Also known as: extended families · extended-family · kin · relatives beyond nuclear family
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A family unit that includes the nuclear family plus collateral relatives such as grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins.
Esther Eisenberg executed a will leaving her estate to her extended family. After her death the probate court applied Uniform Probate Code section 2-710 and refused to treat the reference as creating any reversionary interest in Esther. The property therefore passed directly to the designated collateral relatives without returning to the estate.
Evelyn Ellison and her two grandchildren lived with Evelyn's adult daughter and son-in-law in a single home. The city cited the household for violating an ordinance that limited occupancy to nuclear families. The court held that the ordinance could not constitutionally exclude the extended family arrangement.
In early 1973, Mrs. Inez Moore received a notice of violation from the city of East Cleveland. The notice stated that her grandson John Moore, Jr., was an illegal occupant of her home. It directed her to comply with the housing ordinance. Mrs. Moore lived in her East Cleveland home together with her son Dale Moore, Sr., and her two grandsons Dale Moore, Jr., and John Moore, Jr. John came to live with her after his mother's death when he was less than one year old. When she failed to remove John from the home, the city filed a criminal charge against her. Mrs. Moore moved to dismiss the charge. She claimed that the ordinance was constitutionally invalid on its face. Her motion was overruled. Upon conviction she was sentenced to five days in jail and a $25 fine. The East Cleveland ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. The ordinance defined family to include only a husband or wife of the nominal head of the household, unmarried children of the head or spouse provided they have no children residing with them, a parent of the head or spouse, or not more than one dependent child of the head or spouse along with that child's spouse and dependent children. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction after giving full consideration to her constitutional claims. The Ohio Supreme Court denied review of the case. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of her appeal.
View caseEzra Eastman sought court-ordered visitation with his grandchildren after their mother limited contact. The mother argued that her parental rights controlled all decisions about the children's associations. The court recognized the extended family relationship but required the grandparents to overcome the presumption favoring the parent's wishes.
Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel never married but had two daughters, Isabelle and Natalie. Jenifer and Gary Troxel are Brad's parents and the paternal grandparents of the children. After Granville and Brad separated in 1991, Brad lived with his parents and regularly brought Isabelle and Natalie to their home for weekend visitation. Brad Troxel committed suicide in May 1993. The Troxels continued to see the children on a regular basis after his death. In October 1993 Granville informed the Troxels that she wished to limit their visitation to one short visit per month. In December 1993 the Troxels filed a petition in Washington Superior Court for Skagit County under Rev. Code Wash. § 26.10.160(3) seeking visitation rights. The statute provides that any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time. The court may order visitation when it may serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances. The Troxels requested two weekends of overnight visitation per month and two weeks each summer. Granville proposed one day of visitation per month with no overnight stay. In 1995 the Superior Court ordered visitation one weekend per month, one week during the summer, and four hours on both grandparents' birthdays. Granville appealed. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that nonparents lack standing to seek visitation under the statute unless a custody action is pending. The Washington Supreme Court granted review, held that the Troxels had standing, but affirmed on the ground that the statute unconstitutionally infringes on the fundamental right of parents to rear their children. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the judgment.
View caseEmily Ellis cared for her injured brother after an industrial accident caused by Echelon Security. She sought damages for loss of the extended family relationship that had previously included daily assistance and companionship. The court limited recovery to the spouse's consortium claim and rejected the sibling extension.
The appellant’s husband was employed by appellee Argonne Co., Inc. While in the course of that employment he sustained severe and permanent injuries to his body and in particular in and about his abdomen. As a direct consequence of those injuries the appellant was deprived of her husband’s aid, assistance, and enjoyment, specifically including sexual relations. The husband thereafter received compensation for his injuries pursuant to the provisions of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, the workmen’s compensation statute for the District of Columbia. Subsequently the wife filed the present action against the employer. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction and that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The motion was granted and judgment was entered for the appellee. The wife appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which heard the case on the record of the proceedings below.
View caseElla Emerson's estate included assets held in a trust benefiting multiple generations of collateral relatives. A dispute arose over whether state or federal court should decide the extended family distribution issues. The Supreme Court held that the probate exception did not bar federal jurisdiction over the related claims.
