530 U.S. 57 (2000)
Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel never married but had two daughters, Isabelle and Natalie.1 Jenifer and Gary Troxel are Brad's parents and the paternal grandparents of the children.2 After Granville and Brad separated in 1991, Brad lived with his parents and regularly brought Isabelle and Natalie to their home for weekend visitation.3
Brad Troxel committed suicide in May 1993.4 The Troxels continued to see the children on a regular basis after his death.5 In October 1993 Granville informed the Troxels that she wished to limit their visitation to one short visit per month.6 In December 1993 the Troxels filed a petition in Washington Superior Court for Skagit County under Rev. Code Wash. § 26.10.160(3) seeking visitation rights.7
The statute provides that any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time.8 The court may order visitation when it may serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances.9 The Troxels requested two weekends of overnight visitation per month and two weeks each summer.10 Granville proposed one day of visitation per month with no overnight stay.11 In 1995 the Superior Court ordered visitation one weekend per month, one week during the summer, and four hours on both grandparents' birthdays.12
Granville appealed.13 The Washington Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that nonparents lack standing to seek visitation under the statute unless a custody action is pending.14 The Washington Supreme Court granted review, held that the Troxels had standing, but affirmed on the ground that the statute unconstitutionally infringes on the fundamental right of parents to rear their children.15 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the judgment.16
Whether Rev. Code Wash. § 26.10.160(3) unconstitutionally infringes on the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children?17
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.18
Yes. Section 26.10.160(3), as applied to Granville and her family in this case, unconstitutionally infringes on that fundamental parental right.19 The statute contains no requirement that a court accord the parent’s decision any presumption of validity or any weight whatsoever.20 Instead, the statute places the best-interest determination solely in the hands of the judge.21 The Troxels did not allege, and no court has found, that Granville was an unfit parent.22 The Superior Court applied the opposite presumption.23
The statute violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied in this case.24
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I concur in the judgment affirming the decision of the Washington Supreme Court.25 I write separately to note that I would not decide whether the statute is unconstitutional on its face.2627 In my view, it is sufficient to hold that the statute, as applied in this case, violates the parent’s fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of her children.28
The Superior Court’s order in this case was not supported by any finding that Granville was an unfit parent or that the children would suffer harm in the absence of visitation with the Troxels.29 The order was based solely on the judge’s determination that visitation would be in the children’s best interest.30 That is not enough to overcome the presumption that a fit parent acts in the best interests of her children.31
Whether the Washington nonparental visitation statute is unconstitutional on its face?32
A statute that permits any person to petition for visitation rights at any time is unconstitutionally broad.33 It authorizes a court to order visitation whenever it finds that such visitation would serve the child’s best interest.34 The statute does so without according any deference to the parent’s wishes or requiring a showing of harm or parental unfitness.35 Therefore the statute is unconstitutional on its face.36
Yes. The breadth of the statute is apparent on its face.37 It permits any person to petition for visitation rights.38 It contains no requirement that the petitioner have any relationship with the child.39
It contains no requirement that the parent be shown to be unfit.40 It contains no requirement that the visitation order be limited in duration or that it be subject to any particular conditions.41 The statute thus permits a court to order visitation by any person at any time, so long as the judge believes that such visitation would serve the child’s best interest.42 The combination of these factors renders the statute unconstitutional on its face.43
The statute is unconstitutional on its face.
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I concur in the judgment.44 I agree with the plurality that parents have a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of their children.45 I would apply strict scrutiny to any infringement of that right.46
The Washington statute, as applied here, cannot survive strict scrutiny.47 The State has not shown that the statute is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.48 The statute is not narrowly tailored because it permits any person to obtain visitation rights merely by showing that visitation is in the child’s best interest.49 That standard is far too broad to survive strict scrutiny.50
The Court today affirms the decision of the Washington Supreme Court holding that the State’s nonparental visitation statute is unconstitutional on its face.51 I respectfully dissent.52
The Court’s decision rests on the premise that parents have a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of their children that cannot be infringed without a showing that the parent is unfit.53 While I agree that parents have important interests in the upbringing of their children, I do not believe that those interests are so absolute as to preclude the State from ordering visitation with grandparents when a court determines that such visitation is in the child’s best interest.54
The State has a compelling interest in the welfare of children.55 That interest is not limited to protecting children from harm caused by unfit parents.56 The State also has an interest in ensuring that children have the opportunity to develop relationships with other adults who may play an important role in their lives, including grandparents.57
Whether the Superior Court's visitation order violated the Due Process Clause by placing the burden on the fit parent to disprove that visitation served the children's best interests?58
Yes. The problem here is not that the Washington Superior Court intervened, but that when it did so, it gave no special weight at all to Granville's determination of her daughters' best interests.61 More importantly, it appears that the Superior Court applied exactly the opposite presumption.62 In reciting its oral ruling after the hearing, the Superior Court judge stated that the burden is on the mother to show that the grandparents should not have visitation.63
The judge thus applied a presumption that the grandparents’ request should be granted unless the mother could prove that visitation would not be in the children’s best interest.64 That presumption is contrary to the traditional presumption that parents act in the best interests of their children.65 The decisional framework employed by the Superior Court directly contravened the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child.66
The Superior Court’s visitation order violated the Due Process Clause.67
Related opinions on this issue
I join Justice Stevens’ dissent.68 Parents have no constitutionally protected right to prevent all third-party visitation with their children.69 The right to direct the upbringing of one’s children does not include the right to exclude all other persons from the child’s life.70
The State may reasonably conclude that children benefit from contact with grandparents.71 The Washington statute is a reasonable means of protecting that interest.72 The fact that the statute is broad does not render it unconstitutional.73 Courts are capable of applying the best interest of the child standard in a manner that respects the parent’s wishes.74
I agree with much of Justice Stevens’ dissent.75 The plurality’s decision unduly restricts the States’ ability to protect children’s welfare.76 The plurality’s insistence on a presumption that fit parents always act in their children’s best interests ignores the reality that parental decisions are not always perfect.77
Courts have long had the authority to intervene in family matters when necessary to protect the child.78 The Washington statute is a legitimate exercise of that authority.79 The statute does not authorize courts to override parental decisions lightly.80 It requires a showing that visitation is in the child’s best interest.81 That standard provides sufficient protection for parental rights.82 The plurality’s decision will have the unfortunate effect of invalidating many nonparental visitation statutes across the country.83