549 U.S. 497, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 167 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2007)
In October 1999, nineteen private organizations filed a rulemaking petition with the EPA requesting regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles under section 202 of the Clean Air Act.1 The petition asserted that carbon dioxide and other gases were heat-trapping greenhouse gases that had accelerated climate change, with carbon dioxide as the most important contributor according to the IPCC's 1995 report.2 The EPA received more than fifty thousand comments after requesting public input in 2001.3 A National Research Council report from 2001, prepared at the White House's request, stated that greenhouse gases from human activities were causing surface air temperatures to rise.4
On September 8, 2003, the EPA denied the petition on two grounds: the Clean Air Act did not authorize regulation of greenhouse gases from motor vehicles, and even assuming authority, the agency would not regulate due to scientific uncertainty about causation and concerns that regulation would conflict with the President's comprehensive approach involving voluntary programs and international negotiations.5 The denial order referenced Congress's decision in 1990 not to enact binding emissions limitations and the political history of climate change issues.6
Petitioners including the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and other states and private organizations then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.7 The D.C. Circuit denied the petition for review in 2005.8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2006 to address the issues raised by the denial.9
Massachusetts submitted affidavits showing that global sea levels rose 10 to 20 centimeters over the 20th century, already causing loss of coastal land owned by the Commonwealth, with projections of further inundation by 2100.10 The United States transportation sector alone emitted more than 1.7 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide in 1999, accounting for over 6 percent of worldwide emissions.11
Whether Massachusetts has Article III standing to challenge the EPA's denial of the rulemaking petition?12
Article III requires a petitioner to demonstrate three elements.13 A concrete and particularized injury that is actual or imminent.14 Causation fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct.15 Redressability through a favorable decision. A state litigant receives special solicitude when asserting quasi-sovereign interests in its territory under precedents recognizing independent state stakes in land and air resources.16
Yes. Massachusetts satisfies injury in fact through its ownership of coastal property already affected by documented sea level rise of 10 to 20 centimeters in the twentieth century, with further inundation projected by 2100.17 This establishes a particularized sovereign harm distinct from generalized public injury.18 Causation is met because the EPA's refusal to regulate contributes to the accumulation of greenhouse gases.19
The United States transportation sector emitted more than 1.7 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide in 1999. That accounts for over 6 percent of global emissions. The EPA itself does not dispute the link.20 Redressability follows because regulation of new motor vehicle emissions would slow the pace of global warming and reduce the risk to Massachusetts territory.21
The procedural right under the Clean Air Act to challenge denial of a rulemaking petition further relaxes strict redressability requirements.22
Massachusetts possesses Article III standing to challenge the EPA's denial of the rulemaking petition.23
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Scalia, Thomas, And Alito, Jj.
Chief Justice Roberts dissents on standing grounds.24 He argues that the majority improperly expands standing by granting states special solicitude without textual or precedential support.25 The alleged injury from global warming is widely shared rather than particularized to Massachusetts.26
The causal chain depends on independent third-party actions abroad.27 Any relief would produce only negligible effects on global emissions.28 The proper disposition is dismissal for lack of standing.29
This avoids turning courts into monitors of executive policy.30 Roberts emphasizes that states are not normal litigants but must still meet Article III requirements.31 He criticizes the use of parens patriae to bypass injury particularity.32
Whether the Clean Air Act authorizes the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles?33
Under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, the EPA Administrator shall prescribe standards for emission of any air pollutant from new motor vehicles.34 The standard applies when in the Administrator's judgment the emissions cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.35 Air pollutant is defined capaciously to include any physical, chemical, biological, or radioactive substance or matter emitted into the ambient air.36 Welfare encompasses effects on weather and climate.37
Yes. The statutory definition of air pollutant encompasses carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases.38 They are physical and chemical substances emitted into the ambient air.39 The text contains no exception for substances contributing to global climate change.40
Post-enactment legislative history and the political significance of climate change do not override the unambiguous language.41 Subsequent congressional inaction on binding limits does not amend the 1970 and 1977 provisions granting broad authority.42 The EPA's reliance on FDA v. Brown & Williamson is misplaced.43 Regulating emissions does not require banning motor vehicles, unlike the tobacco context.44
The agency had previously affirmed its authority in internal memoranda.45
The Clean Air Act authorizes the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles.46
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Roberts, C.j., And Thomas And Alito, Jj.
Justice Scalia dissents on the merits.47 He contends that the Clean Air Act does not authorize regulation of greenhouse gases for climate change purposes.48 The term air pollutant requires an agent of air pollution, which global atmospheric concentrations do not constitute under the statute's focus on local ground-level impurities.49
Even the broad definition following including must be limited by the general category of air pollution agents.50 The EPA's reasonable interpretation deserves Chevron deference rather than judicial override.51 Scalia stresses that the statute's text, structure, and history demonstrate Congress did not intend to grant EPA authority over a problem of vast economic and political significance without a clear statement.52
Joined by Scalia, J.
Justice Thomas dissents on the merits.53 He joins Scalia's dissent as to Parts I and II.54 Thomas maintains that the majority's expansive reading of air pollutant to include greenhouse gases is inconsistent with the Clean Air Act's text and structure.55
The term air pollutant was not intended to encompass greenhouse gases that contribute to global climate change.56 The EPA's decision not to regulate should be upheld as a reasonable exercise of discretion under the statute.57 Thomas concludes that the majority's reading conflicts with the statute's original meaning and purpose.58
Whether the EPA's denial of the rulemaking petition was arbitrary and capricious?59
An agency's denial of a rulemaking petition is arbitrary and capricious if it fails to provide a reasoned explanation grounded in the statutory text.60 The agency may not rely on policy considerations divorced from the required judgment whether an air pollutant may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.61 The agency also may not invoke scientific uncertainty without articulating why it precludes an endangerment finding.62
Yes. The EPA's grounds for denial are scientific uncertainty and conflict with presidential foreign policy and voluntary programs.63 These grounds are not tethered to the statutory command to form a judgment on endangerment.64 The agency acknowledged risks from climate change yet declined to decide the issue.65
Reliance on residual uncertainty does not excuse the duty to make a reasoned judgment when the record contains substantial evidence of harm.66 Foreign policy concerns fall outside the EPA's domestic regulatory mandate under the Clean Air Act.67 The decision therefore lacks the required connection to the statutory factors and must be set aside.68
The EPA's denial of the rulemaking petition was arbitrary and capricious.69
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Roberts, C.j., And Thomas And Alito, Jj.
Justice Scalia dissents on the arbitrary and capricious holding.70 He argues that the EPA provided a reasonable explanation for declining to regulate at this time.71 The explanation included the need for a comprehensive rather than piecemeal approach.72
It also addressed the impact on international negotiations.73 The explanation relied on the profound scientific uncertainties identified in the National Research Council report.74 The Court errs by limiting permissible reasons for deferral to only profound uncertainty.75
The Court also errs by second-guessing the agency's policy judgments that are entitled to deference under the Administrative Procedure Act.76 Scalia would uphold the EPA's decision as a valid exercise of discretion.77