Concept
Slander Per Se Categories
Libel versus slander and when special harm is required
Slander Per Se Categories
Four kinds of spoken defamation are actionable without proof of special harm. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 570 lists them: a slander is actionable although no special harm results if it imputes to the plaintiff (a) a criminal offense, (b) a loathsome disease, (c) matter incompatible with the plaintiff’s business, trade, profession, or office, or (d) serious sexual misconduct.1 Sections 571 through 574 fill in the four categories, and the subsections below take them in that order. Slander that fits one of them is “actionable per se,” and at common law these four were the exceptions to the rule that a slander plaintiff must prove pecuniary loss.2
Per se status puts the slander plaintiff close to the position of a libel plaintiff. The plaintiff need not prove pecuniary loss, and, as in libel, the law presumes injury to reputation from the defamatory nature of the words, even if no actual harm is demonstrable.3 A defendant liable for slander actionable per se also owes at least nominal damages. A slander plaintiff outside the categories has no such floor, because that plaintiff has no claim at all without special harm.4
The exception has a reason. Slander leaves behind only the listeners’ memories, so the general rule asks the plaintiff to point to a concrete loss. In these four situations the accusation itself so likely lowers the plaintiff’s standing, and costs the plaintiff opportunities that cannot be traced, that insisting on proof of a specific loss would leave deserving plaintiffs without a remedy. The law therefore presumes the injury, and the plaintiff’s task shifts from proving a loss to proving that the words fall within a category. The same reason fixes the limits: each category is narrow, and each carries screens that keep the exception from swallowing the special-harm rule of § 575.
On an exam, run a spoken accusation through the four categories before turning to special harm. A fit ends the inquiry, and a miss returns it to § 575’s requirement of pecuniary loss.
Imputing a Crime
A slander that imputes conduct constituting a criminal offense is actionable without proof of special harm if the offense is of a type that, if committed in the place of publication, would be punishable by imprisonment in a state or federal institution or would be regarded by public opinion as involving moral turpitude. That is the test in § 571, the section to which § 570(a) refers.5 The two measures are alternatives, and meeting either one dispenses with special harm.6 The test thus has three parts: the words must charge an act, the act must be an offense where the statement is published, and the offense must be serious by one of the two measures.
This is the oldest of the slander per se categories, and its rationale has shifted. The original basis seems to have been that a person accused of a crime was exposed to prosecution. The emphasis later moved to the social ostracism that follows such an accusation and to the likelihood of a pecuniary loss too diffuse to prove.7 Only the second rationale justifies dropping the special-harm requirement, because it assumes that the accusation itself does the damage. It also explains why the action lay even when the words disclosed that the plaintiff had been punished or pardoned, or that the statute of limitations barred prosecution: the stigma outlasts the legal outcome.8 The category cannot reach every violation of every law, or the exception would swallow § 575. Courts have therefore limited it to imputations of more serious crimes or imputations likely to injure reputation, and the two routes in § 571 are the Restatement’s version of that limit.9
The first route, § 571(a), measures seriousness by penalty. An offense punishable by imprisonment in a state or federal institution qualifies, and a petty violation punished only by a fine does not.10 The second route, § 571(b), measures it by reputation. An offense qualifies if public opinion regards it as involving moral turpitude, conduct the community sees as base or vile.11 The character of the act charged, not the label the criminal code gives it, governs that inquiry.12 Two routes exist because penalty and stigma do not always move together. An offense with a light penalty may still brand the accused as dishonest or cruel, and § 571(b) catches what § 571(a) would miss. Jurisdictions phrase the threshold differently: Alabama decisions speak of an indictable offense involving infamy or moral turpitude, Alaska decisions of a serious crime, and some jurisdictions follow the English rule that requires a charge punishable by death or imprisonment.13 On an exam, apply the Restatement formulation unless the facts name a jurisdiction with its own.
