490 U.S. 30 (1989)
The Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians maintains a reservation in Neshoba County, Mississippi.1 J.B. and W.J. were enrolled members of the Tribe who resided on the reservation.2 On December 29, 1985, J.B. gave birth to twin babies in Gulfport, Harrison County, Mississippi, approximately 200 miles from the reservation.3 The twins were born out of wedlock.4
On January 10, 1986, J.B. executed a consent-to-adoption form before the Chancery Court of Harrison County.5 W.J. signed a similar form.6 On January 16, 1986, Orrey and Vivian Holyfield filed a petition for adoption in the same court.7 The chancellor issued a Final Decree of Adoption on January 28, 1986.8
Two months later, the Tribe moved to vacate the adoption decree on the ground that exclusive jurisdiction rested with the tribal court.9 The Chancery Court denied the motion on July 14, 1986.10 The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed that ruling.11
The twins had never been physically present on the reservation.12 Their mother had gone to some efforts to ensure they were born outside the reservation.13 The adoption decree made no reference to the twins' Indian background.14
Whether the term domicile in the Indian Child Welfare Act is defined by federal law or by state law?15
Congress intended a uniform federal law of domicile for the ICWA.16 Congress did not intend to rely on state-law definitions.17 The statute's purpose was to establish nationwide uniformity.18 This prevents state courts from undermining tribal jurisdiction over reservation-domiciled Indian children.19
Yes. The rule requires a federal definition of domicile to achieve the ICWA's goals of protecting tribal interests in Indian children.20 The established facts show that J.B. and W.J. were enrolled members and domiciliaries of the Choctaw Reservation in Neshoba County when the twins were born in Gulfport, Harrison County.21 The parents executed consents and the Holyfields obtained an adoption decree in state court without reference to the ICWA.22
These facts demonstrate that allowing a state-law definition would permit individual parents to defeat exclusive tribal jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) simply by giving birth off the reservation.23 The uniform federal rule prevents this outcome.24
The term domicile in the Indian Child Welfare Act is defined by federal law.25
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice And Justice Kennedy
Justice Stevens agreed that Congress intended a uniform federal law of domicile for the ICWA.26 He dissented from the majority's application of that definition to the facts.27 He argued that the ICWA's jurisdictional provisions were primarily addressed to involuntary removals of Indian children.28
Allowing parents to invoke state-court jurisdiction when they deliberately gave birth off the reservation and consented to adoption would not undermine tribal sovereignty.29 The substantive protections for parents and children would still apply under the Act.30
Whether twin children born off the reservation to enrolled tribal members who reside on the reservation are domiciled on the reservation for purposes of tribal jurisdiction under the Act?31
Yes. The rule applies the common-law principle that a child's domicile is that of the parents to the established facts, under which J.B. and W.J. remained domiciliaries of the Choctaw Reservation at all relevant times.35 The twins were therefore domiciled on the reservation at birth despite being born in Gulfport and never having been physically present there.36 The parents' voluntary consents and efforts to arrange an off-reservation adoption did not change that domicile or defeat exclusive tribal jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a).37
The twin children were domiciled on the reservation, so the tribal court possessed exclusive jurisdiction and the state adoption decree must be vacated.
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice And Justice Kennedy
Justice Stevens dissented on this issue.38 He contended that when both parents deliberately abandon an Indian child to non-Indian adoptive parents off the reservation and invoke state-court jurisdiction, no purpose of the ICWA is served by requiring exclusive tribal jurisdiction.39 The Act is primarily addressed to unjustified removals by nontribal agencies that fail to recognize tribal relations and cultural standards.40
Its substantive and procedural safeguards for parents and children remain available even in voluntary cases.41 The parents' choice of forum should be respected to promote family stability and security, and closing the state courthouse door here distorts the balance between individual and group rights that Congress struck.42 The interpretation adopted by the majority renders custody decisions forever suspect and forces parents who lack resources to establish an off-reservation domicile simply to access state processes.43