304 U.S. 64, 78–80 (1938)
Tompkins, a citizen of Pennsylvania, was injured on a dark night by a passing freight train of the Erie Railroad Company while walking along its right of way at Hughestown in that State.1 He claimed that the accident occurred through negligence in the operation or maintenance of the train.2 He asserted that he was rightfully on the premises as a licensee because he was on a commonly used beaten footpath which ran for a short distance alongside the tracks. He further alleged that he was struck by something which looked like a door projecting from one of the moving cars.3
To enforce that claim he brought an action in the federal court for southern New York, which had jurisdiction because the company is a corporation of that State.4
The Erie insisted that its duty to Tompkins was no greater than that owed to a trespasser.5 It contended, among other things, that its duty to Tompkins, and hence its liability, should be determined in accordance with the Pennsylvania law; that under the law of Pennsylvania, as declared by its highest court, persons who use pathways along the railroad right of way are to be deemed trespassers; and that the railroad is not liable for injuries to undiscovered trespassers resulting from its negligence, unless it be wanton or wilful.6 Tompkins denied that any such rule had been established by the decisions of the Pennsylvania courts.7 He contended that, since there was no statute of the State on the subject, the railroad's duty and liability is to be determined in federal courts as a matter of general law.
The trial judge refused to rule that the Pennsylvania law precluded recovery.8 The jury brought in a verdict of $30,000. The judgment entered thereon was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that it was unnecessary to consider whether the law of Pennsylvania was as contended, because the question was one not of local, but of general, law and that upon questions of general law the federal courts are free, in the absence of a local statute, to exercise their independent judgment as to what the law is. Because of the importance of the question whether the federal court was free to disregard the alleged rule of the Pennsylvania common law, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.9
Whether the oft-challenged doctrine of Swift v. Tyson shall now be disapproved?10
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And whether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or general, be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.11
Yes. It contended, among other things, that its duty to Tompkins, and hence its liability, should be determined in accordance with the Pennsylvania law; that under the law of Pennsylvania, as declared by its highest court, persons who use pathways along the railroad right of way are to be deemed trespassers; and that the railroad is not liable for injuries to undiscovered trespassers resulting from its negligence, unless it be wanton or wilful. The jury brought in a verdict of $30,000; and the judgment entered thereon was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that it was unnecessary to consider whether the law of Pennsylvania was as contended, because the question was one not of local, but of general, law and that upon questions of general law the federal courts are free, in the absence of a local statute, to exercise their independent judgment as to what the law is.12
The established facts confirm that Tompkins relied on the absence of a state statute to invoke general law.13 Erie pointed to Pennsylvania decisions deeming such users trespassers with only a duty to avoid wanton or wilful injury.14 Because the Constitution reserves to the states the authority to declare substantive rules of tort law, the federal court's independent judgment on that issue cannot stand.15
The doctrine of Swift v. Tyson is disapproved, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings to apply the law of Pennsylvania as declared by its highest court.16
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Reed concurs in the result and in disapproving the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson but declines to join the portion of the opinion that rests on constitutional grounds.17 He maintains that the case requires only a statutory interpretation holding that the word laws in section 34 of the Judiciary Act includes decisions of state tribunals.18 Reed notes that the majority's declaration of unconstitutionality goes further than necessary and observes that prior opinions had not resolved whether Congress could direct federal courts to follow state decisions.19
He prefers to overturn the construction of the statute rather than reach a constitutional question in these circumstances.20