394 U.S. 165 (1969)
Petitioners Alderman and Alderisio, along with Ruby Kolod (now deceased), were convicted in federal court of conspiring to transmit murderous threats in interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 875(c).1 Their convictions were affirmed by the Tenth Circuit in 1967, and the Supreme Court initially denied certiorari.2 After denial, the petitioners alleged in a rehearing petition that Alderisio's Chicago business premises had been subjected to government electronic surveillance.3 The government responded by acknowledging that Alderisio's conversations had been overheard through unlawful eavesdropping.4
Petitioners Ivanov and Butenko were convicted in separate proceedings of conspiring to transmit national defense information to the Soviet Union under 18 U.S.C. §§ 794(a) and (c) and related charges under 18 U.S.C. § 951.5 The Third Circuit affirmed most convictions.6 Following the Alderman rehearing developments, certiorari was granted in Ivanov and Butenko on parallel questions concerning surveillance.7
After the convictions were affirmed and while the cases were pending, it was revealed that the United States had engaged in electronic surveillance that might have violated Fourth Amendment rights and tainted the convictions.8 The Supreme Court vacated the judgments and remanded each case to the District Court for adjudication of whether any government evidence supporting the convictions was the product of illegal surveillance.9 The government moved for modification of the remand order, proposing that surveillance records first undergo in camera inspection by the trial judge, who would disclose to petitioners and counsel only those materials found arguably relevant to the prosecution.10
Petitioners opposed the in camera procedure and sought full disclosure of all surveillance records to which they claimed standing.11 The government maintained that none of the overheard conversations were arguably relevant to the prosecutions and that disclosure of irrelevant conversations would endanger third parties or national security.12 The Supreme Court restored the cases for reargument specifically on the disclosure issue and the question of standing to object to the fruits of illegal surveillance.13
Whether the exclusionary rule permits a defendant to suppress evidence obtained through illegal surveillance directed at a third party simply because the defendant is a codefendant or coconspirator?14
Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which may not be vicariously asserted, and suppression of evidence obtained through an unlawful search or seizure may be urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself.15
No. Petitioners Alderman and Alderisio sought suppression of evidence derived from surveillance of Alderisio's business premises even where they claimed no personal participation in every overheard conversation.16 Petitioners Ivanov and Butenko raised parallel claims arising from surveillance conducted during investigations that produced evidence used against them.17 The established principle applied to these facts is that a defendant has no standing to object merely because he is a codefendant or coconspirator aggrieved only by the introduction of damaging evidence.18
No defendant may suppress evidence on the ground that it was obtained through surveillance that violated only the Fourth Amendment rights of another person.19
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan agreed that the traditional standing doctrine should not be expanded to allow codefendants or coconspirators to assert Fourth Amendment claims.20 He is in substantial agreement with the reasons the Court has given for refusing to expand the traditional standing doctrine to permit a Fourth Amendment challenge to be raised by either a codefendant or a co-conspirator.21 Harlan saw no special circumstances justifying such an expansion, unlike in cases involving associational rights.22
He emphasized that Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which may not be vicariously asserted and that there is no necessity to exclude evidence against one defendant in order to protect the rights of another.23
Whether a defendant has standing to object to the use of evidence derived from electronic surveillance of conversations occurring on his premises even if he did not participate in those conversations?24
A defendant has standing to challenge electronic surveillance that violates his own Fourth Amendment rights, which occurs when the government unlawfully overhears conversations of the defendant himself or conversations occurring on his premises, whether or not he was present or participated in those conversations.25
Yes. In the Alderman and Alderisio prosecutions the government conducted electronic surveillance at Alderisio's place of business.26 The Court held that the homeowner or business owner may object to the use against him of third-party conversations overheard on his premises because those conversations are fruits of an unauthorized search of his own protected space.27 The same principle applied to any petitioner whose premises were the site of the surveillance in the Ivanov and Butenko cases.28
A defendant has standing to object to evidence derived from electronic surveillance of conversations on his premises even when he did not participate in the conversations.29
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan dissented from the majority's holding that a property owner has standing to object to third-party conversations overheard on his premises.30 He maintained that the right to conversational privacy is inherently personal and does not derive from property interests.31 The traditional fruits theory based on trespass does not apply after Katz, which rejected property concepts for conversational privacy.32
