468 U.S. 796 (1984)
In January 1981, the New York Drug Enforcement Task Force received information indicating that Andres Segura and Luz Marina Colon probably were trafficking in cocaine from their New York apartment.1 Acting on this information, Task Force agents maintained continuing surveillance over petitioners until their arrest on February 12, 1981.2 On February 9, agents observed a meeting between Segura and Enrique Rivudalla-Vidal.3 Three days later, Segura telephoned Rivudalla-Vidal and agreed to provide him with cocaine at a designated fast-food restaurant in Queens.4
Rivudalla-Vidal and Esther Parra arrived at the restaurant at 5 p.m. Agents observed Colon deliver a bulky package to Parra in the parking lot.5 Agents stopped the couple as they were about to enter Rivudalla-Vidal's apartment, found Parra in possession of cocaine, and arrested both.6 Rivudalla-Vidal cooperated, admitted purchasing the cocaine from Segura, and informed agents that Segura was to call him at approximately 10 o'clock that evening.7 Between 6:30 and 7 p.m., agents received authorization from an Assistant United States Attorney to arrest Segura and Colon and to secure the premises because a search warrant probably could not be obtained until the following day.8
At about 7:30 p.m., agents arrived at petitioners' apartment and established external surveillance.9 At 11:15 p.m., Segura entered the lobby and was arrested.10 Agents took him to the third-floor apartment, knocked on the door, and entered with him when Colon appeared.11 Agents arrested Colon and three other persons found in the apartment.12 They conducted a limited security check and observed in plain view a triple-beam scale, jars of lactose, and numerous small cellophane bags.13 None of these items was disturbed.14 Two agents remained in the apartment awaiting the warrant.15
Because of administrative delay, the warrant application was not presented to the Magistrate until 5 p.m. the next day.16 The warrant was issued and the search was performed at approximately 6 p.m., some 19 hours after the agents' initial entry.17 In the search pursuant to the warrant, agents discovered almost three pounds of cocaine, 18 rounds of .38-caliber ammunition, more than $50,000 cash, and records of narcotics transactions.18 Segura and Colon were indicted for conspiring to distribute cocaine and for distributing and possessing with intent to distribute cocaine.19 They moved to suppress all evidence seized from the apartment.20 The District Court granted the motion.21 The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.22 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.23
Whether the entry and internal securing of the premises constituted an impermissible seizure of all the contents of the apartment, seen and unseen?24
The Fourth Amendment forbids only unreasonable searches and seizures. Different interests are implicated by a seizure than by a search. A seizure affects only the person's possessory interests; a search affects a person's privacy interests. Securing a dwelling, on the basis of probable cause, to prevent the destruction or removal of evidence while a search warrant is being sought is not itself an unreasonable seizure of either the dwelling or its contents.25
No. The agents had abundant probable cause in advance of their entry to believe that there was a criminal drug operation being carried on in petitioners' apartment. Petitioners do not dispute the probable-cause determination.26 The agents had maintained surveillance over petitioners for weeks. They had observed petitioners leave the apartment to make sales of cocaine.27 Wholly apart from observations made during that extended surveillance, Rivudalla-Vidal had told agents after his arrest that petitioners had supplied him with cocaine earlier that day. He said that he had not purchased all of the cocaine offered by Segura. He also said that Segura probably had more cocaine in the apartment.28 The agents entered and secured the apartment from within after arresting Segura and Colon.29
The seizure was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. It was for no more than the period necessary to obtain the warrant. It preserved the status quo while others in good faith were in the process of obtaining a warrant.30
The entry and internal securing of the premises did not constitute an impermissible seizure of all the contents of the apartment, seen and unseen.31
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. He stated that he concurred in the judgment. Stevens agreed with the Court that the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant was admissible because the warrant was based on information independent of the illegal entry.
He wrote separately to emphasize that the agents' decision to secure the apartment while they sought a warrant was reasonable under the circumstances. The concurrence underscores the practical necessity of securing the premises in such investigations.32
Whether the evidence first discovered during the search of the apartment pursuant to a valid warrant issued the day after the entry should have been suppressed as fruit of the illegal entry?33
The independent source doctrine provides that evidence is not to be excluded if the connection between the illegal police conduct and the discovery and seizure of the evidence is so attenuated as to dissipate the taint. Evidence is also admissible if police had an independent source for discovery of the evidence.34 None of the information on which the warrant was secured was derived from or related in any way to the initial entry into petitioners' apartment. The information came from sources wholly unconnected with the entry and was known to the agents well before the initial entry.35
No. None of the information on which the warrant was secured was derived from or related in any way to the initial entry into petitioners' apartment.36 The information came from sources wholly unconnected with the entry and was known to the agents well before the initial entry. No information obtained during the initial entry or occupation of the apartment was needed or used by the agents to secure the warrant. It is therefore beyond dispute that the information possessed by the agents before they entered the apartment constituted an independent source for the discovery and seizure of the evidence now challenged.37 This evidence was discovered the day following the entry, during the search conducted under a valid warrant. It was the product of that search, wholly unrelated to the prior entry.38
The valid warrant search was a means sufficiently distinguishable to purge the evidence of any taint arising from the entry. Had police never entered the apartment, but instead conducted a perimeter stakeout to prevent anyone from entering the apartment and destroying evidence, the contraband now challenged would have been discovered and seized precisely as it was here.39 The legality of the initial entry is thus wholly irrelevant.40
The evidence first discovered during the search of the apartment pursuant to a valid warrant issued the day after the entry should not have been suppressed as fruit of the illegal entry.41
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented. He stated that the agents' 19-hour occupation of the apartment was a clear violation of the Fourth Amendment. The agents had no warrant authorizing their presence in the apartment.
The exigent circumstances that justified the initial entry had long since dissipated by the time the warrant arrived. The agents' continued presence in the apartment was therefore illegal. The evidence seized pursuant to the warrant should have been suppressed as the fruit of that illegality.
Brennan concluded that the majority's approach missed the direct connection between the illegality and the evidence.42