Both routes are measured by the place of publication.14 The offense need only be one that would be punishable, or regarded as base, if committed where the statement is made. Whether the conduct was criminal where it supposedly happened does not matter. The injury to reputation occurs among the listeners, who judge the plaintiff by the standards of their own community, and a Pennsylvania decision, Klumph v. Dunn, chose the law of the place where the words are spoken on that ground.15
Courts reach the same result for workplace accusations of theft.16 The cases that follow mark where the category stops.
A charge can describe a genuine offense and still fall short. In Gallo v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-Societa per Azioni, a federal court held that an accusation of adultery fell outside the crime category, because adultery is not a serious crime and is only a class B misdemeanor.17 Section 571 did its screening work there. A statute prohibited the conduct, but its low classification kept the accusation from being presumed injurious. A plaintiff in that position must look to another category, such as serious sexual misconduct, taught below, or prove special harm under § 575.18
The distinction rests on the text of § 571, which speaks of imputing conduct constituting a criminal offense.19 In Biondi v. Nassimos, a New Jersey appellate court, quoting a comment to § 571, said that accusing a person of being capable of a crime, or of having criminal intent, is insufficient unless a criminal act is charged.20 Only an accusation that the plaintiff did something carries the stigma the exception presumes. A remark about disposition tells listeners what the plaintiff might do and says nothing about what the plaintiff did. The charge need not name the offense in technically correct terms, but it must identify conduct. In Privitera v. Town of Phelps, a general imputation that the plaintiff was involved in organized crime was held not to be slander per se.21 Context can also narrow what the words charge. A Mississippi court held that calling the plaintiff a “thief and liar” was not slander per se in the circumstances in which it was said, although the dissenters thought listeners might not have known the reference was so limited.22
The crime category matters only when the publication is a slander. Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morris involved a magazine article reporting that the 1956 Oklahoma football team had used amphetamines. The court held it defamatory on its face, reasoning that the suggestion of drug use is both criminal and damaging to the players’ professional standing.23 The article was printed, so it was a libel, and under § 569 a libel is actionable without special harm. No court had to decide whether the offense charged was serious enough.24 An Ohio appellate court drew the same line in Gosden v. Louis, observing that voyeurism might not be a crime of moral turpitude but that a written charge of any crime would be libel and actionable.25
Classification can be harder at the edges. The prevailing view treats a defamatory radio or television broadcast as libel, as Restatement § 568A does, although some state statutes call it slander.26 Whether defamatory oral communication transmitted through the Internet would be treated as a broadcast, even if it did not reach a large audience, is an open question.27 One California court treated written messages sent over the Internet as libel, reasoning that, unlike the spoken word, they are “fixed” representations “to the eye.”28 An exam answer that screens a printed accusation for imprisonment or moral turpitude has applied a test from the wrong branch. An answer that treats every spoken accusation of illegality as per se has skipped the seriousness screen.
The fourth step does the real work, and the two routes should be argued in the alternative. An offense with a modest penalty can still qualify through public opinion, and an offense the public views with some indulgence can still qualify through its penalty.
Imputing Loathsome Disease
Section 572, to which § 570(b) refers, provides that one who publishes a slander imputing to another an existing venereal disease or other loathsome and communicable disease is liable without proof of special harm.31 The text yields three requirements, and the plaintiff must meet all of them: the disease must exist when the statement is made, it must be communicable, and it must be loathsome. A plaintiff who misses one falls outside the category and must prove special harm under § 575.32 The category applies only to slander, because a printed accusation of disease is a libel and is actionable under § 569 without special harm.33
The category rests on social exclusion. The exception began with venereal disease and leprosy, which were regarded as permanent, lingering, and incurable, so that a person believed to have either could expect to be shut out of ordinary society.34 That kind of damage arrives as many small refusals by many people, each too diffuse to trace to a listener, which is the difficulty of proof that led the law to presume harm in the other categories. The shape of the category follows from that logic. Smallpox was equally repugnant and more contagious, yet the exception was never applied to it, because a person with smallpox either recovered or died within a short time.35 The exception tracks lasting exclusion, and the three requirements test whether an imputed disease would produce it.
