Also known as: fruit of the poisonous tree · fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine · poisonous tree doctrine · derivative evidence exclusion
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Derivative evidence obtained through exploitation of an unconstitutional search or seizure. The doctrine requires exclusion of evidence later discovered by use of information gained in the initial illegality unless the connection to the violation has become sufficiently attenuated or an exception such as independent source or inevitable discovery applies.
Traffic officers unlawfully opened the glove compartment of a dealership vehicle owned by Sunrise Auto LLC and found a notebook listing storage units. They used the notebook to obtain a warrant and seized altered dashboards from the units. The dashboards must be suppressed because they were located only through the initial illegal search.
Cultural heritage officers planted a hidden listening device without a warrant in the back office of Ortiz Gallery LLC and overheard manager Lena Ortiz discuss moving paintings. They obtained a warrant based solely on that conversation and recovered the paintings. The paintings are inadmissible because they resulted directly from the unlawful surveillance.
Detectives elicited a statement from a suspect in violation of his rights and learned the location of a child's body. Officers later searched the area and recovered the body. The body evidence is admissible under the inevitable discovery exception because search teams were already closing in on the location through independent efforts.
On December 24, 1968, ten-year-old Pamela Powers disappeared from a YMCA building in Des Moines, Iowa, where she had accompanied her parents to watch an athletic contest. Williams was seen leaving the YMCA carrying a large bundle wrapped in a blanket. A fourteen-year-old boy who helped open his car door reported seeing two skinny white legs inside it. Williams' car was found the next day 160 miles east in Davenport, Iowa. Items of the child's clothing along with an army blanket were recovered at a rest stop on Interstate 80 near Grinnell between Des Moines and Davenport. A warrant issued for Williams' arrest. On December 26 the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation organized a search with two hundred volunteers divided into teams that began twenty-one miles east of Grinnell and moved westward through Poweshiek County into Jasper County. Searchers checked all roads, ditches, culverts, abandoned farm buildings, and other places where a small child's body could be hidden. The search area was marked off in grids on highway maps. Williams surrendered to police in Davenport and was arraigned. After his attorneys arranged for no questioning during transport, two Des Moines detectives took him into custody for the return drive. During the trip Detective Leaming spoke to Williams about predicted snow and the parents' right to a Christian burial. Williams then directed the officers to the child's shoes, the blanket, and ultimately the body itself. The body lay next to a culvert in a ditch beside a gravel road in Polk County. It was roughly two and one-half miles from where one search team had stopped when the search was suspended at 3 p.m. Williams was indicted for first-degree murder. At his first trial the evidence of the body was admitted over objection. He was convicted. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed. The United States Supreme Court reversed in Brewer v. Williams on the ground that the statements were obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. At the second trial in 1977 the prosecution introduced evidence of the condition of the body, articles and photographs of clothing, and autopsy results without offering Williams' statements or showing that he had directed police to the body. The trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the body would have been discovered within a short time in essentially the same condition by the continuing search. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed. On federal habeas corpus the District Court denied relief after an independent review. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseFederal agents conducted an illegal wiretap of conversations involving multiple defendants. One defendant moved to suppress evidence derived from the tap even though his own conversations were not recorded. The court must first determine whether that defendant has standing before applying the fruit of the poisonous tree analysis to the derivative evidence.
Petitioners Alderman and Alderisio, along with Ruby Kolod (now deceased), were convicted in federal court of conspiring to transmit murderous threats in interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 875(c). Their convictions were affirmed by the Tenth Circuit in 1967, and the Supreme Court initially denied certiorari. After denial, the petitioners alleged in a rehearing petition that Alderisio's Chicago business premises had been subjected to government electronic surveillance. The government responded by acknowledging that Alderisio's conversations had been overheard through unlawful eavesdropping. Petitioners Ivanov and Butenko were convicted in separate proceedings of conspiring to transmit national defense information to the Soviet Union under 18 U.S.C. §§ 794(a) and (c) and related charges under 18 U.S.C. § 951. The Third Circuit affirmed most convictions. Following the Alderman rehearing developments, certiorari was granted in Ivanov and Butenko on parallel questions concerning surveillance. After the convictions were affirmed and while the cases were pending, it was revealed that the United States had engaged in electronic surveillance that might have violated Fourth Amendment rights and tainted the convictions. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments and remanded each case to the District Court for adjudication of whether any government evidence supporting the convictions was the product of illegal surveillance. The government moved for modification of the remand order, proposing that surveillance records first undergo in camera inspection by the trial judge, who would disclose to petitioners and counsel only those materials found arguably relevant to the prosecution. Petitioners opposed the in camera procedure and sought full disclosure of all surveillance records to which they claimed standing. The government maintained that none of the overheard conversations were arguably relevant to the prosecutions and that disclosure of irrelevant conversations would endanger third parties or national security. The Supreme Court restored the cases for reargument specifically on the disclosure issue and the question of standing to object to the fruits of illegal surveillance.
