Also known as: ex converso · conversely · on the contrary
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A Latin phrase used to introduce a contrasting or opposite legal proposition. It signals that the stated rule or outcome applies in reverse under the inverted facts or doctrine.
Enzo spoke openly on a street corner about a planned transaction while standing near a police officer. The officer overheard the details without any device. E converso, when Enzo later conducted the same discussion inside a closed office with drawn curtains, the intrusion required a warrant.
Emma owned land in State X and sought to transfer it under the law of her domicile in State Y. The court applied the full law of State X including its choice-of-law rules. E converso, when the asset was a movable chattel, the forum applied only the local law of the state with the most significant relationship.
Elliot challenged a state ban on contraceptive counseling for married couples. The Court recognized a right of privacy not listed in the first eight amendments. E converso, when a claimed right fell outside the zone of protected liberty interests, the Ninth Amendment supplied no independent basis for invalidation.
Estelle Griswold served as Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Dr. C. Lee Buxton served as the League's Medical Director and was a professor at Yale Medical School. Together they opened and operated a center in New Haven that was open from November 1 to November 10, 1961. At the center they gave information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the means of preventing conception. They examined the wife and prescribed the best contraceptive device or material for her use. Fees were usually charged, although some couples were serviced free. The statutes involved were sections 53-32 and 54-196 of the General Statutes of Connecticut (1958 rev.). Section 53-32 made it a crime to use any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception. Section 54-196 punished accessories as principals. The appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each. The Appellate Division of the Circuit Court affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut affirmed that judgment in State v. Griswold, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A. 2d 479. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction. The appellants asserted standing to raise the constitutional rights of the married persons with whom they had a professional relationship. A criminal conviction for serving married couples removes doubts about case or controversy. The rights of husband and wife would be diluted unless considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them.
View caseEsther's utility company ran advertisements promoting energy consumption. The commission banned the ads under a state energy-conservation policy. E converso, when the speech concerned truthful information about lawful activity and directly advanced a substantial interest without being more extensive than necessary, the ban failed.
In December 1973, the Public Service Commission ordered electric utilities in New York State to cease all advertising that promoted the use of electricity because the interconnected utility system lacked sufficient fuel stocks for the 1973-1974 winter. The order rested on the Commission's finding that the system did not have sufficient fuel stocks or sources of supply to meet customer demands. Three years later, when the fuel shortage had eased, the Commission requested comments from the public on its proposal to continue the ban on promotional advertising. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. opposed the ban on First Amendment grounds. After reviewing the public comments, the Commission extended the prohibition in a Policy Statement issued on February 25, 1977. The Policy Statement divided advertising expenses into promotional and institutional categories. It permitted informational advertising designed to encourage shifts of consumption from peak demand times to periods of low electricity demand. The Commission banned promotional advertising because additional electricity would be more expensive to produce and promotional advertising would give misleading signals to the public. Central Hudson challenged the order in state court. The order was upheld through the New York Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and reversed.
View caseEthan purchased land in State A from a nonresident seller. The buyer later sued the seller in State A over a related debt. E converso, when the property lay outside the forum and the defendant had no other contacts, the court lacked jurisdiction to enter a personal judgment.
In February 1866, J.H. Mitchell obtained a judgment in an Oregon circuit court against Neff for less than $300 in an action for attorney services. At that time, Neff resided outside Oregon, received no personal service of process, and made no appearance in the case. The judgment was entered by default following constructive service by publication as authorized by the Oregon Code for non-resident defendants possessing property within the state. The Oregon Code also provided for attachment of a non-resident's property in money actions. No such attachment occurred with respect to the land at issue. Instead, after the judgment, an execution issued, leading to a levy on the land and its sale at a sheriff's auction. Pennoyer purchased the property at that sale and received a sheriff's deed. Separately, in 1866, the United States issued a patent to Neff for the same tract of land under the Donation Law of Oregon, which Neff valued at $15,000. Neff then brought suit against Pennoyer in the circuit court to recover possession of the premises based on his patent title. The lower court held the Oregon judgment invalid because of deficiencies in the affidavits used to obtain the publication order and to prove publication occurred. The Supreme Court of the United States granted review to consider the validity of the state court judgment and the resulting sheriff's sale.
View caseElijah's home was searched without a warrant by federal agents who destroyed property. He sued the agents directly for damages under the Constitution. E converso, when Congress had provided an alternative remedy or explicitly barred the action, the implied damages claim was unavailable.
On the morning of November 26, 1965, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics entered Webster Bivens's apartment in the Bronx. The agents broke open the door, handcuffed Bivens in front of his wife and young children, and thoroughly searched the apartment. They then transported Bivens to the federal courthouse in Brooklyn, where he was interrogated, booked, and subjected to a visual strip search. Several days later Bivens was released on his own recognizance, and he was never indicted or prosecuted for any offense. Bivens filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the six agents in their individual capacities. His complaint sought fifteen thousand dollars in damages from each agent and alleged that the arrest and search were effected without a warrant, that unreasonable force was employed, and that the arrest was made without probable cause. Bivens claimed to have suffered great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering as a result of the agents' conduct. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review the judgment.
View caseIt introduces the opposite proposition when facts invert the original holding. In Griswold the Court used the phrase to explain that a negation in particular cases implies an affirmation in all others.
No. The phrase merely signals that the stated rule applies in reverse under the inverted facts. The underlying doctrine remains the same.
Use it to contrast two outcomes that turn on the presence or absence of a single element, such as privacy expectation or consent requirement.
…U. S. 245, 255-256; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, supra ; cf. St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Alexander , 227 U. S. 218. Conversely it has been generally recognized that the casual presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a state in the corporation’s behalf are not…