397 U.S. 742 (1970)
In 1959, petitioner Brady was charged with kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a).1 The indictment charged that the victim of the kidnapping was not liberated unharmed, so Brady faced a maximum penalty of death if the jury recommended it.2 Represented by competent counsel throughout, Brady first elected to plead not guilty.3 He made no serious attempt to reduce the possibility of a death penalty by waiving a jury trial because the trial judge was unwilling to try the case without a jury.4 Upon learning that his codefendant, who had confessed to the authorities, would plead guilty and be available to testify against him, Brady changed his plea to guilty.5
The trial judge twice questioned Brady as to the voluntariness of his plea before accepting it.6 Brady was sentenced to fifty years' imprisonment, later reduced to thirty years.7 In 1967, Brady sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming that his plea of guilty was not voluntarily given because the statute operated to coerce his plea, because his counsel exerted impermissible pressure upon him, and because his plea was induced by representations with respect to reduction of sentence and clemency.8 He also alleged that the trial judge had not fully complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.9
After a hearing, the District Court for the District of New Mexico denied relief.10 The District Court found that Brady's counsel did not put impermissible pressure on him to plead guilty and that no representations were made with respect to a reduced sentence or clemency.11 The court determined that Brady decided to plead guilty when he learned that his codefendant was going to plead guilty.12 The court concluded that the plea was voluntarily and knowingly made.13
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, determining that the District Court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and specifically approving the finding that Brady's plea of guilty was voluntary.14 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the claim that the Court of Appeals was in error in not reaching a contrary result on the authority of United States v. Jackson.15
Whether a guilty plea to a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) is involuntary when the possibility of a death penalty influenced the decision to plead guilty?16
A guilty plea is valid if it is both voluntary and intelligent.17 The Fifth Amendment prohibits compulsion, but the possibility of a heavier sentence does not render a plea involuntary where the defendant, advised by competent counsel, rationally weighs the advantages of pleading guilty against going to trial.18
No. The District Court found that Brady decided to plead guilty when he learned that his codefendant was going to plead guilty.19 Brady was advised by competent counsel and the trial judge questioned him twice as to the voluntariness of his plea.20 There is no evidence that Brady was gripped by fear of the death penalty or that he could not rationally weigh the advantages of going to trial against pleading guilty.21
The guilty plea was voluntary despite the influence of the possible death penalty.22
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan concurred in the result.23
Whether a guilty plea entered before the decision in United States v. Jackson is unintelligent and subject to later attack?24
A plea is intelligent if the defendant is advised by competent counsel, aware of the nature of the charge, and in control of his mental faculties.25 A voluntary plea intelligently made in light of the then applicable law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise.26
No. Brady was advised by competent counsel and made aware of the nature of the charge against him.27 Although his counsel advised him that the statute empowered the jury to impose the death penalty, and nine years later Jackson held otherwise, the plea was intelligently made at the time based on the then-existing law.28 Brady chose to plead guilty perhaps to ensure that he would face no more than life imprisonment.29
The guilty plea is not subject to later attack based on the subsequent Jackson decision.30