Also known as: case by case basis · case-by-case · ad hoc · individualized
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A method of legal decision-making that requires evaluating the facts and circumstances of each individual matter rather than applying a categorical rule. This approach ensures that outcomes turn on the specific details presented instead of a uniform prohibition or mandate. It commonly appears when courts or agencies must weigh competing interests or assess qualifications without mechanical formulas.
The city allows its officials to grant occasional exemptions from the same-sex certification rule when special circumstances arise. A religious foster agency applies for an exemption citing its sincerely held beliefs. Officials review the agency's history of placements and the particular children involved before deciding whether to grant the request.
An applicant receives an automatic point boost solely because of race under the university's formula. The admissions office never examines the applicant's individual background or contributions. The court finds the mechanical award fails to provide the required individualized consideration.
The law school admissions committee reads each file in full and weighs race alongside leadership, work experience, and academic trajectory. No single factor automatically determines admission. The process satisfies strict scrutiny because it treats every applicant as an individual.
The jury hears testimony about the defendant's mental condition and deliberates whether that evidence warrants a sentence less than death. The court instructs jurors to decide based on the particular facts of the crime and the defendant's personal circumstances rather than a fixed category.
In March 1944 petitioner Fisher, the janitor at the library of the Cathedral of Saint Peter and Saint Paul in Washington, D.C., killed librarian Catherine Cooper Reardon inside the library building between eight and nine o'clock on the morning of March 1. Reardon had complained a few days earlier to the verger about Fisher's care of the premises, and the verger had informed Fisher of the complaint. Fisher and Reardon were alone in the library at the time of the homicide. Fisher testified that Reardon spoke insulting words about his work, after which he slapped her impulsively. He ran up a flight of steps toward an exit but turned back, seized a stick of firewood, struck her, and when the stick broke choked her to silence. He then dragged her to a lavatory and left the body to clean up some spots of blood on the floor outside. While Fisher was doing this cleaning up, the victim started hollering again. Fisher then took out his knife and stuck her in the throat. After that he dragged her body down into an adjoining pump pit, where it was found the next morning. Fisher's accounts of the events varied. His original confession made no reference to insulting words from Reardon. His written confession mentioned them, and his trial testimony amplified their effect on him. In the written confession he admitted his main reason for assaulting her was that she had reported him for not cleaning the floor. The Deputy Coroner testified that the knife wound was not deep and only went through the skin. Defense psychiatrists testified that Fisher was a psychopathic personality of a predominantly aggressive type, mentally somewhat below average, with minor stigmata of mental subnormalcy, and that he was unable by reason of a deranged mental condition to resist the impulse to kill. The prosecution introduced competent evidence that Fisher was capable of understanding the nature and quality of his acts. All evidence offered by the defense was received by the trial court. Fisher was tried in the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia on an indictment charging killing by choking and strangling with deliberate and premeditated malice. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the first count, and the court imposed a sentence of death. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the judgment and sentence.
A grandmother seeks permission to live with her grandchildren in a single-family zone that limits occupancy to nuclear families. City officials inspect the specific household composition and the impact on neighborhood character before ruling on the request.
In early 1973, Mrs. Inez Moore received a notice of violation from the city of East Cleveland. The notice stated that her grandson John Moore, Jr., was an illegal occupant of her home. It directed her to comply with the housing ordinance. Mrs. Moore lived in her East Cleveland home together with her son Dale Moore, Sr., and her two grandsons Dale Moore, Jr., and John Moore, Jr. John came to live with her after his mother's death when he was less than one year old. When she failed to remove John from the home, the city filed a criminal charge against her. Mrs. Moore moved to dismiss the charge. She claimed that the ordinance was constitutionally invalid on its face. Her motion was overruled. Upon conviction she was sentenced to five days in jail and a $25 fine. The East Cleveland ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. The ordinance defined family to include only a husband or wife of the nominal head of the household, unmarried children of the head or spouse provided they have no children residing with them, a parent of the head or spouse, or not more than one dependent child of the head or spouse along with that child's spouse and dependent children. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction after giving full consideration to her constitutional claims. The Ohio Supreme Court denied review of the case. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of her appeal.
