Also known as: FRCP 12(b)(6) · Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) · Rule 12(b)(6) · 12(b)(6) motion · failure to state a claim
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A pretrial motion by which a defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint. The court assumes the truth of well-pleaded factual allegations and draws reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor but disregards legal conclusions and labels. Dismissal follows when those facts fail to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.
The Bayview Neighborhood Association sued GreenWaste Services alleging toxic dumping near a wetland. Its complaint stated only that animals were disappearing and the water looked different, without any facts about discharges, tests, or pollutants. GreenWaste moved to dismiss before answering. The court granted the motion because the allegations supplied no factual content permitting a plausible inference of liability.
A patient sued Medtronic after a pacemaker lead allegedly caused injury. The complaint asserted state tort claims without addressing the device's federal regulatory approval. Medtronic moved to dismiss. The court examined whether the claims survived federal preemption analysis at the pleading stage.
In 1976, Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in response to concerns over defective devices such as the Dalkon Shield intrauterine contraceptive. The amendments established a regulatory framework classifying devices into three classes based on risk, with Class III devices like pacemakers requiring premarket approval unless they qualified for an exemption. In October 1982, Medtronic, Inc. notified the FDA that its Model 4011 pacemaker lead was substantially equivalent to pre-1976 devices, and the FDA cleared it for marketing under the §510(k) process. In 1982, Lora Lohr underwent surgery in Florida to receive a Medtronic pacemaker equipped with the Model 4011 lead. Five years later, on December 30, 1990, the device failed, allegedly causing a complete heart block that required emergency surgery; her physician attributed the failure to a defect in the lead. Lohr and her husband subsequently filed suit in Florida state court in 1993, asserting claims for negligent design, negligent manufacture, failure to warn, and strict liability based on an unreasonably dangerous product. Medtronic removed the action to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The district court initially denied Medtronic's motion for summary judgment but later dismissed the entire complaint after the Eleventh Circuit's decision in a related case, concluding that the claims were preempted by the MDA. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the design defect claims were not preempted while the manufacturing and failure-to-warn claims were preempted by general federal regulations. The Lohrs and Medtronic both petitioned for certiorari, and the Supreme Court granted review to address the conflict among the circuits regarding the preemptive scope of the MDA's preemption provision. The case was argued on April 23, 1996, and decided on June 26, 1996.
View caseAdam Clayton Powell sued the Speaker and other House officials after the House voted to exclude him from his seat. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief based on constitutional violations. Defendants moved to dismiss. The court assessed whether the allegations presented a justiciable controversy under the pleaded facts.
In November 1966 Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., was duly elected from New York's Eighteenth Congressional District to serve in the 90th Congress. During the preceding Congress a Special Subcommittee on Contracts of the Committee on House Administration investigated expenditures of the Committee on Education and Labor. The subcommittee issued a report concluding that Powell had deceived House authorities about travel expenses and that illegal salary payments had been made to his wife at his direction. The report also found that Powell met the standing qualifications of age, citizenship, and residence. When the 90th Congress organized in January 1967 the House adopted House Resolution No. 1 by a vote of 363 to 65. The resolution appointed a nine-member Select Committee to inquire into Powell's qualifications and alleged misconduct. Powell appeared before the committee but, on advice of counsel, limited his testimony to the three standing qualifications and refused to answer questions about other matters. The Select Committee issued a report finding that Powell met the standing qualifications yet recommending that he be seated, censured, fined $40,000, and deprived of seniority. On March 1, 1967, the House rejected a motion to vote on that recommendation. The House then adopted an amendment calling for exclusion by a vote of 248 to 176 and passed House Resolution No. 278 by a vote of 307 to 116, thereby excluding Powell and declaring the seat vacant. Powell and thirteen voters from his district filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against Speaker John W. McCormack, four other House members, and the Clerk, Sergeant at Arms, and Doorkeeper. The complaint alleged that House Resolution No. 278 violated the Constitution because Powell satisfied the standing qualifications and requested declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and mandamus to compel seating and payment of salary. The district court dismissed the complaint for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. While the case was pending the 90th Congress ended. Powell was reelected in November 1968 and seated in the 91st Congress under a resolution that imposed a $25,000 fine. Respondents filed a suggestion of mootness, but Powell's claim for back salary from the period of exclusion remained unresolved.
View casePaul sued a police chief after his name appeared on a flyer listing active shoplifters. The complaint claimed the listing damaged his reputation and employment prospects. The chief moved to dismiss. The court evaluated whether the pleaded facts stated a liberty or property interest sufficient to support relief.