Vickie Lynn Marshall, also known as Anna Nicole Smith, met J. Howard Marshall II in October 1991 and married him on June 27, 1994. J. Howard died on August 4, 1995. Although he had given Vickie substantial gifts and money during their relationship, his will made no provision for her. Vickie maintained that J. Howard had intended to secure her future through a catchall trust. Respondent E. Pierce Marshall, one of J. Howard’s sons, stood as the sole ultimate beneficiary under his father’s estate plan, which consisted of a living trust and a pourover will directing all remaining assets into the trust. In January 1996, while J. Howard’s estate remained subject to probate proceedings in Harris County, Texas, Vickie filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California. In June 1996 Pierce filed a proof of claim in that bankruptcy case asserting that Vickie had defamed him through statements made to the press shortly after J. Howard’s death. Vickie answered and asserted a counterclaim alleging that Pierce had tortiously interfered with her expected gift by imprisoning J. Howard against his wishes, surrounding him with hired guards, making misrepresentations to him, and transferring property contrary to his expressed intentions. The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment to Vickie on Pierce’s defamation claim. After a trial on the merits it entered judgment for Vickie on her tortious interference counterclaim and awarded her more than $449 million in compensatory damages, less any amount recovered in the Texas probate action, plus $25 million in punitive damages. Pierce then moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the claim belonged exclusively in the Texas probate proceedings. In the Texas Probate Court, Pierce sought a declaration that the living trust and will were valid. Vickie initially challenged the instruments and asserted her own tortious interference claim there but voluntarily dismissed both claims after the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment. Following a jury trial the Probate Court declared the trust and will valid. On review of the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment the District Court rejected the probate-exception argument. The court adopted the Bankruptcy Court’s findings with supplements. It awarded Vickie approximately $44.3 million in compensatory damages together with an equal amount in punitive damages. The Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that the probate exception barred federal jurisdiction because the claim raised questions ordinarily decided by a probate court and because the Texas Probate Court had asserted exclusive jurisdiction over all of Vickie’s claims. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2005.
View caseErika Echevarria's will directed that remainder property go to her family. The remaindermen argued that the language created a reversion in the estate because the class was too indefinite. The court applied the modern rule that such family references do not presumptively retain any interest in the transferor.
In January 1899, James J. Hanigan conveyed a house and lot in New York City to a trustee. The trust instrument directed the trustee to pay the grantor from the rents and profits the yearly sum of $1,500, with discretion to pay more, and to pay some debts and two existing mortgages on the property. The trustee received powers to mortgage the premises to satisfy liens or carry out the deed's provisions and to sell the property. Upon the grantor's death, the trustee was to convey the premises, if unsold, to the grantor's heirs at law or to pay them the unexpended balance of any sale proceeds. The trustee could also reconvey the premises to the grantor at any time to end the trust. At the time of trial in this action, the grantor remained alive, with two daughters as his sole descendants. In June 1902, one daughter, Mrs. Hughes, executed a deed conveying to her husband all her interest in the real estate. The plaintiffs, who are judgment creditors, later recovered a judgment for more than $4,000 against Mr. and Mrs. Hughes. They brought this action to subject what they alleged to be an interest in the real property to the lien of their judgment. The Special Term ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on the existence of a reachable interest, but the Appellate Division reached a contrary conclusion, leading to this appeal.
View caseExtended family includes the immediate family plus collateral relatives such as grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins who form a clan. Immediate family is limited to parents, spouse, children, and siblings. The distinction matters for zoning, adoption preferences, and constitutional household protections.
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Yes. A city ordinance that limits household composition to nuclear families only violates due process when it prevents extended family members from living together. Courts recognize the long tradition of grandparents and other relatives sharing homes for child-rearing and economic support.
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Under the Uniform Probate Code, language describing beneficiaries as heirs, relatives, or family does not create or presumptively create a reversion in the transferor. The abolition of the worthier title doctrine means the property passes according to the instrument without returning to the estate.
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Federal law requires preferential placement with members of the child's extended family, then other tribal members, then other Indian families. This rule protects the child's connection to the Indian community and tribe.
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…has no place in our constitutional tradition. The rights of family association are not limited to the nuclear family. Extended families have played a vital role in our society, particularly among minority groups and the poor. The Constitution must protect the right of grandparents to live with their grandchildren.…