A child welfare agency receives reports of abuse but decides not to remove the child after reviewing the family's particular history and available services. The court later examines whether that individualized judgment created a constitutional duty to act.
Joshua DeShaney was born in 1975. In 1980, a Wyoming court granted his parents a divorce and awarded custody of Joshua to his father, Randy DeShaney, who then moved with the child to Winnebago County, Wisconsin. In January 1982, the Winnebago County Department of Social Services became aware that Joshua might be a victim of child abuse after he was admitted to a local hospital with multiple bruises and abrasions. The examining physician notified DSS. A caseworker interviewed Randy DeShaney and visited the home, observing suspicious injuries on Joshua's head, but concluded there was insufficient evidence of abuse to retain him in court custody and returned him to his father while recommending counseling and preschool enrollment. Over the next two years, Joshua was repeatedly treated for suspicious injuries at local hospitals, with physicians notifying DSS on multiple occasions. Caseworkers conducted regular visits, noted additional injuries, received reports from emergency room personnel and neighbors, and at one point convened a Child Protection Team that decided against retaining custody, yet consistently returned Joshua to his father's care after determining insufficient evidence existed for court intervention. In March 1984, Randy DeShaney beat Joshua so severely that the child fell into a coma and suffered permanent brain damage requiring lifelong institutionalization for profound mental retardation. Randy DeShaney was later tried and convicted of child abuse. Joshua and his mother filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Winnebago County, its Department of Social Services, and two social workers in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, claiming a deprivation of liberty without due process. The district court granted summary judgment for the respondents. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
A policy is not generally applicable if officials retain discretionary power to grant individualized exemptions. Once that discretion exists, the government must satisfy strict scrutiny to enforce the policy against a religious claimant. The presence of even occasional exemptions defeats general applicability.
…in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas , 416 U. S. 1, this Court did not review the substance of any zoning ordinances. The case-by-case development of the constitutional limits on the zoning power has not, therefore, taken place in this Court. On the other hand, during the past half century the broad formulations found in…
…are not unlimited. See Friendly, supra , 123 U. Pa. L. Rev., at 1276, 1303. But more is implicated in cases of this type than ad hoc weighing of fiscal and administrative burdens against the interests of a particular category of claimants. The ultimate balance involves a determination as to when, under our constitutional…
…during the post-adjudicatory or dispositional hearing for a wide-ranging review of the child's social history and for his individualized treatment will remain unimpaired. Similarly, there will be no effect on the procedures distinctive to juvenile proceedings that are employed prior to the adjudicatory hearing. The Court of…
…with maternal ancestors." Id., at 52 , 329 N. E. 2d, at 240. Alluding to the possibilities of abuse, the court rejected a case-by-case approach to claims based on alleged paternity. Id., at 52-53 , 329 N. E. 2d, at 240-241. The more serious problems of proving paternity might justify a more demanding standard for…
…woman under abstract circumstances and received an abstract trial on abstract issues. Murder cases are apt to be peculiarly individualized, and this case has its own distinctive features. It is in the light of these that we must decide whether Fisher's death sentence should legally stand. According to the more enlightened…
Automatic points based solely on race substitute a mechanical formula for genuine review of each applicant's unique qualities. The Supreme Court has held that such predominant mechanical use of race prevents the narrow tailoring demanded by strict scrutiny. Holistic review that treats race as one factor among many is required instead.
The school must show that it evaluates every applicant as an individual and considers race only as one element in a broader assessment of diversity contributions. Courts defer to the school's academic judgment on the educational value of diversity while still examining whether the process avoids mechanical or predominant reliance on race.
Case-by-case analysis requires courts and agencies to weigh all relevant factors, including any existing non-cohabitation orders, for each child. A blanket prohibition eliminates that individualized inquiry and assumes the outcome for an entire category of placements.