The disease must first be an existing one. An imputation that the plaintiff had a disease in the past, even a venereal disease, does not qualify, and the plaintiff must prove special harm. The rule is well settled, and Bruce v. Soule applied it.36 The category presumes exclusion, and a person who has recovered would not meet the same avoidance. The Restatement’s comments likewise require that the imputation describe a present disease, and they exclude diseases that end in death or recovery within a short time.37
Both remarks accuse a treasurer of the same infection, and the difference lies in the tense of the imputation. The first describes a condition the committee members may still fear and avoid, so the law presumes injury. The second describes a closed chapter, so Dara would have to prove a pecuniary loss, such as removal from the post because the committee believed the remark, under § 575.38
The second and third requirements work together to confine the category. The disease must be communicable, and it must also be loathsome, because the presumption of damage has been limited to diseases that are not merely contagious but also loathsome and therefore lead to social ostracism.39 Communicability alone does not suffice. Tuberculosis is communicable, yet an accusation of it falls outside the category, as does an accusation of insanity.40 Advances in medicine and in public understanding of disease tended to freeze the category within its original limits. It has stayed with a small group identified centuries ago, namely venereal diseases, leprosy, and the plague, although § 572 leaves open an extension to some other loathsome and communicable disease.41 That narrowness helps explain why the category rarely produces litigation.42
Because loathsomeness is measured by public reaction, a modern condition is tested by asking how people actually treat those who have it, and the answers do not always match intuition. In Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, the court held that cancer is not a loathsome disease, reasoning that the public’s reaction to a victim of cancer is “usually one of sympathy rather than scorn, support and not rejection.”43 In Nolan v. State, a New York appellate court reached the opposite result for HIV. It held that a statement imputing HIV-positive status is defamatory per se under the loathsome disease category, because a significant segment of society has been “too slow in understanding that those who have the disease are entitled to equal treatment under the law and the full embrace of society.”44 Both illnesses are serious, so the difference between the outcomes lies in the courts’ readings of public attitudes: sympathy toward cancer patients and continued shunning of people with HIV. A Nebraska decision, McCune v. Neitzel, likewise applied the category to AIDS.45
The pairing is uncomfortable. The Nolan court used the word loathsome with evident reluctance while concluding that an HIV imputation can cause societal disapproval and shunning.46 A test built on shunning asks about a reaction the law might prefer not to credit, and its answers can lag behind changing attitudes. Nolan is an intermediate appellate decision from one state, so it persuades rather than binds elsewhere. An exam answer should state the three requirements, identify the historic core of venereal disease, leprosy, and the plague, and argue the social-reaction question for any modern condition, citing Nolan on HIV and Chuy on cancer. If the facts show a past disease, a disease the public meets with sympathy, or one outside the historic list, the analysis moves to the other per se categories and then to special harm under § 575.
Harm to Business or Profession
Under § 573, to which § 570(c) refers, one who publishes a slander that ascribes to another conduct, characteristics, or a condition that would adversely affect fitness for the proper conduct of a lawful business, trade, or profession, or of a public or private office, whether honorary or for profit, is liable without proof of special harm.48 Three requirements follow, and all must be met. The words must ascribe conduct, a characteristic, or a condition to the plaintiff. What is ascribed must bear on fitness for the calling. The plaintiff must hold the calling when the words are spoken. Of the four per se categories, this is the one that matters most to employment law, because disputes at work generate a steady supply of spoken accusations about how a person does a job.49
The category exists because of the probability of economic loss. When words attack a person’s fitness for earning a living, the chance that work or customers will be lost is so obvious that the law does not make the plaintiff prove it.50 A client who hears that a surgeon is incompetent simply chooses another surgeon and rarely says why, so the plaintiff cannot trace the lost business to the remark. The same reasoning fixes the category’s limits. The presumption of loss is warranted only when the words strike at the capacity the calling demands. If every insult to a worker qualified, nearly every slander about a person who works could be said to harm that person in business, and the exception would absorb the general requirement of special harm.
