595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979)
Don Chuy, a professional football player who had previously played for the Los Angeles Rams, joined the Philadelphia Eagles Football Club after being traded in 1969.1 On June 16, 1969, Chuy met with Eagles general manager Palmer "Pete" Retzlaff in Philadelphia and the parties executed three National Football League standard form player contracts covering the 1969, 1970, and 1971 seasons at a salary of $30,000 per season with a $15,000 advance for 1969.2
Chuy sustained a serious shoulder injury during a November 1969 game against the New York Giants and was sidelined for the remainder of the season.3 He was hospitalized for most of December 1969, where testing revealed a pulmonary embolism.4 Following his physician's advice, Chuy notified the Eagles of his intention to retire and requested payment for the remaining two years under what he asserted was a three-year contract.5
The Eagles arranged for Chuy to undergo a physical examination by Dr. Dick D. Harrell in March 1970.6 After tests, Dr. Harrell concluded Chuy suffered from an abnormal cell condition, presumably stress polycythemia, and recommended he not participate further in contact sports.7 Shortly after receiving this recommendation, General Manager Retzlaff informed sports columnist Hugh Brown of the Philadelphia Bulletin that Chuy had been advised to quit football because of his blood clot condition, after which Brown contacted Eagles team physician Dr. James Nixon for further information.8
On April 9, 1970, Brown's by-lined column in the Philadelphia Bulletin reported that Chuy suffered from polycythemia vera and quoted Dr. Nixon on the risks of embolisms; the Associated Press picked up the story and it appeared the next day in newspapers including the Los Angeles Times.9 After reading the Los Angeles Times article, Chuy panicked, contacted his personal physician Dr. John W. Perry who assured him the diagnosis was incorrect, yet Chuy experienced severe emotional distress, avoided people, and developed marital difficulties before tests ultimately disproved the presence of polycythemia vera.10
Chuy brought suit against the Eagles and the National Football League in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging antitrust violations, breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation.11 The district court dismissed the antitrust claim.12 The remaining claims were submitted to the jury by special interrogatories, which returned a verdict for Chuy on the contract and emotional distress claims but against him on defamation.13 After the district court denied post-trial motions by both parties, the Eagles appealed the contract and emotional distress judgments while Chuy cross-appealed the defamation judgment, and the Third Circuit heard the case en banc.14
Whether the three contracts executed by Chuy and the Eagles on June 16, 1969, were ambiguous regarding the term of coverage under the injury-benefit provision?15
Yes. The three contracts Chuy signed with the Eagles on the same day were reasonably susceptible to ambiguity in the meaning of the phrase term of this contract as used in paragraph 14.18 When the contracts were read together, paragraph 14 was highly ambiguous.19
The date of execution for each contract was June 16, 1969.20 This made the plain meaning of paragraph 1 create overlapping terms of coverage that rendered paragraph 14 ambiguous.21 The jury heard testimony from Chuy and Retzlaff concerning the negotiations.22 The jury found that both Chuy and Retzlaff manifested by words an intent to have the Eagles liable for salary to Chuy for 1970 and 1971 in the event he sustained a football-related injury in 1969 which rendered him incapable of playing in 1970 and 1971.23 The district court properly submitted to the jury the question of the parties' intent after determining that parol evidence was pertinent to the construction of an ambiguous contract.24
The three contracts executed by Chuy and the Eagles on June 16, 1969, were ambiguous regarding the term of coverage under the injury-benefit provision.25
Whether statements by the Eagles' team physician to a sportswriter that Chuy suffered from polycythemia vera could reasonably be regarded as extreme and outrageous conduct?26
Under section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, one who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability.27 The court must determine as a matter of law whether there is sufficient evidence for reasonable persons to find extreme or outrageous conduct.28 The jury finds the facts and makes its own characterization.29
Yes. If Dr. Nixon advised sportswriter Brown that Chuy suffered from polycythemia vera, knowing that Chuy did not have the disease, such conduct could reasonably be regarded as extreme and outrageous.30 Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.31
Accepting Chuy's version of the events, a statement to the press by a physician assumed to know the facts that a person is suffering from a potentially fatal disease, even though the physician was aware that the person was not stricken with that condition, constituted intolerable professional conduct.32 Disseminating the falsehood through the national press compounded the harm.33
Statements by the Eagles' team physician to a sportswriter that Chuy suffered from polycythemia vera could reasonably be regarded as extreme and outrageous conduct.34
Whether the Eagles could be held vicariously liable for the team physician's statements to the press?35
Under Pennsylvania law, a master-servant relationship is established if the employer had the power to control and direct the conduct of the employee.36 A master is liable for the torts of his servant if the latter's tortious conduct was within the scope of his employment, meaning conduct performed to further the business of the employer and not for the servant's personal purposes.37 The existence of the relationship and conduct within the scope are factual issues for the jury.38
Yes. The jury specifically found that the Eagles had the right to control and actually did control the substance of Dr. Nixon's statements to the press concerning the physical condition of the team's players.39 There was ample evidence that in this limited function as press spokesman about players' medical status, Dr. Nixon was subject to control by team officials.40
