536 U.S. 622 (2002)
After immigration agents found 30 kilograms of marijuana in Angela Ruiz's luggage, federal prosecutors offered her what is known in the Southern District of California as a "fast track" plea bargain.1 That bargain—standard in that district—asks a defendant to waive indictment, trial, and an appeal.2 In return, the Government agrees to recommend to the sentencing judge a two-level departure downward from the otherwise applicable United States Sentencing Guidelines sentence.3 In Ruiz's case, a two-level departure downward would have shortened the ordinary Guidelines-specified 18-to-24-month sentencing range by 6 months, to 12-to-18 months.4
The prosecutors' proposed plea agreement contains a set of detailed terms.5 Among other things, it specifies that "any [known] information establishing the factual innocence of the defendant" "has been turned over to the defendant," and it acknowledges the Government's "continuing duty to provide such information."6 At the same time, it requires that the defendant "waiv[e] the right" to receive "impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses."7 The agreement also requires waiver of the right to receive information supporting any affirmative defense the defendant raises if the case goes to trial.8
Because Ruiz would not agree to this last-mentioned waiver, the prosecutors withdrew their bargaining offer.9 The Government then indicted Ruiz for unlawful drug possession.10 And despite the absence of any agreement, Ruiz ultimately pleaded guilty.11 At sentencing, Ruiz asked the judge to grant her the same two-level downward departure that the Government would have recommended had she accepted the "fast track" agreement.12 The Government opposed her request, and the District Court denied it, imposing a standard Guideline sentence instead.13
Relying on 18 U.S.C. § 3742, Ruiz appealed her sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.14 The Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court's sentencing determination.15 The Government sought certiorari.16 It stressed what it considered serious adverse practical implications of the Ninth Circuit's constitutional holding.17 It added that the holding is unique among courts of appeals.18 The Supreme Court granted the Government's petition.19
Whether 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) authorizes a defendant to appeal a sentence on the ground that it was imposed in violation of law due to the absence of impeachment information disclosure prior to a guilty plea?20
A sentence is imposed in violation of law if it violates the Constitution.21 A federal court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.22 Thus if the constitutional claim were sound the sentence would be imposed in violation of law under § 3742(a)(1) and the court of appeals would have jurisdiction.23
Yes. Although Ruiz's constitutional claim ultimately failed on the merits, the Ninth Circuit properly exercised jurisdiction to consider it.24 The record showed that the district judge understood his discretion to depart downward but chose not to exercise it.25 Because a federal court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction, the court of appeals could address whether the sentence was imposed in violation of law.26
Appellate jurisdiction was proper under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1) to consider the constitutional claim.27
Whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require federal prosecutors, before entering into a binding plea agreement with a criminal defendant, to disclose impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses?28
The Constitution does not require the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant.29 Impeachment information is special in relation to the fairness of a trial, not in respect to whether a plea is voluntary.30 There is no legal authority requiring such disclosure, and due process considerations argue against it because of the limited value to the defendant and the serious interference with government interests in efficient plea bargaining.31
No. In this case the prosecutors offered Ruiz a fast track plea bargain that required waiver of the right to receive impeachment information.32 Because Ruiz would not agree to the waiver the offer was withdrawn, she was indicted, and she pleaded guilty without receiving the information.33 The Ninth Circuit had held that the Constitution requires disclosure of impeachment information before a plea, but the Supreme Court reversed.34 The Court reasoned that while more information makes a defendant more aware of the consequences of a plea, the Constitution does not require prosecutors to share all useful information with the defendant.35
Impeachment information is not critical to the voluntariness of a plea because its helpfulness depends on the defendant's own independent knowledge of the prosecution's case.36 Past cases permit guilty pleas despite different forms of misapprehension by the defendant.37 Due process factors show the added value of the Ninth Circuit's proposed right is often limited.38 The burden on the Government would be serious, risking disruption of ongoing investigations and forcing greater resources to trial preparation before pleas.39 These considerations led the Court to conclude that the Constitution does not require disclosure of material impeachment evidence prior to a plea agreement.40
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not require disclosure of impeachment information prior to a plea agreement.41
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Thomas agreed with the Court that the Constitution does not require the Government to disclose either affirmative defense information or impeachment information relating to informants or other witnesses before entering into a binding plea agreement with a criminal defendant.42 He noted that the Court suggests the constitutional analysis turns in some part on the degree of help such information would provide to the defendant at the plea stage.43 That distinction is neither necessary nor accurate.44
To the extent that the Court is implicitly drawing a line based on a flawed characterization about the usefulness of specific types of information, Thomas could only concur in the judgment.45 The principle supporting Brady was avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused.46 That concern is not implicated at the plea stage regardless.47
Whether the Constitution requires disclosure of information supporting affirmative defenses prior to a defendant entering a guilty plea?48
The Constitution does not require provision of affirmative defense information to the defendant prior to plea bargaining.49 For most of the reasons stated regarding impeachment information, the need for this information is more closely related to the fairness of a trial than to the voluntariness of the plea, the value in terms of the defendant's added awareness of relevant circumstances is ordinarily limited, and the added burden imposed upon the Government can be serious.50
No. The proposed plea agreement required the defendant to waive the right to receive information the Government has regarding any affirmative defense she raises at trial.51 The Court concluded that the Constitution does not require its provision prior to plea bargaining for most of the same reasons given for impeachment information.52 The agreement already specifies that any information establishing the factual innocence of the defendant has been turned over.53 Other guilty-plea safeguards such as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 diminish concerns that innocent individuals will plead guilty without the information.54
The need for affirmative defense information is more closely related to trial fairness than to plea voluntariness, its value to the defendant is ordinarily limited, and requiring its provision well in advance of trial can seriously interfere with the administration of the plea-bargaining process.55
The Constitution does not require disclosure of affirmative defense information prior to a guilty plea.56