Also known as: duress of circumstance · necessity
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A form of duress recognized when a natural parent consents to adoption because of dire personal circumstances such as lack of resources or assistance. It justifies later revocation of consent once the parent's situation improves.
Diana Delgado consented to adoption while without resources. She later revoked consent after her situation improved. The mortgage on her home remained enforceable because a valid underlying obligation continued to support the security device.
Darius Dixon created his financial hardship through reckless spending. He sought to revoke consent to adoption citing duress of circumstances. The justification failed because his recklessness in bringing about the situation barred the defense.
Doris Duffy claimed an easement by necessity after consenting to adoption under pressure. The extent of necessity to the claimant supported her revocation request once resources returned. The court weighed that factor in allowing the revocation.
Daphne Doyle revoked consent after her circumstances improved. The servitude by necessity ended because the necessity that gave rise to the original consent no longer continued.
Denise Donovan sought revocation citing duress of circumstances. Her attorney prepared memoranda in anticipation of the adoption hearing. The materials required a showing of necessity before disclosure.
Delilah Duran signed the consent form while under external pressure from circumstances. The muscular act of signing remained her volitional act even though the pressure was severe.
Courts look for a natural parent who lacked resources or assistance and consented to adoption as a way out of immediate troubles. Later improvement in the parent's situation allows revocation when the pressure from circumstances has lifted.
Yes. When the parent was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation, the justification for revocation is unavailable.
The claim lasts only as long as the necessity that gave rise to the consent continues. Once the parent's circumstances improve, the basis for revocation ends.
…Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (1923) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 51-52, 81-88, 108. : Shelton, Concurrent Jurisdiction — Its Necessity and its Dangers (1928) 15 Va. L. Rev. 137; Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between Federal and State Courts (1928) 13 Corn. L.Q. 499, 524-30; Johnson, State Law and the Federal…