The category is broad in the callings it covers. Any legitimate calling qualifies, however humble, and uncompensated positions of trust count along with paid ones. In Dietrich v. Hauser, a court held it slander per se to say of a club president that he was a cheat and a fraud.51 Public officials are covered, as in a decision treating it as per se to say of a governor that he was indifferent to lynching and had approved the work of a mob. Enterprises are covered too, since saying that a bank is insolvent or that a merchant’s credit is bad also qualifies.52 Imputations of insolvency fall within the category when they apply to the plaintiff’s own business.53
The words may disparage fitness in general, as when a physician is called incompetent or a “quack,” or they may accuse the plaintiff of specific misconduct.54 Courts have found per se slander in calling an attorney a shyster, in saying that a teacher behaved improperly with pupils, and in saying that a chauffeur habitually drinks.55 The word “condition” in the Restatement text reaches beyond misconduct to circumstances that have nothing to do with the plaintiff’s character. In Ravnikar v. Bogojavlensky, one physician told a prospective patient that a colleague at the same facility was dying of cancer, when in fact she had been cured.56 The patient kept the plaintiff as her doctor, so no special damages could be proved. The court nonetheless let the claim for general damages go forward, because the statement can discourage potential patients: it invites the inference that death is not far off and that the physician will be distracted by her illness and its treatment.57
The words must first relate to the plaintiff’s calling. An allegation that the plaintiff was or would be harmed in business or profession is not enough. The slander must be spoken in relation to the calling or at least impute conduct or character incompatible with it, as Liberman v. Gelstein held.58 In Harris v. Hirsh, a supervisor’s statement that a train crew dispatcher took drugs was held not to be slander per se, because it was not “specifically related” to the plaintiff’s status as a crew dispatcher.59 The remark was unflattering and could have cost the dispatcher goodwill, yet it said nothing about how the dispatcher did the job. The same reasoning governs accusations of drinking. A statement meaning that the plaintiff is a drunkard is not slander per se unless it is understood to mean that the plaintiff is intoxicated while working.60 That is why the chauffeur who habitually drinks stands differently from a worker whose drinking is confined to private life.
The difference between the two remarks lies in the work. A habit confined to private life tells listeners nothing about the driver’s performance, while a flask on the morning route puts the safety of every passenger in issue. Decisions about character statements draw the same line from the other direction. In Smith v. IMG Worldwide, Inc., a sports agent allegedly told a potential recruit that a competing agent “played the race card” in negotiating with the NFL on behalf of players. The court held the statements slander per se because they were peculiarly harmful to an agent whose ability to represent professional football players depended on his relationships with club general managers.61 Hancock v. Variyam came out the other way on an assertion that a physician lacked veracity, because the court concluded that the words did not affect fitness for the proper conduct of the medical profession.62 Both statements attacked personal character, so what separates them is how tightly the trait was tied to what the calling demands. For the agent, the charge concerned conduct in the very negotiations and relationships that make up the work.
Statements about money show the boundary again. In Pippen v. NBCUniversal Media, LLC, an assertion that a former basketball star had gone through personal bankruptcy was held not to imply any lack of competence or integrity for serving as a goodwill ambassador for a professional team, a basketball analyst, or a celebrity endorser.63 A report of financial trouble can hurt earning prospects in a loose sense and still say nothing about fitness. A charge that a bank is insolvent or a merchant’s credit is bad is different, because it goes to the soundness of the very enterprise the plaintiff runs. The words must also assert something about the plaintiff’s work, so a bare insult does not suffice. In Finck v. City of Tea, crude name-calling coupled with a charge that a police chief was incompetent was treated as opinion only and was not actionable. In Lawnwood Medical Center, Inc. v. Sadow, by contrast, a hospital senior executive told a new doctor that the plaintiff doctor was not competent to operate on a dog. The statement carried an implication of unstated facts, and an opinion from someone who seems to know the facts may be accepted as slander per se.64
The plaintiff must also hold the calling when the statement is made. The Restatement’s comment to § 573 says so, and in Bassim v. Howlett a doctor whose license was removed just after the defamatory statement could not maintain the per se claim, because he was no longer a member of the medical profession.65 The reason follows from what the category presumes. The law infers lost work because the words threaten the plaintiff’s standing in a calling the plaintiff is pursuing, and a person with no position has no fitness for it to impair.
