514 U.S. 419 (1995)
On September 20, 1984, sixty-year-old Dolores Dye was shot and killed in the parking lot of the Schwegmann Brothers grocery store on Old Gentilly Road in New Orleans after placing her groceries in the trunk of her red Ford LTD.1
Six eyewitnesses gave statements to police describing the gunman as a black man, with varying accounts of his height, age, weight, build, facial hair, and hair length; four said he had braided hair.2 Police recorded the license plate numbers of cars remaining in the parking lots around the store at 9:15 p.m. that evening.3
On September 22, a man identifying himself as James Joseph, later known as Joseph Banks or Beanie, contacted police and claimed he had purchased a red Thunderbird from Curtis Kyles on the day of the murder.4 Beanie met with Detective John Miller that evening and gave a recorded statement in which he changed details of his story, led officers to the victim's car, described Kyles, and suggested Kyles had retrieved a purse from bushes near the store.5 Beanie gave additional statements over the following days that contained further inconsistencies about dates, participants, and the location of the victim's purse.6
Police arrested Kyles on September 24 after searching his apartment pursuant to a warrant and recovering a .32-caliber revolver later identified as the murder weapon, a homemade shoulder holster, boxes of ammunition, and cans of pet food in Schwegmann's bags.7 The victim's purse and personal items were later found in garbage bags outside Kyles's building.8 Kyles's fingerprints were found on a small Schwegmann's receipt in the victim's car, but no fingerprints on the gun, purse, or pet food cans were matched to him.9
Kyles was tried twice for first-degree murder.10 The November 1984 trial ended in a hung jury after four hours of deliberation.11 In the December 1984 trial, four eyewitnesses identified Kyles as the killer, and the prosecution introduced the gun, holster, pet food, and receipt.12 Kyles was convicted and sentenced to death.13 Beanie did not testify at either trial.14
After the conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, Kyles sought state collateral relief.15 During an evidentiary hearing on newly discovered evidence, the defense first obtained a police file containing six contemporaneous eyewitness statements, Beanie's initial call and multiple inconsistent statements, the license plate list that did not include Kyles's car, an internal police memorandum about seizing the garbage, and other items.16 The state trial court denied relief, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied review, the federal district court denied habeas corpus, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Whether the State violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense prior to trial?17
Under Brady v. Maryland, the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.18 The duty to disclose favorable evidence encompasses both impeachment and exculpatory evidence, and the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf, including the police.19
Yes. The facts establish that on September 20, 1984, Dolores Dye was shot and killed in the Schwegmann's parking lot.20 Police obtained statements from six eyewitnesses with varying descriptions of the gunman.21 Beanie then contacted police claiming to have purchased the victim's car from Kyles, leading to Kyles's arrest after a search of his apartment recovered the murder weapon and other items.22
Kyles was tried twice. The first trial ended in a hung jury.23 At the second trial four eyewitnesses identified Kyles and the prosecution introduced the gun, holster, pet food, and receipt.24 Kyles was convicted and sentenced to death. After the conviction was affirmed, Kyles sought collateral relief. During an evidentiary hearing the defense first obtained the police file containing six contemporaneous eyewitness statements, Beanie's multiple inconsistent statements, the license plate list that did not include Kyles's car, and an internal police memorandum about seizing the garbage.25
The suppressed evidence was favorable because Beanie's statements were inconsistent with each other and with the State's theory, the license plate list excluded Kyles's car, and the eyewitness statements differed from trial testimony.26 The net effect of nondisclosure allowed the State's eyewitnesses to give testimony inconsistent with their suppressed statements and deprived the defense of the opportunity to confront those witnesses or benefit from the exculpatory physical evidence.27 The District Court and Fifth Circuit erred by failing to consider the evidence collectively.28
The State violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose the evidence, and Kyles is entitled to a new trial.29
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Rehnquist, C. J., And Kennedy And Thomas, Jj.
Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that the undisclosed evidence was not material under Bagley because the case against Kyles remained strong even after disclosure.30 He emphasized that four eyewitnesses consistently identified Kyles from photo arrays and again at trial after viewing him beside Beanie.31 The physical evidence of the gun, holster, and pet food in Kyles's apartment was compelling.32
Scalia maintained that the majority's approach improperly expanded Brady by treating any helpful evidence as material.33 He argued that the defense failed to show the suppressed items would have created a reasonable probability of acquittal when weighed against the entire record.34 He would have affirmed the judgment below.35
Joined by Ginsburg And Breyer, Jj.
Justice Stevens concurred to explain why the Court properly granted certiorari despite the fact-bound nature of the claim.36 He noted that the first trial ended in a hung jury.37 This provided strong reason to believe the Brady errors at the second trial were prejudicial.38
Stevens stressed that cases revealing repeated failures by the State to disclose exculpatory evidence are rare.39 Independent review of the record left him with the same serious doubt about Kyles's guilt expressed by the dissenting judge below.40 He concluded that the Court's duty to ensure fair trials in capital cases justified the grant of review.41
Whether the materiality of suppressed evidence under United States v. Bagley is determined by considering the cumulative effect of all such evidence rather than item by item?42
Under United States v. Bagley, favorable evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.43 Materiality is assessed by considering the suppressed evidence collectively, not item by item, because the Constitution is not violated every time the government fails to disclose evidence that might prove helpful to the defense.44
Yes. The District Court and Fifth Circuit evaluated items of suppressed evidence separately rather than assessing their cumulative effect on the whole case.45 When considered together, Beanie's inconsistent statements, the license plate list, the eyewitness statements that differed from trial testimony, and the internal police memorandum would have permitted the defense to impeach the State's key witnesses, attack the thoroughness of the investigation, and raise serious doubts about whether Beanie had planted evidence.46 The jury would have been entitled to accept parts of the State's evidence and reject other parts.47
The suppressed evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.48
Materiality under Bagley requires evaluation of the cumulative effect of all suppressed evidence rather than item-by-item analysis.49
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Rehnquist, C. J., And Kennedy And Thomas, Jj.
Justice Scalia maintained that even under a cumulative approach the undisclosed evidence remained immaterial.50 He argued that the core of four eyewitness identifications, reaffirmed after Beanie stood beside Kyles in court, together with the physical evidence recovered from Kyles's apartment, would still have supported conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.51 Scalia contended that the majority's piecemeal weakening of individual witnesses did not create a reasonable probability that the jury would have accepted the implausible defense theory that all four witnesses had mistaken Beanie for Kyles.52
Whether the prosecutor has a duty to learn of favorable evidence known to police acting on the government's behalf?53
The individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf, including the police, because the prosecution alone can know what is undisclosed and must gauge the likely net effect of all such evidence.54
Yes. The prosecutor responded to the defense's general request for exculpatory evidence by stating there was none, yet the police file compiled during the investigation contained multiple items favorable to Kyles.55 The prosecutor therefore had a duty to learn of that evidence from the police and to disclose it when the point of reasonable probability was reached.56 The State's argument that some evidence was not disclosed even to the prosecutor until after trial does not excuse the failure, because procedures can be established to ensure communication of all relevant information.57
The prosecutor has an affirmative duty to learn of favorable evidence known to police acting on the government's behalf.58