Also known as: adverse effects · adverse impact
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A material negative impact or consequence on a client's interests or a lawyer's representation of a client.
Jordan represents ByteForge in a licensing negotiation with several weeks left before deadlines. The founders have missed meetings and stopped paying invoices. Apex Legal has agreed to take over and can prepare in time. Jordan files a motion to withdraw because the transition will not create a material adverse effect on ByteForge.
A lawyer serves as a director of a legal services organization that assists clients with interests adverse to one of the lawyer's firm clients. The lawyer participates in a board decision allocating resources. The decision creates a material adverse effect on the representation of the firm client whose interests conflict with the organization's client.
Defense counsel represents two co-defendants in a joint trial. Counsel fails to cross-examine a key prosecution witness to protect the interests of one defendant over the other. The defendant shows that the conflict produced an adverse effect on counsel's performance and the outcome of the defense.
In September 1976, respondent David Washington committed a series of crimes over a ten-day period in the Miami area that included three brutal stabbing murders along with torture, kidnapping, severe assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion, and theft. After his two accomplices were arrested, Washington surrendered to police and gave a lengthy statement confessing to the third criminal episode. The State of Florida indicted him for kidnapping and murder and appointed an experienced criminal lawyer to represent him. Washington waived his right to a jury trial against counsel's advice and pleaded guilty to all charges, including the three capital murder counts. In the plea colloquy he stated that he had committed a string of burglaries but had no significant prior criminal record and that he had been under extreme stress caused by his inability to support his family. Counsel spoke with Washington about his background, contacted his wife and mother by telephone, but did not seek out character witnesses or request a psychiatric examination. At the sentencing hearing before the trial judge, counsel's strategy relied primarily on the plea colloquy to convey remorse and emotional stress and argued that these factors justified sparing Washington the death penalty. Counsel successfully moved to exclude Washington's rap sheet and decided not to request a presentence report because it would have included his criminal history. The trial judge found multiple aggravating circumstances for each murder and no mitigating circumstances, sentencing Washington to death on each of the three murder counts. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Washington sought collateral relief in state court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on six grounds including failure to request a psychiatric report, investigate and present character witnesses, and seek a presentence investigation report. He submitted fourteen affidavits from friends, neighbors, and relatives willing to testify and two reports from a psychiatrist and psychologist. The state trial court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. Washington then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. After an evidentiary hearing at which trial counsel testified, the District Court denied relief, concluding that although counsel made errors in judgment by failing to investigate mitigating evidence further, no prejudice resulted. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for application of a new framework it developed for analyzing ineffectiveness claims. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the proper standards for judging claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a capital sentencing proceeding.
View caseA detainee alleges that officials adopted detention policies because of the detainee's religion. The complaint must plead facts showing that the policies were adopted because of, and not merely in spite of, their adverse effect on the religious group.
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the FBI dedicated more than 4,000 special agents and 3,000 support personnel to an investigation that by September 18 had received more than 96,000 tips or potential leads from the public. In the ensuing months the FBI questioned more than 1,000 people with suspected links to the attacks or to terrorism in general. Of those individuals, 762 were held on immigration charges, and a 184-member subset of that group was deemed to be of high interest to the investigation and held under restrictive conditions designed to prevent communication with the general prison population or the outside world. Javaid Iqbal, a citizen of Pakistan and a Muslim, was arrested in November 2001 by agents of the FBI and Immigration and Naturalization Service on charges of fraud in relation to identification documents and conspiracy to defraud the United States. Pending trial, he was housed at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York. In January 2002 he was designated a person of high interest and placed in the Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit, where detainees were kept in lock-down 23 hours a day and spent the remaining hour outside their cells in handcuffs and leg irons accompanied by a four-officer escort. Iqbal pleaded guilty to the criminal charges, served a term of imprisonment, and was removed to Pakistan. He then filed a Bivens action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against 34 current and former federal officials, including former Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller, as well as 19 John Doe corrections officers. The complaint concentrated on his treatment while confined to the ADMAX SHU and alleged that petitioners designated him a person of high interest on account of his race, religion, or national origin. The complaint alleged that the FBI under Mueller’s direction arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men as part of the September 11 investigation, that the policy of holding post-September-11 detainees in highly restrictive conditions until cleared by the FBI was approved by Ashcroft and Mueller in discussions in the weeks after September 11, and that petitioners each knew of, condoned, and willfully agreed to subject Iqbal to harsh conditions solely on account of his religion, race, and national origin. It named Ashcroft as the principal architect of the policy and identified Mueller as instrumental in its adoption, promulgation, and implementation. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state sufficient allegations showing their own involvement in clearly established unconstitutional conduct. The District Court denied the motion. Petitioners brought an interlocutory appeal, and while the appeal was pending the Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA state statute requires physicians to provide certain information before an abortion. The statute includes an exception when the physician reasonably believes the information would produce a severely adverse effect on the patient's physical or mental health.
