diversity of the parties

In 1892 a national magazine proposed that schoolchildren recite a pledge of allegiance to the flag. Congress first codified rules for the Pledge in a 1942 joint resolution and amended the text twelve years later to add the words "under God." California law requires every public elementary school to begin each day with appropriate patriotic exercises. The Elk Grove Unified School District satisfies the requirement by directing that each elementary class recite the Pledge once daily, while permitting students who object on religious grounds to abstain. Michael A. Newdow, an atheist whose daughter was then enrolled in kindergarten in the district, filed suit in March 2000 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California against Congress, the President, the State of California, the School District, and its superintendent. The complaint sought a declaration that the 1954 amendment adding "under God" violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses and an injunction against the district's daily recitation policy. The district court adopted a magistrate judge's recommendation and dismissed the complaint on July 21, 2000. A divided Ninth Circuit panel reversed, holding that Newdow had standing as a parent and that both the 1954 Act and the district policy violated the Establishment Clause. After that decision, Sandra Banning, the mother of Newdow's daughter, moved to intervene or dismiss, stating that she held sole legal custody and that the child was a Christian who had no objection to reciting or hearing the Pledge. On September 25, 2002, a California Superior Court enjoined Newdow from including his daughter as a party or suing as her next friend. The Ninth Circuit subsequently held that Newdow retained Article III standing as a noncustodial parent under California law. In February 2003 the court amended its opinion to omit any determination of standing to challenge the 1954 Act itself. At a September 2003 hearing the Superior Court announced that the parents now share joint legal custody but that Banning makes the final decisions if they disagree. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider both Newdow's standing and the First Amendment question.

On May 22, 1974, appellee Heitner, a nonresident of Delaware who owned one share of stock in the Greyhound Corporation, filed a shareholder's derivative suit in the Court of Chancery for New Castle County, Delaware. The complaint named as defendants Greyhound Corporation, its wholly owned subsidiary Greyhound Lines, Inc., and twenty-eight present or former officers and directors of one or both corporations. Heitner alleged that the individual defendants had violated their fiduciary duties by causing the corporations to engage in activities that resulted in a private antitrust judgment of over thirteen million dollars and a criminal contempt fine of six hundred thousand dollars, both arising from events in Oregon. The individual defendants resided primarily in Arizona and conducted their business there. Simultaneously with the complaint, Heitner filed a motion for sequestration of the Delaware property of the individual defendants pursuant to Del. Code Ann., Tit. 10, § 366. The Court of Chancery granted the motion the same day and appointed a sequestrator who seized approximately eighty-two thousand shares of Greyhound common stock belonging to nineteen defendants, along with options belonging to two others and certain debentures, warrants, and stock unit credits. The stock certificates were not physically present in Delaware, but Del. Code Ann., Tit. 8, § 169 deemed the situs of ownership of all stock in Delaware corporations to be in the state, allowing the sequestrator to place stop-transfer orders on the corporation's books. The value of the sequestered stock was approximately one point two million dollars. All twenty-eight defendants received notice of the suit by certified mail to their last known addresses and by publication in a New Castle County newspaper. The twenty-one defendants whose property had been seized entered special appearances and moved to quash service of process and vacate the sequestration order. They argued that the ex parte sequestration procedure violated due process and that they lacked sufficient contacts with Delaware to sustain jurisdiction. The Court of Chancery rejected these arguments in a letter opinion, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A. 2d 225 (1976). The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and heard argument on February 22, 1977. The individual defendants whose property was seized became the appellants before the Court. Greyhound Corporation and its subsidiary appeared in the action and moved to dismiss on the ground that the sequestration statute was unconstitutional. The sequestration order remained in effect pending resolution of the constitutional questions presented.

Tompkins, a citizen of Pennsylvania, was injured on a dark night by a passing freight train of the Erie Railroad Company while walking along its right of way at Hughestown in that State. He claimed that the accident occurred through negligence in the operation or maintenance of the train. He asserted that he was rightfully on the premises as a licensee because he was on a commonly used beaten footpath which ran for a short distance alongside the tracks. He further alleged that he was struck by something which looked like a door projecting from one of the moving cars. To enforce that claim he brought an action in the federal court for southern New York, which had jurisdiction because the company is a corporation of that State. The Erie insisted that its duty to Tompkins was no greater than that owed to a trespasser. It contended, among other things, that its duty to Tompkins, and hence its liability, should be determined in accordance with the Pennsylvania law; that under the law of Pennsylvania, as declared by its highest court, persons who use pathways along the railroad right of way are to be deemed trespassers; and that the railroad is not liable for injuries to undiscovered trespassers resulting from its negligence, unless it be wanton or wilful. Tompkins denied that any such rule had been established by the decisions of the Pennsylvania courts. He contended that, since there was no statute of the State on the subject, the railroad's duty and liability is to be determined in federal courts as a matter of general law. The trial judge refused to rule that the Pennsylvania law precluded recovery. The jury brought in a verdict of $30,000. The judgment entered thereon was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that it was unnecessary to consider whether the law of Pennsylvania was as contended, because the question was one not of local, but of general, law and that upon questions of general law the federal courts are free, in the absence of a local statute, to exercise their independent judgment as to what the law is. Because of the importance of the question whether the federal court was free to disregard the alleged rule of the Pennsylvania common law, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Vickie Lynn Marshall, also known as Anna Nicole Smith, met J. Howard Marshall II in October 1991 and married him on June 27, 1994. J. Howard died on August 4, 1995. Although he had given Vickie substantial gifts and money during their relationship, his will made no provision for her. Vickie maintained that J. Howard had intended to secure her future through a catchall trust. Respondent E. Pierce Marshall, one of J. Howard’s sons, stood as the sole ultimate beneficiary under his father’s estate plan, which consisted of a living trust and a pourover will directing all remaining assets into the trust. In January 1996, while J. Howard’s estate remained subject to probate proceedings in Harris County, Texas, Vickie filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California. In June 1996 Pierce filed a proof of claim in that bankruptcy case asserting that Vickie had defamed him through statements made to the press shortly after J. Howard’s death. Vickie answered and asserted a counterclaim alleging that Pierce had tortiously interfered with her expected gift by imprisoning J. Howard against his wishes, surrounding him with hired guards, making misrepresentations to him, and transferring property contrary to his expressed intentions. The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment to Vickie on Pierce’s defamation claim. After a trial on the merits it entered judgment for Vickie on her tortious interference counterclaim and awarded her more than $449 million in compensatory damages, less any amount recovered in the Texas probate action, plus $25 million in punitive damages. Pierce then moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the claim belonged exclusively in the Texas probate proceedings. In the Texas Probate Court, Pierce sought a declaration that the living trust and will were valid. Vickie initially challenged the instruments and asserted her own tortious interference claim there but voluntarily dismissed both claims after the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment. Following a jury trial the Probate Court declared the trust and will valid. On review of the Bankruptcy Court’s judgment the District Court rejected the probate-exception argument. The court adopted the Bankruptcy Court’s findings with supplements. It awarded Vickie approximately $44.3 million in compensatory damages together with an equal amount in punitive damages. The Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that the probate exception barred federal jurisdiction because the claim raised questions ordinarily decided by a probate court and because the Texas Probate Court had asserted exclusive jurisdiction over all of Vickie’s claims. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2005.