The frequency of his performance established that he did it within the scope of his employment.41 The Eagles could therefore be held vicariously liable for Dr. Nixon's tortious statement to Brown.42
The Eagles could be held vicariously liable for the team physician's statements to the press.43
Whether punitive damages could be awarded on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim and assessed against the Eagles for the physician's conduct?44
Pennsylvania courts recognize the standards governing punitive damages set forth in section 908 of the Restatement of Torts.45 Punitive damages are damages other than compensatory or nominal awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct.46 A corporation is liable for exemplary damages for the acts of its servant acting within the scope of his authority provided the conduct of the agent who inflicts the injury complained of must be rather clearly outrageous to justify the vicarious imposition of exemplary damages upon the principal.47
Yes. There is no inconsistency in awarding punitive damages by the same legal standard used in determining liability for compensatory damages.48 The purposes of the two forms of damages are quite distinct under Pennsylvania law.49
Punitive damages serve the dual function of penalizing past conduct constituting an aggravated violation of another's interests and of deterring such behavior in the future.50 The jury was instructed to award in its discretion punitive damages as a penalty and deterrent for dereliction and malice.51 In light of this court's prior construction of Pennsylvania law, punitive damages could properly have been assessed against either Dr. Nixon or the Eagles without requiring the Eagles' management to participate in or approve the reckless acts.52
Punitive damages could be awarded on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim and assessed against the Eagles for the physician's conduct.53
Whether Chuy qualified as a public figure for purposes of his defamation claim?54
Under Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., some individuals of pervasive fame or notoriety are public figures in all contexts.55 An individual who injects himself or is drawn into a public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues also qualifies.56 Professional athletes at least as to their playing careers generally assume a position of public prominence because their contractual disputes as well as their athletic accomplishments command the attention of sports fans.57
Yes. Chuy was a starting player for the Eagles who had gained special prominence for being involved in a major and well-publicized trade in which his contract was assigned from the Los Angeles Rams to the Eagles.58 His injury was sustained on the field and led to discovery of a physical condition which forced his retirement.59
His dispute with the Eagles in the 1970 offseason concerning payment of two years' salary was no mere private contractual matter because Chuy had been thrust into public prominence long before Dr. Nixon's statements appeared in the April 1970 Bulletin.60 The article which discussed Chuy's physical condition, his contractual dispute, and his retirement clearly concerned a man who was a public figure at least with respect to his ability to play football.61
Chuy qualified as a public figure for purposes of his defamation claim.62
Whether the statements attributed to the team physician were capable of defamatory meaning as a matter of law?63
Under Pennsylvania law, the question of whether a publication is capable of defamatory meaning is for the court in the first instance and not for the jury.64 A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.65 Liability for imputing to another an existing loathsome disease must be limited to diseases that are held in some special repugnance such as sexually communicable venereal disease and leprosy.66
No. The comment attributed to Dr. Nixon that Chuy suffered from polycythemia vera is not a loathsome disease which should be treated as defamatory per se.67 Polycythemia vera is a disease of unknown cause characterized by increased concentration of hemoglobin and a great absolute increase in red cells attended by an enlargement of the spleen.68
It is neither contagious nor attributed in any way to socially repugnant conduct.69 Examination of Brown's article reveals absolutely nothing in the statements attributed to Dr. Nixon which can be construed as defamatory.70 In this modern era with its greater medical knowledge and societal concern with health and medical care, diseases and medical treatment are discussed candidly and freely.71 The public's reaction today to a victim of cancer or other serious diseases is usually one of sympathy rather than scorn, support and not rejection.72 The incurrence of a crippling or fatal illness is unfortunate but unless the disease is loathsome it does not tarnish the victim's reputation or cause others to spurn him.73
The statements attributed to the team physician were not capable of defamatory meaning as a matter of law.74
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Seitz, Chief Judge, And Gibbons, Circuit Judge
Circuit Judge Van Dusen dissented from the majority's conclusion that the statements were not capable of defamatory meaning as a matter of law.75 He noted that the uncontroverted evidence showed polycythemia vera is potentially fatal while stress polycythemia is not.76 All doctors agreed Chuy never suffered from polycythemia vera.77 The jury found that dissemination of Dr. Nixon's remarks tended to injure Chuy's reputation and that Dr. Nixon intentionally told Brown Chuy suffered from the disease.78
Van Dusen concluded the district court erred in treating sportswriter Brown as the relevant recipient rather than the average reader of the Philadelphia Bulletin.79 Defamatory words spoken to a reporter for attribution should be deemed communicated to the general readership.80 Where the imputation of a fatal physical disease is explicitly related to a person's professional demise, his business stature has been seriously weakened.81 Retired professional athletes might be deterred from opportunities in sportscasting or advertising if thought to suffer from a potentially fatal disease.82 This error necessitates a remand on the defamation claim.83