542 U.S. 630 (2004)
In June 2001, Samuel Francis Patane was arrested for harassing his ex-girlfriend, Linda O’Donnell.1 He was released on bond subject to a temporary restraining order that prohibited him from contacting O’Donnell.2
On June 6, 2001, after Patane apparently violated the restraining order by attempting to telephone O’Donnell, Officer Tracy Fox of the Colorado Springs Police Department began to investigate the matter.3 A county probation officer informed an agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms that Patane, a convicted felon, illegally possessed a .40 Glock pistol.4 The ATF relayed this information to Detective Josh Benner, who worked closely with the ATF.5 Detective Benner and Officer Fox proceeded to Patane’s residence.6
After reaching the residence and inquiring into Patane’s attempts to contact O’Donnell, Officer Fox arrested Patane for violating the restraining order.7 Detective Benner attempted to advise Patane of his Miranda rights but got no further than the right to remain silent. At that point, Patane interrupted, asserting that he knew his rights, and neither officer attempted to complete the warning.8
Detective Benner then asked Patane about the Glock. Patane was initially reluctant to discuss the matter. He ultimately told Benner that the pistol was in his bedroom and gave permission to retrieve it. Detective Benner found the pistol and seized it.9
A grand jury indicted Patane for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The District Court granted Patane’s motion to suppress the firearm.10 The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s ruling with respect to probable cause but affirmed the suppression order on Patane’s alternative theory.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.12
Whether a failure to give a suspect the warnings prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona requires suppression of the physical fruits of the suspect’s unwarned but voluntary statements?13
The Miranda rule is a prophylactic measure designed to protect the core right against compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.14 Because the Self-Incrimination Clause is not implicated by the introduction of nontestimonial physical evidence resulting from voluntary statements, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to mere failures to provide Miranda warnings.15
No. The Miranda rule protects against violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause, which is not implicated by the admission of physical evidence resulting from voluntary statements.16 In this case, the officers failed to complete the Miranda warnings after Patane asserted that he knew his rights, yet Patane voluntarily directed Detective Benner to the location of the Glock pistol in his bedroom and granted permission for its retrieval.17 The resulting physical evidence is nontestimonial and therefore falls outside the protections of the Self-Incrimination Clause. Because no constitutional violation occurred from the incomplete warnings alone, the exclusionary rule of Wong Sun has no application and suppression of the firearm is not required.18
A failure to give a suspect the warnings prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona does not require suppression of the physical fruits of the suspect’s unwarned but voluntary statements.19
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment.20 He explained that prior decisions in Oregon v. Elstad, New York v. Quarles, and Harris v. New York held evidence obtained following an unwarned interrogation admissible.21 This result was based on recognition that the concerns underlying the Miranda rule must be accommodated to other objectives of the criminal justice system.22
He agreed with the plurality that Dickerson did not undermine these precedents and in fact cited them in support.23 Here, admission of nontestimonial physical fruits such as the Glock does not run the risk of admitting into trial an accused’s coerced incriminating statements against himself.24 In light of the important probative value of reliable physical evidence, it is doubtful that exclusion can be justified by a deterrence rationale sensitive to both law enforcement interests and a suspect’s rights.25
Unlike the plurality, he found it unnecessary to decide whether the detective’s failure to give Patane the full Miranda warnings should be characterized as a violation of the Miranda rule itself.26
Justice Souter dissented.27 He argued that the real issue is whether courts should apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine lest an incentive be created for police to omit Miranda warnings before custodial interrogation.28 By closing their eyes to the consequences of giving an evidentiary advantage to those who ignore Miranda, the plurality adds an important inducement for interrogators to ignore the rule.29
Miranda rested on insight into the inherently coercive character of custodial interrogation and the difficult assessment of voluntariness.30 Unless the police give the prescribed warnings, a custodial confession is inadmissible.31 That inducement to forestall involuntary statements can only atrophy if an evidentiary benefit is recognized when an unwarned statement leads to tangible evidence.32
The Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination extends to the exclusion of derivative evidence.33
Justice Breyer dissented.34 For reasons similar to those set forth in Justice Souter’s dissent and in his concurring opinion in Missouri v. Seibert, he would extend to this context the fruit of the poisonous tree approach.35 He believed the Court has come close to adopting this approach in Seibert.36
Under that approach, courts would exclude physical evidence derived from unwarned questioning unless the failure to provide Miranda warnings was in good faith.37 Because the courts below made no explicit finding as to good or bad faith, he would remand for such a determination.38