The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989, established several requirements governing the performance of abortions within the Commonwealth. The Act required a woman seeking an abortion to provide informed consent after receiving specific information from a physician or counselor at least twenty-four hours before the procedure. It mandated that a minor obtain the informed consent of one parent, subject to a judicial bypass option. It further required a married woman to sign a statement confirming that she had notified her husband of her planned abortion, unless certain exceptions applied. The Act also imposed reporting obligations on facilities providing abortion services and defined a medical emergency exception to the various requirements. Before any of these provisions took effect, the petitioners brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The petitioners were five abortion clinics and one physician representing himself as well as a class of physicians who provide abortion services. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and challenged each provision as unconstitutional on its face. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction. After conducting a three-day bench trial, the District Court held all the provisions unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against their enforcement by Pennsylvania. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It adopted the District Court's factual findings and legal analysis except with respect to the spousal notification requirement. The Court of Appeals upheld the spousal notification requirement as constitutional and applied the undue burden standard in evaluating the provisions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.
View caseA city enacts a historic preservation ordinance that prevents a church from expanding its building. The church claims the ordinance produces an adverse effect on religious exercise by limiting worship space and activities.
St. Peter Catholic Church was built in 1923 in Boerne, Texas. Its structure replicates the mission style of the region's earlier history. The church seats about 230 worshippers, a number too small for its growing parish. Some 40 to 60 parishioners cannot be accommodated at some Sunday masses. To meet the needs of the congregation, the Archbishop of San Antonio gave permission to the parish to plan alterations to enlarge the building. A few months later, the Boerne City Council passed an ordinance authorizing the city's Historic Landmark Commission to prepare a preservation plan with proposed historic landmarks and districts. Under the ordinance, the commission must preapprove construction affecting historic landmarks or buildings in a historic district. Soon afterwards, the Archbishop applied for a building permit so construction to enlarge the church could proceed. City authorities, relying on the ordinance and the designation of a historic district which they argued included the church, denied the application. The Archbishop brought this suit challenging the permit denial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The complaint contained multiple claims, but to this point the litigation has centered on RFRA and the question of its constitutionality. The District Court concluded that by enacting RFRA Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court certified its order for interlocutory appeal and the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding RFRA to be constitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and now reverses. Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith. RFRA prohibits government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. Unless the government can demonstrate that the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, it must also show that the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The Act applies to all federal and state law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the enactment of RFRA.
View caseA lawyer may withdraw when the withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the client's interests. The presence of replacement counsel and sufficient time before deadlines typically shows that no material adverse effect exists.
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A lawyer may not participate in a board decision or action that would have a material adverse effect on the representation of a firm client whose interests are adverse to an organization client.
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An actual conflict of interest necessarily produces an adverse effect on counsel's performance. The defendant must show that the conflict adversely affected the lawyer's representation.
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A plaintiff must plead facts showing that the decisionmaker acted because of, and not merely in spite of, the adverse effect on an identifiable group.
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