In June 1971 Edward Charles Davis was arrested in Louisville, Kentucky, on a shoplifting charge while employed as a photographer at a retail store. The charge was arraigned in September 1971. Davis pleaded not guilty. The charge was filed away with leave to reinstate. It was ultimately dismissed in December 1972 after the events at issue. In late 1972 Louisville Police Chief Paul and Jefferson County Police Chief McDaniel combined their departments' efforts. They distributed a five-page flyer containing mug shots and names to approximately 800 merchants in the Louisville metropolitan area. The flyer was headed "NOVEMBER 1972 CITY OF LOUISVILLE JEFFERSON COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENTS ACTIVE SHOPLIFTERS" and listed Davis among the individuals shown. The persons depicted had been arrested during 1971 and 1972. Davis's photograph and name appeared on page two. The flyer stated it was distributed so merchants could inform security personnel to watch for the subjects. At the time the flyer circulated, Davis was employed as a photographer by the Louisville Courier-Journal and Times. The flyer came to the attention of Davis's supervisor. The supervisor called him in to discuss the matter. The supervisor informed Davis he would not be fired but warned him not to find himself in a similar situation again. Davis then filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. He alleged that the police chiefs' distribution of the flyer deprived him of liberty without due process of law and violated his right to privacy. The District Court granted petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. It held that the distribution implicated a liberty interest and required prior notice and an opportunity to be heard. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the constitutional questions presented.
View caseA tenured teacher sued the school board after dismissal without a pre-termination hearing. The complaint alleged deprivation of a protected interest without due process. The board moved to dismiss. The court considered whether the facts alleged a cognizable constitutional claim.
In 1979 the Cleveland Board of Education hired James Loudermill as a security guard. On his job application Loudermill stated that he had never been convicted of a felony. Eleven months later a routine check revealed that Loudermill had been convicted of grand larceny in 1968. By letter dated November 3, 1980 the Board's Business Manager informed Loudermill that he had been dismissed for dishonesty in filling out the employment application. Loudermill received no opportunity to respond to the charge or to challenge the dismissal before it took effect. Under Ohio law Loudermill was a classified civil servant who could be discharged only for cause and who could file an administrative appeal within ten days of receiving notice of dismissal. Loudermill filed an appeal with the Cleveland Civil Service Commission on November 12, 1980. A referee held a hearing on January 29, 1981 and recommended reinstatement. On July 20, 1981 the full Commission heard argument and upheld the dismissal. Richard Donnelly was hired as a bus mechanic by the Parma Board of Education in 1979. Donnelly had been fired by the same Board in 1977 for failing an eye examination but had been reinstated after appeal. On his new application Donnelly listed his prior employment with the Board but did not disclose the earlier discharge. When the omission was discovered Donnelly was again fired for dishonesty. He received no opportunity to respond to the charge before termination. Donnelly appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which affirmed the dismissal. Loudermill and Donnelly filed separate suits in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Ohio alleging that the dismissal procedures violated their rights to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court dismissed both complaints for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in part and remanded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseMonroe sued Chicago police officers after an alleged unlawful search and seizure. The complaint sought damages directly under the Constitution. Defendants moved to dismiss. The court examined whether the pleaded facts supported an implied federal cause of action.
On October 29, 1958, at approximately 5:45 a.m., thirteen Chicago police officers entered the apartment of James Monroe and his family without a search warrant or arrest warrant. The officers roused the Monroes from bed using flashlights and forced them at gunpoint to stand naked in the living room while ransacking every room, emptying drawers, and ripping mattress covers. Detective Pape struck Mr. Monroe several times with his flashlight and called him "nigger" and "black boy." Other officers hit and kicked several of the children and pushed them to the floor. Mr. Monroe was then taken to the police station and detained on open charges for ten hours. During this period he was interrogated about a murder, exhibited in lineups, and not permitted to call his family or attorney, although he was not brought before a magistrate despite their availability. He was released without any criminal charges being filed against him. The complaint alleged that these actions occurred under color of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs, and usages of Illinois and Chicago, and that the City had no rules or controls over its police officers, permitting them to act without restraint. The Monroes claimed deprivations of rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and sought compensatory and punitive damages from the officers and the City. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment.
View caseA defendant may raise failure to state a claim in a pre-answer motion or in the answer itself. The defense is preserved even if omitted from an initial motion and may be asserted later by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at trial.
Supporting sources
The court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. It disregards legal conclusions and labels. Dismissal is proper only when the facts alleged do not state a plausible claim for relief.
Supporting sources
The motion must be converted to one for summary judgment. Both parties must receive a reasonable opportunity to present all material pertinent to that motion before the court rules.
Supporting sources
No. The complaint must contain enough factual content to make a plausible claim, not merely a theoretical possibility. Bare assertions of a course of dealing or conclusory labels are insufficient.
Supporting sources
…harms identified by petitioner in his brief before this Court is a subject of hot dispute, hardly amenable to dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Compare, e. g. , Brief for Petitioner 36-37 and Brief for David Robinson, Jr., as Amicus Curiae 23-28, on the one hand, with People v. Onofre , 51 N. Y. 2d 476, 489, 415 N. E. 2d 936,…