323 U.S. 214 (1944)
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States declared war on Japan on December 8, 1941.1 On February 19, 1942, the President issued Executive Order No. 9066 authorizing military commanders to prescribe military areas from which any or all persons could be excluded.2 Lieutenant General DeWitt, commander of the Western Defense Command, issued Public Proclamation No. 1 on March 2, 1942, establishing Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2 covering the Pacific Coast states and portions of Arizona.3 On March 21, 1942, Congress enacted legislation making it a misdemeanor for any person to enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in a military area contrary to restrictions imposed by military order.4
On March 27, 1942, General DeWitt issued Proclamation No. 4 prohibiting all persons of Japanese ancestry within Military Area No. 1 from leaving the area until further order.5 On May 3, 1942, he issued Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34, which required all persons of Japanese ancestry to depart from a described portion of Military Area No. 1, including San Leandro, California, by May 9, 1942, and to report to assembly centers for instructions.6 Fred Korematsu, a native-born United States citizen of Japanese ancestry residing in San Leandro, remained in the prohibited area after the deadline.7
Korematsu was charged by information in federal district court with violating the March 21, 1942 Act by knowingly remaining in the area covered by Exclusion Order No. 34.8 He was tried under a plea of not guilty, convicted, and placed on probation for five years.9 The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the importance of the constitutional question presented.10
At the time of the charged violation on May 30, 1942, Korematsu was subject to an earlier order prohibiting him from leaving Military Area No. 1 and the later exclusion order requiring him to leave unless he reported to an assembly center.11 No question was raised at trial concerning his loyalty to the United States, and the sole basis for the conviction was his Japanese ancestry and presence in the area after the exclusion date.12
Whether Executive Order No. 9066, the Act of March 21, 1942, and Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 authorized the military to exclude all persons of Japanese ancestry from designated West Coast areas during World War II?13
The war power of the Government is the power to wage war successfully, and military authorities may exclude persons from areas when there is a definite and close relationship to the prevention of espionage and sabotage.14
Yes. The exclusion order was issued pursuant to Executive Order No. 9066 after the United States was at war with Japan.15 The military authorities determined that exclusion was necessary to protect against espionage and sabotage.16 Korematsu was convicted for remaining in the area as a person of Japanese ancestry.17
The court upheld the order as reasonably related to the protection of the war effort.18 The facts show that the order was one of a series aimed at the twin dangers of espionage and sabotage, similar to the curfew order upheld in Hirabayashi.19
The orders authorized the military exclusion as a valid exercise of the war power.20
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Justice Frankfurter concurred separately in the judgment.21 He stressed that the provisions of the Constitution conferring war powers on Congress and the President are as much part of the Constitution as provisions looking to a nation at peace.22 The war power of the Government is the power to wage war successfully.23
The validity of action under the war power must be judged wholly in the context of war and not stigmatized as lawless because like action in times of peace would be lawless.24 He joined the opinion of the Court because the military order does not transcend the means appropriate for conducting war.25
Whether the conviction of a native-born American citizen of Japanese ancestry for remaining in a military area after the exclusion date, without any evidence or finding of individual disloyalty, violated constitutional protections?26
All legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect and must be subjected to the most rigid scrutiny, but pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions.27
No. Although restrictions on a single racial group are suspect, the military necessity justified the exclusion order.28 The court could not reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities that there were disloyal members of the population.29 The exclusion was not based upon racial prejudice but upon the military necessity of protecting the West Coast from espionage and sabotage.30 Korematsu was not excluded because of hostility to him or his race.31
The conviction did not violate constitutional protections because the exclusion was justified by military necessity.32
The conviction did not violate constitutional protections because the exclusion was justified by military necessity.
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Justice Roberts dissented because the indisputable facts exhibit a clear violation of constitutional rights.33 This is the case of convicting a citizen as a punishment for not submitting to imprisonment in a concentration camp based on ancestry and solely because of ancestry without evidence or inquiry concerning loyalty.34 The petitioner was faced with two diametrically contradictory orders given sanction by the Act of Congress.35
The earlier order made him a criminal if he left the zone while the later made him a criminal if he did not leave.36 To punish him for violation of either would deny due process of law.37 He would reverse the judgment of conviction.38
Justice Murphy dissented from this legalization of racism.39 The exclusion order is a clear violation of the constitutional rights of citizens of the United States because it is based solely on racial ancestry.40 The military necessity claimed is not supported by the evidence and the order is the result of racial prejudice rather than military necessity.41
It violates the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.42 The petitioner is a native-born citizen who has not been charged with any act of disloyalty.43 Racial discrimination has no justifiable part in the democratic way of life.44
Whether the validity of the exclusion order could be determined separately from later orders requiring persons of Japanese ancestry to report to and remain in assembly or relocation centers?45
The lawfulness of one order does not necessarily determine the lawfulness of the others because they impose distinct duties in connection with the separate steps in a complete evacuation program.46
Yes. The petitioner was convicted only of violating the exclusion order by remaining in the prohibited area.47 The court is not required to pass upon the whole subsequent detention program in assembly and relocation centers because the separate requirements imposed distinct duties on those of Japanese ancestry to depart from the area, report to and temporarily remain in an assembly center, and go to a relocation center.48 Each requirement imposed distinct duties in connection with the separate steps in a complete evacuation program.49
The lawfulness of the exclusion order can therefore be determined separately from the later detention orders.50
The validity of the exclusion order could be determined separately from the later detention orders.51
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Justice Jackson dissented because the Court is approving a military order that will live as a precedent for future repression.52 The exclusion order was not based on any individual guilt but on racial ancestry.53 The Court is saying that in time of war the military can do anything it chooses and the courts will not interfere.54
This is a dangerous doctrine.55 The petitioner has been convicted of an offense which consists only in being present in the place where he lived.56 This is not a crime and the conviction should be set aside.57
A civil court cannot be made to enforce an order which violates constitutional limitations even if it is a reasonable exercise of military authority.58