View caseOfficers obtained an unwarned statement from a suspect revealing the location of a firearm. They then seized the gun. The physical firearm is admissible because the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not extend to physical evidence obtained in violation of Miranda warnings alone.
In June 2001, Samuel Francis Patane was arrested for harassing his ex-girlfriend, Linda O’Donnell. He was released on bond subject to a temporary restraining order that prohibited him from contacting O’Donnell. On June 6, 2001, after Patane apparently violated the restraining order by attempting to telephone O’Donnell, Officer Tracy Fox of the Colorado Springs Police Department began to investigate the matter. A county probation officer informed an agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms that Patane, a convicted felon, illegally possessed a .40 Glock pistol. The ATF relayed this information to Detective Josh Benner, who worked closely with the ATF. Detective Benner and Officer Fox proceeded to Patane’s residence. After reaching the residence and inquiring into Patane’s attempts to contact O’Donnell, Officer Fox arrested Patane for violating the restraining order. Detective Benner attempted to advise Patane of his Miranda rights but got no further than the right to remain silent. At that point, Patane interrupted, asserting that he knew his rights, and neither officer attempted to complete the warning. Detective Benner then asked Patane about the Glock. Patane was initially reluctant to discuss the matter. He ultimately told Benner that the pistol was in his bedroom and gave permission to retrieve it. Detective Benner found the pistol and seized it. A grand jury indicted Patane for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The District Court granted Patane’s motion to suppress the firearm. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s ruling with respect to probable cause but affirmed the suppression order on Patane’s alternative theory. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseOfficers made an unlawful entry into an apartment and observed drug activity. They later obtained a search warrant based on information wholly independent of the entry and seized evidence. The evidence is admissible because the warrant rested on an untainted source that broke any causal link to the initial illegality.
In January 1981, the New York Drug Enforcement Task Force received information indicating that Andres Segura and Luz Marina Colon probably were trafficking in cocaine from their New York apartment. Acting on this information, Task Force agents maintained continuing surveillance over petitioners until their arrest on February 12, 1981. On February 9, agents observed a meeting between Segura and Enrique Rivudalla-Vidal. Three days later, Segura telephoned Rivudalla-Vidal and agreed to provide him with cocaine at a designated fast-food restaurant in Queens. Rivudalla-Vidal and Esther Parra arrived at the restaurant at 5 p.m. Agents observed Colon deliver a bulky package to Parra in the parking lot. Agents stopped the couple as they were about to enter Rivudalla-Vidal's apartment, found Parra in possession of cocaine, and arrested both. Rivudalla-Vidal cooperated, admitted purchasing the cocaine from Segura, and informed agents that Segura was to call him at approximately 10 o'clock that evening. Between 6:30 and 7 p.m., agents received authorization from an Assistant United States Attorney to arrest Segura and Colon and to secure the premises because a search warrant probably could not be obtained until the following day. At about 7:30 p.m., agents arrived at petitioners' apartment and established external surveillance. At 11:15 p.m., Segura entered the lobby and was arrested. Agents took him to the third-floor apartment, knocked on the door, and entered with him when Colon appeared. Agents arrested Colon and three other persons found in the apartment. They conducted a limited security check and observed in plain view a triple-beam scale, jars of lactose, and numerous small cellophane bags. None of these items was disturbed. Two agents remained in the apartment awaiting the warrant. Because of administrative delay, the warrant application was not presented to the Magistrate until 5 p.m. the next day. The warrant was issued and the search was performed at approximately 6 p.m., some 19 hours after the agents' initial entry. In the search pursuant to the warrant, agents discovered almost three pounds of cocaine, 18 rounds of .38-caliber ammunition, more than $50,000 cash, and records of narcotics transactions. Segura and Colon were indicted for conspiring to distribute cocaine and for distributing and possessing with intent to distribute cocaine. They moved to suppress all evidence seized from the apartment. The District Court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseNo. The doctrine requires suppression only of evidence obtained by exploitation of the initial illegality. Evidence discovered through an independent source, inevitable discovery, or after sufficient attenuation of the taint remains admissible.
Supporting sources
Courts examine the temporal proximity between the illegality and the discovery of the evidence, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the flagrancy of the official misconduct. When these factors show the evidence was obtained by means sufficiently distinguishable from the primary illegality, the taint dissipates.
Supporting sources
A later warrant does not automatically purge the taint. If the warrant affidavit relies on information obtained through the illegal search, the resulting evidence remains fruit of the poisonous tree unless an independent source or other exception applies.
Supporting sources