Allowing property owners to assert claims for conversations they did not participate in permits vicarious assertion of others' rights, contrary to established precedent.33 Harlan would limit standing to those who actually participated in the overheard conversations.34
Justice Fortas concurred in the judgment but advocated a broader standing rule.35 He argued that standing should extend to any person against whom an investigation involving illegal electronic surveillance was directed, even if the surveillance did not occur on his premises or capture his conversations.36 Drawing from Jones v. United States, Fortas emphasized that the Fourth Amendment grants individuals the right to insist that the government use only lawful means when proceeding against them.37
This approach would more fully implement the Amendment's protections without relying on property concepts.38
Whether the government must disclose to a defendant all records of electronic surveillance to which he has standing to object without first allowing a trial judge to conduct an in camera examination to determine relevance?39
Surveillance records as to which any petitioner has standing to object must be turned over to him without being screened in camera by the trial judge.40 The task of identifying records that might have contributed to the government's case is too complex and the margin for error too great to entrust wholly to the court in the first instance.41
No. The government proposed that records first undergo in camera inspection by the trial judge who would disclose only arguably relevant materials to petitioners Alderman, Alderisio, Ivanov, and Butenko.4243 The Court rejected that procedure.44 The records of conversations to which a petitioner has standing must be turned over directly so that adversary proceedings can determine whether the government's evidence was tainted.45
The government must disclose to a defendant all records of electronic surveillance to which he has standing to object; in camera screening by the trial judge is not permitted.46
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan would have permitted in camera inspection at least for third-party conversations and especially in the Ivanov and Butenko espionage cases.47 Disclosure could reveal sensitive national-security information such as the location of listening devices or the identity of undercover agents.48 The risk that a defendant might pass new information to a foreign power justified judicial screening before turnover.49
The number of conversations at issue is very small in espionage cases, reducing the risk of error from in camera review.50
Justice Fortas agreed with the majority that in camera inspection should not be the usual method for determining relevance of surveillance records.51 However, he would permit such a procedure in limited circumstances where the Attorney General personally certifies that specific portions of the unlawfully obtained materials are so sensitive that their disclosure would substantially injure national security interests.52 In those instances, the trial judge should make written findings, which would be sealed and available for appellate review, determining that the material is clearly irrelevant before withholding it.53
Fortas emphasized that all arguably relevant material must still be turned over to the defendant or his counsel, unless the government chooses to dismiss the prosecution instead.54
Whether a defendant has standing under the Fourth Amendment to object to the introduction of evidence derived from electronic surveillance that violated the rights of another person?55
Suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence.56
No. Petitioners in all three cases sought to suppress evidence on the theory that surveillance illegal as to one person or premises rendered the evidence inadmissible against codefendants or coconspirators.5758 The Court applied the established rule that only the victim of the search or seizure may invoke the exclusionary rule.59 None of the petitioners could claim standing merely because evidence obtained in violation of someone else's rights was offered against them.60
A defendant has no standing under the Fourth Amendment to object to evidence derived from electronic surveillance that violated only the rights of another person.61
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan agreed that the traditional standing doctrine should not be expanded to allow codefendants or coconspirators to assert Fourth Amendment claims. He is in substantial agreement with the reasons the Court has given for refusing to expand the traditional standing doctrine to permit a Fourth Amendment challenge to be raised by either a codefendant or a co-conspirator. He stressed that Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which may not be vicariously asserted.
There is no necessity to exclude evidence against one defendant in order to protect the rights of another, as the victim can and very probably will object for himself when and if it becomes important for him to do so.
Justice Fortas concurred in the judgment but advocated a broader standing rule. He argued that a person concerning whom an investigation involving illegal electronic surveillance has been conducted has the right to suppression of the illegally obtained material and its fruits. Fortas maintained that the Fourth Amendment grants the individual a personal right to insist that the state utilize only lawful means of proceeding against him.
This position draws from the principle that the government is bound by the law and that lawlessness on the part of the government must be stoutly condemned.