Also known as:allies · allied · allying · alliance · coalition partner
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
1
international law
A nation tied to another by treaty or alliance. The Constitution prohibits states from entering such arrangements without congressional consent.
2
international law
Sense 1
1
international law
A nation tied to another by treaty or alliance. The Constitution prohibits states from entering such arrangements without congressional consent.
See Our Sources· 1 primary source
Constitution
Examples
Sense 2
2
international law
A citizen or subject of an allied nation.
Examples2
Diversity Jurisdiction Dispute
Avalon Pharmaceuticals sued Aether Technologies in federal court over a contract breach. Aether moved to dismiss for lack of complete diversity because one plaintiff was a citizen of an allied nation. The court applied supplemental jurisdiction rules to retain the case.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
4
State Treaty Prohibition
The governor of New York signed an agreement with officials from Canada establishing mutual defense commitments. Federal authorities challenged the pact as an alliance. The court held the arrangement invalid under the constitutional bar on state alliances.
Standing for Allied Interests
Massachusetts and allied states petitioned the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases from vehicles. The agency denied the petition. The Supreme Court recognized the states' standing to challenge the denial as sovereign allies in protecting their territory.
Massachusetts, et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al.549 U.S. 497, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 167 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2007)
In October 1999, nineteen private organizations filed a rulemaking petition with the EPA requesting regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles under section 202 of the Clean Air Act. The petition asserted that carbon dioxide and other gases were heat-trapping greenhouse gases that had accelerated climate change, with carbon dioxide as the most important contributor according to the IPCC's 1995 report. The EPA received more than fifty thousand comments after requesting public input in 2001. A National Research Council report from 2001, prepared at the White House's request, stated that greenhouse gases from human activities were causing surface air temperatures to rise.
On September 8, 2003, the EPA denied the petition on two grounds: the Clean Air Act did not authorize regulation of greenhouse gases from motor vehicles, and even assuming authority, the agency would not regulate due to scientific uncertainty about causation and concerns that regulation would conflict with the President's comprehensive approach involving voluntary programs and international negotiations. The denial order referenced Congress's decision in 1990 not to enact binding emissions limitations and the political history of climate change issues.
Petitioners including the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and other states and private organizations then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The D.C. Circuit denied the petition for review in 2005. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2006 to address the issues raised by the denial.
Massachusetts submitted affidavits showing that global sea levels rose 10 to 20 centimeters over the 20th century, already causing loss of coastal land owned by the Commonwealth, with projections of further inundation by 2100. The United States transportation sector alone emitted more than 1.7 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide in 1999, accounting for over 6 percent of worldwide emissions.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye formed an alliance with a foreign religious group for ritual practices. The city enacted ordinances targeting the alliance. The Supreme Court invalidated the laws as targeting the allied religious conduct.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah508 U.S. 520, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1993)
In April 1987 the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation organized under Florida law in 1973 whose president is Ernesto Pichardo, leased land in Hialeah, Florida, and announced plans to build a house of worship, school, cultural center, and museum at which members would practice Santeria.
Santeria originated in nineteenth-century Cuba as a fusion of Yoruba traditions and Roman Catholicism. It centers on animal sacrifice performed by cutting the carotid arteries, after which the animals are usually cooked and eaten except in healing and death rituals. The announcement prompted the Hialeah City Council to convene an emergency public session on June 9, 1987.
At that session residents and council members voiced strong opposition to Santeria practices. The council then adopted Resolution 87-66 declaring opposition to religious acts inconsistent with public morals, peace, or safety and passed Ordinance 87-40 incorporating Florida's animal-cruelty statute that criminalizes unnecessary or cruel killing of animals.
After the Florida attorney general issued an opinion that ritual animal sacrifice other than for food consumption violated state law, the council in August 1987 adopted Resolution 87-90 opposing ritual animal sacrifice. In September 1987 the council enacted three further ordinances. Ordinance 87-52 barred possession of animals with intent to use them for ritual sacrifice except by licensed food establishments. Ordinance 87-71 directly prohibited any person from sacrificing an animal within city limits. Ordinance 87-72 restricted slaughter of animals to properly zoned slaughterhouse premises while exempting small-scale commercial hog and cattle operations.
The Church and Pichardo filed suit against the city and its officials in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They alleged that the ordinances violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. After granting summary judgment to the individual defendants on immunity grounds, the district court conducted a nine-day bench trial on the remaining claims and entered judgment for the city. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Association with Allied Group
Antonio Alvarado sought membership in the Boy Scouts as a representative of an allied youth organization. The organization revoked his membership. The Court upheld the right of expressive association for the allied group.
