493 U.S. 307 (1990)
On the night of August 30, 1982, eight young boys returning home from a party were confronted by a trio of other boys who demanded money.1 When the eight boys refused to comply, one member of the trio produced a gun and fired into the larger group, killing one boy and seriously injuring another.2 When the police arrived, the remaining members of the larger group provided eyewitness accounts of the event and descriptions of the perpetrators.3
The next evening, two detectives of the Chicago Police Department took 15-year-old Darryl James into custody as a suspect in the shooting.4 James was found at his mother’s beauty parlor sitting under a hair dryer; when he emerged, his hair was black and curly.5 After placing James in their car, the detectives questioned him about his prior hair color. He responded that the previous day his hair had been reddish brown, long, and combed straight back.6 The detectives questioned James again later at the police station. He further stated that he had gone to the beauty parlor to have his hair dyed black and curled to change his appearance.7
The State subsequently indicted James for murder and attempted murder.8 Prior to trial, James moved to suppress the statements regarding his hair.9 After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that the statements would be inadmissible at trial.10 At trial, five members of the larger group of boys testified for the State, and each made an in-court identification of the defendant.11 Each testified that the person responsible for the shooting had reddish hair, worn shoulder length in a slicked-back style.12 James did not testify in his own defense.13 He called as a witness Jewel Henderson, a friend of his family.14 Henderson testified that on the day of the shooting she had taken James to register for high school and that, at that time, his hair was black.15 The State then sought to introduce James’ statements as a means of impeaching the credibility of Henderson’s testimony.16 One of the interrogating detectives then reported James’ prior admissions that he had reddish hair the night of the shooting and he dyed and curled his hair the next day to change his appearance.17 James ultimately was convicted of both murder and attempted murder and sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment.18
On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed James’ convictions and ordered a new trial.19 However, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed and ordered James’ convictions reinstated.20 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.21
Whether the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule permits the prosecution to introduce illegally obtained evidence to impeach the testimony of defense witnesses other than the defendant?22
The impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule permits prosecutors to introduce illegally obtained evidence only to impeach the credibility of the defendant's own testimony.23 Expanding the exception to encompass the testimony of all defense witnesses would not promote the truth-seeking function to the same extent as the original exception.24 It would also significantly undermine the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule on police misconduct.25
No. James called Jewel Henderson to testify that his hair was black on the day of the shooting. The prosecution introduced the illegally obtained statements to impeach her testimony by showing he had changed his hair color. Because the established impeachment exception applies only to the defendant's own testimony and not to other defense witnesses, the admission of the evidence violated the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.26
The Illinois Supreme Court erred in affirming James’ convictions despite the prosecutor’s use of illegally obtained statements to impeach a defense witness’ testimony. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.27
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens joined the Court’s opinion but wrote separately to address the dissent. He explained that the dissent answered the wrong question by focusing solely on the truth-seeking interest without weighing it against the loss to the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule.28 Stevens noted that the threat of perjury prosecution provides a stronger deterrent for defense witnesses than for defendants already facing conviction.29
He further observed that the dissent’s assumption of reliability in the officer’s testimony about James’ statements was unwarranted, as police officers may also have faulty recollection or incentives to overstate evidence, and the five eyewitness identifications already supported the verdict without the rebuttal testimony.30
Joined by The Chief Justice, Justice O’connor, And Justice Scalia
Justice Kennedy dissented, joined by the Chief Justice, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Scalia. He argued that the balance of values favors allowing rebuttal with excluded evidence when defense witness testimony directly contradicts reliable suppressed statements.31 The truth-seeking interest remains equally strong, and the majority’s rule permits the jury to be misled by false testimony.32 Kennedy contended that limiting rebuttal to direct contradictions would not unduly chill the presentation of a defense.33 The threat of perjury prosecution is unrealistic given proof difficulties.34 Police officers would still face substantial deterrence from exclusion in the case in chief.35
He would have affirmed the convictions, finding any error harmless given the eyewitness testimony.36