545 U.S. 469, 503 (2005)
In the late 1990s the city of New London, Connecticut, confronted severe economic decline after the 1996 closure of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, which had employed more than 1,500 people.1 The city's unemployment rate stood nearly double the state average and its population had dropped below 24,000 residents from a 1970 high of 30,000.2 State and local officials therefore designated the Fort Trumbull peninsula for targeted economic revitalization.3
In 1998 the New London Development Corporation, a private nonprofit entity, was reactivated to prepare a redevelopment plan covering roughly 90 acres.4 The plan divided the area into seven parcels designated for a waterfront conference hotel and marinas, retail and entertainment space, research and office facilities, parking and park support, residential units, a Coast Guard museum, and additional office and retail uses.5 The city council formally approved the plan in January 2000 and authorized the NLDC to acquire needed parcels by purchase or, if necessary, by eminent domain.6
Petitioners Susette Kelo, Wilhelmina Dery, and seven other owners held fifteen properties within parcels 3 and 4A; ten of those parcels were occupied by the owners or their family members and none was alleged to be blighted.7 After negotiations with the NLDC failed, the corporation initiated condemnation proceedings against the remaining properties in November 2000.8
In December 2000 the petitioners filed suit in New London Superior Court asserting that the proposed takings violated the public-use limitation of the Fifth Amendment.9 Following a seven-day bench trial the Superior Court entered a permanent restraining order barring condemnation of the parcel 4A properties but denied relief as to the parcel 3 properties.10
Both sides appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court, which upheld the validity of all challenged takings.11 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the federal constitutional question.12
Whether the city's proposed disposition of this property qualifies as a “public use” within the meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution?13
The “public use” requirement of the Fifth Amendment is coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers.14 This Court has embraced the broad and inclusive definition of “public purpose.”15 The Court has read the Fifth Amendment’s language to authorize the exercise of eminent domain for a public purpose.16 The city’s determination that the area at issue was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic rejuvenation is entitled to deference.17 The city has carefully formulated an economic development plan that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community, including new jobs and increased tax revenue.18 The plan unquestionably serves a public purpose.19 The takings at issue do not fail the “public use” test simply because the city will transfer the properties to private developers.20 The government may transfer property from one private owner to another if future “use by the public” is the purpose of the taking.21 The city’s development plan is not adopted to benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals.22 The city’s plan is intended to revitalize its economy.23 The “public use” requirement is not a judicially enforceable limit on the sovereign’s power of eminent domain.24
Yes. The City has carefully formulated an economic development plan that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community, including new jobs and increased tax revenue.25 The plan unquestionably serves a public purpose. The City’s determination that the area at issue was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic rejuvenation is entitled to our deference.26
The takings do not fail the public use test simply because the city will transfer the properties to private developers.27 The plan is intended to revitalize the economy and is not adopted to benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals.28
The city's proposed takings satisfy the “public use” requirement of the Fifth Amendment.29
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Kennedy wrote separately to underscore that a taking should be upheld under rational-basis review unless the record shows a clear impermissible purpose or an adverse effect on a discrete group of citizens.30 He stressed that the trial court conducted an extensive inquiry into whether the development plan primarily benefited private parties such as Pfizer or the developer rather than the city.31 The trial court found no such illicit motivation and concluded that the primary purpose was to capitalize on Pfizer's presence to revitalize the local economy.32
Justice Kennedy noted that the identities of most private beneficiaries remained unknown when the plan was adopted and that elaborate procedural safeguards had been followed.33 He agreed that no circumstances in this case warranted a more demanding standard of review.34
Joined by Rehnquist, C. J., And Scalia And Thomas, Jj.
Justice O’Connor dissented on the ground that the public-use requirement is not satisfied when the government takes property from one private owner and transfers it to another private owner solely for economic development.35 She argued that the three traditional categories of valid public uses—public ownership, use by the public, and elimination of harmful property uses—do not encompass ordinary economic development.36 In her view, the majority's approach erases any distinction between public and private use because nearly every lawful private use generates some incidental public benefit such as tax revenue or jobs.37
She contended that the decision renders the public-use limitation a nullity and would have reversed the judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court.38
Justice Thomas dissented and urged the Court to return to the original meaning of the Public Use Clause.39 He read the Clause as permitting takings only when the government or the public actually uses or has a legal right to use the property.40 He argued that the Court's precedents had erroneously equated public use with any legitimate public purpose and had improperly deferred to legislative judgments.41
In his view, the economic-development rationale adopted by the majority is too broad and effectively eliminates the Public Use Clause as a meaningful limit on eminent-domain power.42 He would have held the takings unconstitutional and reversed the judgment below.43