397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970)
During a 1967 adjudicatory hearing conducted pursuant to section 742 of the New York Family Court Act, a judge in New York Family Court found that the twelve-year-old appellant had entered a locker and stolen one hundred twelve dollars from a woman's pocketbook.1 The petition which charged appellant with delinquency alleged that his act, if done by an adult, would constitute the crime or crimes of larceny.2 The judge acknowledged that the proof might not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but relied on section 744(b) of the New York Family Court Act, which provides that any determination at the conclusion of an adjudicatory hearing that a juvenile did an act or acts must be based on a preponderance of the evidence.3
After a subsequent dispositional hearing, appellant was ordered placed in a training school for an initial period of eighteen months, subject to annual extensions of his commitment until his eighteenth birthday, six years in appellant's case.4 The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, First Judicial Department, affirmed without opinion.5 The New York Court of Appeals then affirmed by a four-to-three vote, expressly sustaining the constitutionality of section 744(b).6 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.7
Whether the Due Process Clause requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt during the adjudicatory stage of a juvenile delinquency proceeding when the juvenile is charged with an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult?8
The Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.9
Yes. During a 1967 adjudicatory hearing conducted pursuant to section 742 of the New York Family Court Act, a judge in New York Family Court found that the twelve-year-old appellant had entered a locker and stolen one hundred twelve dollars from a woman's pocketbook. The petition alleged that this act, if done by an adult, would constitute the crime or crimes of larceny.10 The judge acknowledged that the proof might not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but relied instead on section 744(b), which requires only a preponderance of the evidence.11
After a subsequent dispositional hearing the court ordered the boy placed in a training school for an initial period of eighteen months subject to annual extensions until his eighteenth birthday.12 This commitment potentially resulted in confinement for up to six years.13 The same considerations that demand extreme caution in factfinding to protect the innocent adult apply as well to the innocent child when charged with an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult.14 The reasonable-doubt standard applies because the juvenile faced interests of immense importance, including the possibility of losing his liberty and the certainty of stigmatization by a delinquency finding equivalent to a criminal conviction.15
The Due Process Clause requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt during the adjudicatory stage of a juvenile delinquency proceeding when the juvenile is charged with an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult.16
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to emphasize that the choice of proof standard reflects a fundamental assessment of the comparative social costs of erroneous factual determinations.17 He explained that in a juvenile delinquency proceeding an erroneous finding exposes the accused to complete loss of personal liberty through state-imposed confinement.18 It also exposes the youth to stigmatization based on a finding that the accused committed a crime.19
Harlan concluded that these consequences are sufficiently similar to those in a criminal case.20 It is far worse to declare an innocent youth a delinquent than to let a guilty youth go free.21 Therefore a juvenile court judge must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the charged criminal act.22
Joined by Justice Stewart
Chief Justice Burger dissented on the ground that the Court's opinion rests entirely on the assumption that all juvenile proceedings are criminal prosecutions.23 Hence they are subject to constitutional limitations.24 Burger contended that there is no constitutional requirement of due process sufficient to overcome the legislative judgment of the States.25
The decision further erodes the differences between juvenile courts and traditional criminal courts by strait-jacketing an already overly restricted system.26
Justice Black dissented on the ground that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not expressly or impliedly commanded by any provision of the Constitution.27 He maintained that the Bill of Rights spells out in detail the kind of trial a defendant charged with crime should have.28 The Court has no power to add to or subtract from the procedures set forth by the Founders.29
Black argued that due process of law means according to the law of the land as enacted by the legislature.30 When a State through its duly constituted legislative branch decides to apply a different standard such as preponderance of the evidence, that standard must be applied unless it is otherwise unconstitutional.31