Bassim shows how strictly the status requirement operates, since the plaintiff there held the license when the words were spoken and lost it almost immediately afterward. On an exam, ask what the plaintiff’s status was on the date of publication, and flag any facts showing that the status was lost near that date.
Employment disputes supply the most frequent applications. Statements that an employee was fired for drunkenness, accusations of theft, and allegations of excessive absenteeism and misrepresentation of salary have all been held slander per se, because each describes how the person performs, or betrays, the work.66 In Nassa v. Hook-SupeRx, Inc., statements suggesting that an employee was disloyal by taking kickbacks from those dealing with the employer were easily slander per se.67 Theft at work shows why an exam answer should argue two categories together. An accusation that an employee stole from the employer imputes a crime, and it also ascribes conduct unfit for the job, so the plaintiff can satisfy either § 571 or § 573. All of these examples involve spoken words. The same accusation in a written reference letter would be libel, and the plaintiff would need no per se category at all.
The third step carries most of the argument in a contested case. A plaintiff will characterize the words broadly, as an attack on honesty or reliability that any employer would care about. A defendant will characterize them narrowly, as comment on private life. The better answer shows how the trait attributed connects to what the particular calling requires, and then states the conclusion that follows.
Serious Sexual Misconduct
Section 574, to which § 570(d) refers, states the rule: one who publishes a slander that imputes serious sexual misconduct to another is liable without proof of special harm.69 The category applies only to slander, since a libel is actionable without special harm whatever it charges.70 It has three working parts: the publication must be a slander, the words must impute sexual conduct to the plaintiff, and the conduct imputed must be serious. A plaintiff who satisfies all three skips the pecuniary-loss requirement that otherwise governs slander.71
The reason matches the reason for the other three categories. Listeners who think badly of the plaintiff rarely say so. They simply stop extending invitations, introductions, and trust, and no single refusal can be tied to the slander. What sets this category apart is that the presumption rests on a community judgment about which sexual conduct is disgraceful, and that judgment has shifted over time. The category took shape when a charge of unchastity was regarded as a social disgrace for a woman, and the presumption of damage followed from that belief.72
The path to the category ran partly through the crime category. In England, imputing unchastity to a woman was not actionable per se until Parliament changed the common-law rule in the Slander of Women Act of 1891.73 American courts without such a statute sometimes reached the same result by treating the imputation as a charge of adultery or fornication, offenses involving moral turpitude, as the Rhode Island court did in Kelly v. Flaherty. That workaround gradually gave way to recognition of the damaging nature of the charge itself, and a fourth exception is now generally recognized, as in Hollman v. Brady and Gnapinsky v. Goldyn.74 Some legislatures acted directly. An Illinois statute makes it actionable slander to utter words charging any person with fornication or adultery.75 The workaround also shows why a separate category was needed. An accusation of adultery can describe an offense too minor to satisfy § 571, as Gallo showed above, and without an independent category a plaintiff in that position would have to prove special harm.
