heightened equal protection standard

Since the late 19th century the United States has restricted immigration into this country. Unsanctioned entry is a crime and those who enter unlawfully are subject to deportation, yet a substantial number of persons have succeeded in unlawfully entering and now live within various States including Texas. In May 1975 the Texas Legislature revised its education laws to withhold state funds from local school districts for the education of children not legally admitted into the United States. The revision also authorized local districts to deny enrollment to such children under Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.031. In September 1977 a class action was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas on behalf of school-age children of Mexican origin residing in Smith County who could not establish legal admission. The suit challenged their exclusion from the Tyler Independent School District schools, and the State of Texas intervened as a defendant. After certifying a class of all undocumented school-age children of Mexican origin in the district, the court held an extensive hearing in December 1977. It found that the statute had neither the purpose nor effect of keeping illegal aliens out of Texas, that enrollment increases stemmed primarily from legal residents, and that barring undocumented children would save money but would not necessarily improve education quality. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the injunction. During 1978 and 1979 additional suits were filed in other Texas districts. The Judicial Panel on Multi-district Litigation consolidated them in the Southern District of Texas. After a hearing the district court held the statute violated equal protection, the Court of Appeals summarily affirmed, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and consolidated the cases.

In 1839 the Commonwealth of Virginia established the Virginia Military Institute as one of the nation's first state military colleges. VMI has remained financially supported by the state and subject to the control of the Virginia General Assembly. The school enrolls approximately 1,300 male cadets and offers academic programs in the liberal arts, sciences, and engineering that are also available at other Virginia public institutions. Its distinctive mission is to produce citizen-soldiers through an adversative method featuring physical rigor, mental stress, absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy, minute regulation of behavior, and indoctrination in desirable values. Cadets live in spartan barracks, participate in drills, endure the rat line, and operate under a strict honor code. VMI graduates have included military generals, members of Congress, and business executives, and the school maintains the largest per-student endowment of any public undergraduate institution in the nation. In 1990 a female high-school student filed a complaint with the Attorney General seeking admission to VMI. The United States then sued the Commonwealth of Virginia and VMI, alleging that the exclusively male admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause. Trial consumed six days and involved expert witnesses on each side. In the two years preceding the lawsuit VMI had received inquiries from 347 women but responded to none. The District Court ruled in VMI's favor in 1991, finding that single-gender education yields substantial benefits and that VMI's methods are inherently suited to men. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed in 1992 and remanded the case for selection of a remedy. On remand Virginia proposed the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership, a four-year state-sponsored undergraduate program located at the private Mary Baldwin College and open initially to twenty-five to thirty students. VWIL would share VMI's mission of producing citizen-soldiers but would employ a cooperative method rather than an adversative one, would not require barracks living or uniforms during the school day, and would offer a narrower range of academic programs. The average combined SAT score of Mary Baldwin entrants was about 100 points lower than VMI's, its faculty held significantly fewer Ph.D.s and received lower salaries, and its endowment was substantially smaller. The District Court approved the VWIL plan in 1994, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed in 1995. The United States petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted in 1995. Some women could meet VMI's physical standards. VMI's methodology could be used to educate women. VWIL students would not experience the rigorous military training, faculty, facilities, alumni network, or prestige associated with VMI.

In April 1987 the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation organized under Florida law in 1973 whose president is Ernesto Pichardo, leased land in Hialeah, Florida, and announced plans to build a house of worship, school, cultural center, and museum at which members would practice Santeria. Santeria originated in nineteenth-century Cuba as a fusion of Yoruba traditions and Roman Catholicism. It centers on animal sacrifice performed by cutting the carotid arteries, after which the animals are usually cooked and eaten except in healing and death rituals. The announcement prompted the Hialeah City Council to convene an emergency public session on June 9, 1987. At that session residents and council members voiced strong opposition to Santeria practices. The council then adopted Resolution 87-66 declaring opposition to religious acts inconsistent with public morals, peace, or safety and passed Ordinance 87-40 incorporating Florida's animal-cruelty statute that criminalizes unnecessary or cruel killing of animals. After the Florida attorney general issued an opinion that ritual animal sacrifice other than for food consumption violated state law, the council in August 1987 adopted Resolution 87-90 opposing ritual animal sacrifice. In September 1987 the council enacted three further ordinances. Ordinance 87-52 barred possession of animals with intent to use them for ritual sacrifice except by licensed food establishments. Ordinance 87-71 directly prohibited any person from sacrificing an animal within city limits. Ordinance 87-72 restricted slaughter of animals to properly zoned slaughterhouse premises while exempting small-scale commercial hog and cattle operations. The Church and Pichardo filed suit against the city and its officials in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They alleged that the ordinances violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. After granting summary judgment to the individual defendants on immunity grounds, the district court conducted a nine-day bench trial on the remaining claims and entered judgment for the city. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

The District of Columbia generally prohibits the possession of handguns. It is a crime to carry an unregistered firearm, and the registration of handguns is prohibited. Wholly apart from that prohibition, no person may carry a handgun without a license, but the chief of police may issue licenses for one-year periods. District of Columbia law also requires residents to keep their lawfully owned firearms unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device unless they are located in a place of business or are being used for lawful recreational activities. Respondent Dick Heller is a D.C. special police officer authorized to carry a handgun while on duty at the Federal Judicial Center. He applied for a registration certificate for a handgun that he wished to keep at home, but the District refused. He thereafter filed a lawsuit in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia seeking, on Second Amendment grounds, to enjoin the city from enforcing the bar on the registration of handguns, the licensing requirement insofar as it prohibits the carrying of a firearm in the home without a license, and the trigger-lock requirement insofar as it prohibits the use of functional firearms within the home. The District Court dismissed respondent's complaint. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, construing his complaint as seeking the right to render a firearm operable and carry it about his home in that condition only when necessary for self-defense. The Court of Appeals directed the District Court to enter summary judgment for respondent. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In 2000 Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. Petitioners are current and former inmates of institutions operated by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction who adhere to nonmainstream religions including the Satanist, Wicca, and Asatru religions and the Church of Jesus Christ Christian. They initially filed suit against Ohio prison officials asserting claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. After enactment of the Act petitioners amended their complaints to add claims under Section 3. The inmates complained that prison officials failed to accommodate their religious exercise in a variety of ways including denying access to religious literature, denying opportunities for group worship granted to adherents of mainstream religions, forbidding adherence to dress and appearance mandates, withholding religious ceremonial items, and failing to provide a chaplain trained in their faith. For purposes of the litigation respondents stipulated that petitioners are members of bona fide religions and sincere in their beliefs. Respondents moved to dismiss the statutory claims arguing that Section 3 violates the Establishment Clause. Pursuant to statute the United States intervened in the District Court to defend the constitutionality of the Act. The District Court denied the motion to dismiss. On interlocutory appeal the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court determination. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among Courts of Appeals on whether the institutionalized-persons provision of the Act is consistent with the Establishment Clause.