms of marijuana in Angela Ruiz's luggage, federal prosecutors offered her what is known in the Southern District of California as a "fast track" plea bargain. That bargain—standard in that district—asks a defendant to waive indictment, trial, and an appeal. In return, the Government agrees to recommend to the sentencing judge a two-level departure downward from the otherwise applicable United States Sentencing Guidelines sentence. In Ruiz's case, a two-level departure downward would have shortened the ordinary Guidelines-specified 18-to-24-month sentencing range by 6 months, to 12-to-18 months. The prosecutors' proposed plea agreement contains a set of detailed terms. Among other things, it specifies that "any [known] information establishing the factual innocence of the defendant" "has been turned over to the defendant," and it acknowledges the Government's "continuing duty to provide such information." At the same time, it requires that the defendant "waiv[e] the right" to receive "impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses." The agreement also requires waiver of the right to receive information supporting any affirmative defense the defendant raises if the case goes to trial. Because Ruiz would not agree to this last-mentioned waiver, the prosecutors withdrew their bargaining offer. The Government then indicted Ruiz for unlawful drug possession. And despite the absence of any agreement, Ruiz ultimately pleaded guilty. At sentencing, Ruiz asked the judge to grant her the same two-level downward departure that the Government would have recommended had she accepted the "fast track" agreement. The Government opposed her request, and the District Court denied it, imposing a standard Guideline sentence instead. Relying on 18 U.S.C. § 3742, Ruiz appealed her sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court's sentencing determination. The Government sought certiorari. It stressed what it considered serious adverse practical implications of the Ninth Circuit's constitutional holding. It added that the holding is unique among courts of appeals. The Supreme Court granted the Government's petition.
View caseIngrid Innes and co-defendants sought disclosure of promises made to government witnesses. The prosecution acknowledged its duty to produce impeachment information but limited production to materials that were genuinely exculpatory.
Idris Ives called a defense witness whose testimony conflicted with earlier statements obtained by police. The prosecution sought to use illegally obtained evidence to impeach that witness. The court refused because the impeachment exception does not extend to all defense witnesses.
Ines Ibarra was convicted after the prosecution withheld evidence that could have impeached its main witness. On appeal the court reversed because there was a reasonable probability that disclosure would have produced a different result.
In October 1977 respondent Hughes Anderson Bagley was indicted in the Western District of Washington on fifteen counts of violating federal narcotics and firearms statutes. On November 18, 1977, twenty-four days before trial, Bagley filed a discovery motion requesting the names and addresses of government witnesses, their prior criminal records, and any deals, promises or inducements made to witnesses in exchange for their testimony. The government's response identified James F. O'Connor and Donald E. Mitchell as its two principal witnesses and stated that each had been paid $250 for information and expenses. It produced forms signed by both men entitled "Contract for Purchase of Information and Payment of Cash Reward" showing the $250 payments. O'Connor and Mitchell were state law-enforcement officers employed by the Milwaukee Railroad as private security guards. Between April and June 1977 they assisted the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in an undercover investigation of Bagley. At the December 1977 bench trial O'Connor and Mitchell testified that they had observed Bagley selling a handgun to a third person and test-firing several weapons. The district court found Bagley guilty on the narcotics charges, acquitted him on the firearms charges, and sentenced him to a total of twenty years' imprisonment, all but two years of which were suspended. In mid-1980 Bagley filed requests under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act and received copies of additional ATF contracts that O'Connor and Mitchell had signed on May 3, 1977. Each contract was entitled "Contract for Purchase of Information and Payment of Lump Sum Therefor." The printed portion stated that the vendor would provide information to ATF and that upon accomplishment of the objective the United States would pay a sum commensurate with services and information rendered. The typewritten description stated that each man would provide information regarding violations committed by Bagley, purchase evidence for ATF, work undercover, assist in gathering evidence, and testify against the violator in federal court. The contracts also provided for monthly payments of $300 up to a maximum of $3,000 and a $2,500 reward for information leading to arrest and conviction. On the basis of the newly obtained contracts Bagley moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence, alleging that the government's failure to disclose the contracts violated his right to due process. After an evidentiary hearing before a magistrate, the district court denied the motion, finding beyond a reasonable doubt that disclosure of the agreements would have had no effect on its finding of guilt. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseThe Constitution does not require disclosure of impeachment information before a plea agreement. Failure to provide such evidence does not render the plea involuntary.
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Impeachment evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that its disclosure would have produced a different result at trial.
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Evidence of bias is always relevant and admissible. A witness may be impeached by showing membership in an organization whose tenets encourage members to lie or commit perjury on behalf of fellow members.
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Yes. When a defendant preemptively introduces a prior conviction on direct to lessen the sting of anticipated impeachment, the defendant may not later claim on appeal that admission was error.
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