The traditional rule protected only women, and the Restatement’s wording is built to remove that limit. Unchastity was thought to be a social disgrace for a woman and not for a man, so the per se rule protected women alone, and the Restatement acknowledges that older rule without endorsing it.76 Courts following that assumption held that imputing unchastity to a man was not slander per se unless the words fell within another category, as in Hickerson v. Masters and Marion v. Davis.77 The first Restatement had treated allegations of unchastity as per se, and the Second Restatement replaced that term with serious sexual misconduct, language its own comment applies to both men and women.78 Equal protection adds pressure toward neutral treatment. A New York trial court in King v. Tanner suggested that the older New York rule of Terwilliger v. Wands would not survive equal protection scrutiny, and a South Carolina appellate court in Wardlaw v. Peck refused, reading the old case law, to distinguish between men and women.79
Whether a particular accusation counts as serious depends on current community standards, and that dependence is where the category is least settled. Strictly speaking, unchastity means sexual intercourse outside marriage, though other sexual conduct has been included.80 Attitudes toward extramarital sex have changed greatly, and gender equality is now a strong legal policy. It is therefore doubtful that either the gender distinction or the proposition that an imputation of consensual sexual conduct outside marriage is generally slander per se remains valid law.81 That doubt gives the word serious its practical weight. A court in a state that no longer regards a consensual affair as seriously discreditable could hold that neither retiree in the block association hypothetical falls within the category, and both would then have to prove special harm under § 575.
What should an essay say when the false statement is that the plaintiff is gay? Courts divide, and the division shows the category moving with community standards. Older decisions treated the imputation as per se. Buck v. Savage held that saying a man was “queer on” another man amounted to a charge of sodomy and so was actionable without special harm, and Plumley v. Landmark Chevrolet, applying Texas law, likewise held an imputation of homosexuality slander per se.82 The Missouri Supreme Court in Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College held a false allegation of homosexuality defamatory, reasoning that homosexuality is still viewed with disfavor by a sizeable part of the population.83 The older ground in cases like Buck was a criminal charge, so the reasoning weakens once the conduct is no longer criminal, and later courts have relied on that point.
Other courts have gone the opposite way. In Yonaty v. Mincolla, the New York Appellate Division held in 2012 that statements falsely describing a person as lesbian, gay, or bisexual are not defamatory per se, and the decision reflects a trend of courts across the country repudiating similar precedents of their own.84 The court reasoned that the defamatory tendency of a statement depends “upon the temper of the times [and] the current of contemporary public opinion.”85 A federal district court applying Massachusetts law in Albright v. Morton declined to treat the statement as per se, because it no longer imputes criminal conduct and because doing so would, in effect, validate anti-homosexual sentiment.86 A Colorado appellate court in Hayes v. Smith held such statements not slander per se even in an employment setting directed at business reputation, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Donovan v. Fiumara required allegation and proof of special damages as a condition of recovery.87 The Southern District of New York took the other view in Gallo. It recognized that many people no longer regard homosexuality as reprehensible but concluded that homophobia remains widespread and deeply held enough for the imputation to be treated as every bit as offensive as imputing unchastity to a woman, and Yonaty declined to follow it.88 A California trial court applied reasoning like Albright’s in Simmons v. American Media to a statement that the plaintiff had withdrawn from public life because of transitioning from male to female. The court declined to give effect to prejudice even if a sizeable portion of the population views being transgender negatively.89 Both lines of decisions accept that the category tracks present public attitudes. They part over whether continuing prejudice against a group is a community reaction the law should presume and compensate or one it should decline to give effect to.
Those decisions answer a question about per se status, and a separate question sits beneath it: whether the imputation is defamatory at all. The Restatement measures defamatory meaning against society at large, and where society is divided, courts are likely to apply Justice Holmes’s statement in Peck v. Tribune Co. that if a communication “would hurt the plaintiff in the estimation of an important and respectable part of the community, liability is not a question of a majority vote.”90 A plaintiff who loses the per se argument may still recover by proving special harm under § 575. The split therefore decides who must show a pecuniary loss and leaves the claim itself alive.91
The third step carries the weight. A plaintiff will argue that sexual accusations remain damaging to the community that heard them, and a defendant will argue that the conduct or status imputed no longer lowers anyone’s standing. An essay that states the rule, identifies the split, and applies each line to the facts earns credit whichever way the jurisdiction falls. An essay that announces a single national rule on homosexuality claims more than the cases support.