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale530 U.S. 640 (2000)
James Dale entered scouting in 1978 at the age of eight by joining Monmouth Council’s Cub Scout Pack 142. He became a Boy Scout in 1981. Dale achieved the rank of Eagle Scout in 1988 after earning 25 merit badges and being inducted into the Order of the Arrow.
In 1989, Dale applied for and received approval for adult membership in the Boy Scouts. He served as an assistant scoutmaster for Troop 73 in Matawan, New Jersey.
Around the same time, Dale’s position as co-president of the Lesbian/Gay Alliance at Rutgers University was publicized in a July 1990 newspaper interview. Later that month, the Boy Scouts sent Dale a letter revoking his adult membership. The letter stated that his membership was inconsistent with the values and standards of the Boy Scouts of America. It explained that the organization specifically forbids membership to homosexuals.
Dale responded by filing a complaint in New Jersey Superior Court against the Boy Scouts and the Monmouth Council. He alleged that the revocation violated the New Jersey public accommodations statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Boy Scouts.
The New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately held that the Boy Scouts is a place of public accommodation subject to the law and that Dale’s expulsion violated the statute. The Boy Scouts petitioned for a writ of certiorari. The United States Supreme Court granted the petition to determine whether the application of New Jersey’s public accommodations law in this case violates the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right of expressive association.
2 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
What distinguishes the two senses of ally in international law?
One sense refers to a nation bound by treaty while the other refers to an individual citizen of such a nation. The Constitution addresses only the national sense by barring states from forming alliances.
Supporting sources
Does the constitutional prohibition on alliances apply to informal agreements?
The prohibition covers any treaty alliance or confederation entered by a state. Courts examine the substance of the arrangement rather than its label to determine if it creates an alliance.
Supporting sources
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.545 U.S. 546, 558–59 (2005)
In 1991, about 10,000 Exxon dealers filed a class-action suit against the Exxon Corporation in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. They alleged an intentional and systematic scheme by which they were overcharged for fuel purchased from Exxon. The plaintiffs invoked the District Court's diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Each dealer's claim was for slightly less than the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum. After a unanimous jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, the District Court certified the case for interlocutory review on the question of supplemental jurisdiction over class members who did not meet the jurisdictional minimum.
In a separate action, a 9-year-old girl sued Star-Kist in a diversity action in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. She sought damages for unusually severe injuries she received when she sliced her finger on a tuna can. Her family joined in the suit seeking damages for emotional distress and medical expenses. The District Court granted summary judgment to Star-Kist, finding that none of the plaintiffs met the minimum amount-in-controversy requirement.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the District Court's extension of supplemental jurisdiction to the class members who did not meet the amount requirement. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled that the injured girl, but not her family members, had made allegations of damages in the requisite amount. It further held that section 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction only when the district court has original jurisdiction over the action. In a diversity case, original jurisdiction is lacking if one plaintiff fails to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeals. The cases were consolidated before the Supreme Court.
Alfred Ashford, a citizen of an allied nation residing in Connecticut, challenged a state ban on contraceptive counseling. The Court recognized a right of privacy that extended to such individuals through the allied relationship. The statute was struck down.
Griswold v. Connecticut381 U.S. 479 (1965)
Estelle Griswold served as Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Dr. C. Lee Buxton served as the League's Medical Director and was a professor at Yale Medical School. Together they opened and operated a center in New Haven that was open from November 1 to November 10, 1961.
At the center they gave information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the means of preventing conception. They examined the wife and prescribed the best contraceptive device or material for her use. Fees were usually charged, although some couples were serviced free.
The statutes involved were sections 53-32 and 54-196 of the General Statutes of Connecticut (1958 rev.). Section 53-32 made it a crime to use any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception. Section 54-196 punished accessories as principals. The appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each.
The Appellate Division of the Circuit Court affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut affirmed that judgment in State v. Griswold, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A. 2d 479. The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
The appellants asserted standing to raise the constitutional rights of the married persons with whom they had a professional relationship. A criminal conviction for serving married couples removes doubts about case or controversy. The rights of husband and wife would be diluted unless considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them.
Can a citizen of an allied nation assert rights under U.S. constitutional protections?
Yes when the allied status brings the individual within the scope of recognized liberties such as privacy or association. Courts have extended protections to such citizens in appropriate cases.
381 U.S. 479 (1965)
…courts and the argument of Connecticut in this Court, the State claims but one justification for its anti-use statute. Cf. Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers , 358 U. S. 522, 530; Martin v. Walton , 368 U. S. 25, 28 (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting). There is no serious contention that Connecticut thinks the use of artificial…