Concept
Alternatives to Strict Liability
Claims against manufacturers and other defendants arising out of the manufacture and distribution of products, and defenses to such claims
Strict Products Liability
Alternatives to Strict Liability
Strict liability under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts answered the failures of older remedies. Section 402A makes a seller liable for physical harm caused by a product sold in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to the user’s property, if the seller is engaged in the business of selling such products and the product is expected to reach, and does reach, the user without substantial change.1 Subsection (2) then removes the two obstacles that defeated earlier plaintiffs: the rule applies even though the seller exercised all possible care, and even though the user never bought from or contracted with the seller.2
Those two obstacles, privity and proof of fault, shaped each older remedy. The privity-of-contract rule required a plaintiff to have contracted directly with the defendant, which made recovery from a remote seller such as a wholesaler or manufacturer impossible.3 Once MacPherson gave birth to negligence claims against manufacturers, privity stopped blocking recovery, but the plaintiff still had to prove negligence, and specific careless acts inside a large, faceless manufacturer were often hard to find.4 By the 1950s courts were also applying warranty claims to manufacturers of defective food, cosmetics, and similar products, yet warranty came with its own contract defenses: privity, disclaimer, and notice. Notice was one of the “big three” that long frustrated products liability claimants and helped lead courts in the 1960s to strict liability in tort.5
Strict liability did not erase the older theories. Where it applies, a negligence claim often adds little, but a statute of repose, a limitations period, or another defense may defeat one claim and spare the other.6 Some states go further and make a statute the exclusive tort remedy for product injury; there the plaintiff sues under the statute and cannot assert negligence, breach of implied warranty, or other common law theories.7 Because the details vary, check your state’s statute before applying the general doctrine in this chapter.
Negligence, implied warranty, and strict liability in tort share a premise: something was wrong with the product, which was dangerously defective in some respect.8 Defectiveness is, quite simply, the heart of products liability law.9 Express warranty and misrepresentation reach further, because they may supply a remedy when a product is more dangerous than the seller said it was, even though the product is not defective.10 The three sections below take the older theories in turn, beginning with negligence, whose privity barrier shaped the others.
Negligence and the Privity Rule
The rule that MacPherson overthrew came from Winterbottom v. Wright, a decision of the 1840s.11 Lord Abinger warned that without a limit the law would invite “an infinity of actions”: unless courts confined such contracts “to the parties who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue.”12 Until the early twentieth century, courts repeatedly invoked contractual privity on that reasoning, so that the seller of a defective product could be liable in tort only to the buyer and not to third parties.13 Judges feared that liability beyond the contract would impose excessive costs on manufacturers and other sellers and so disrupt product markets to society’s detriment.14
The rule left bystanders with no remedy at all. A contract-based regime could never have protected them, because a bystander by definition has no contract with any party in the chain of distribution, so tort law had to supply the cause of action that Winterbottom denied.15 Courts first softened the rule with an exception for imminently dangerous products, such as poisons and explosives, that by their nature are implements of destruction.16
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., decided by Judge Cardozo in 1916, turned that exception into the general rule.17 Writing for the majority, Cardozo held that the imminent danger rule was not limited to poisons, explosives, and other implements of destruction: “If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger.” A manufacturer who knows that such a product “will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests” must make it carefully “irrespective of contract.”18 The court put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb grows “out of contract and nothing else” and put “its source in the law.”19 Duty now follows the physical harm that a negligently made product foreseeably threatens, so the occurrence of foreseeable physical harm shows that the defect made the product a “thing of danger.”20 Because foreseeable injury to a class of persons that includes the plaintiff is essentially the test for negligence anyway, the exception swallowed the rule.21
Other jurisdictions adopted the MacPherson rule one after another over the next several decades, Maine last in 1982, and every American jurisdiction now follows it.22 The duty reaches component makers as well. In Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., the court allowed a direct negligence action against the manufacturer of a component part, like the wheel maker in MacPherson, and Great Britain eventually abandoned Winterbottom too.23
The duty MacPherson recognized is modest. Manufacturers must use reasonable care to refrain from selling products that contain unreasonable risks of harm; the duty protects only persons foreseeably placed at risk, covers only foreseeable risks, and demands reasonable care, not perfect care.24
A retailer’s duty depends on what it does to the product. A retailer that merely passes a product along acts as a conduit, but one that affirmatively prepares, assembles, installs, repairs, tests, or inspects the product has a duty to exercise reasonable care in those actions.25
MacPherson settled the duty question but not the proof problem. Because the duty requires only reasonable care, a defect alone ordinarily will not establish breach; the plaintiff normally must prove both that the product was defective in design, manufacture, or marketing and that the manufacturer acted unreasonably in making or selling it in that condition.26 Finding specific negligent acts inside a typically large, faceless manufacturer was often difficult for the plaintiff’s lawyer.27 Timing posed a second hurdle. MacPherson had to show that the broken wheel was defective when it left the manufacturer’s possession, yet his car had been driven on rough country roads for a year and might have been damaged through heavy use.28
Res ipsa loquitur gave plaintiffs a partial answer. Its elements raise inferences that someone was negligent, that the someone was the defendant, and that the someone was not the plaintiff, so a plaintiff may rely on it where the circumstances suggest that the accident probably resulted from the defendant’s negligence and not from the actions of the plaintiff or another.29 In Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., the majority upheld a judgment for a waitress on res ipsa although she could not prove specifically how the defendant bottler had been negligent.30 The doctrine works even when a defect is crystal clear but its origin is a matter of conjecture, as when a mouse shows up in a bottle of Coke; still, what must be inferred is the defendant’s negligence in allowing the defect into the product and selling it in that condition, and proof of a defect alone will not suffice.31 The longer a product stays out of the manufacturer’s hands, the more room remains for damage after sale, as MacPherson’s year on country roads shows.32 With the advent of strict liability and its parallel “malfunction doctrine,” res ipsa matters far less in products cases than it once did.33
Negligence thus solved the duty problem and left the fault problem. Warranty promised liability without proof of fault, but it carried privity rules of its own, which the next section examines.34
Warranty Claims and Their Contract Defenses
Warranty law concerns the legal obligations that arise from assertions in a sales transaction; the assertions may be express, made in the seller’s affirmative statements about the product, or implied by the nature of the transaction.36 Because liability rests on a product’s condition and not on the seller’s fault, warranty is a truly strict form of liability, and proof of the seller’s negligence is not only unnecessary but irrelevant.37 Strictness carries a price, however. Warranty belongs to the law of sales, and its contract rules govern who may sue, what the seller may disclaim, and when the buyer must complain. Article 2 of the UCC supplies three warranties: express warranties under § 2–313, the implied warranty of merchantability under § 2–314, and the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose under § 2–315.38
An express warranty is the seller’s own allocation of risk. A seller who asserts, or acts to indicate, that goods offer a certain quality of performance or contain certain attributes assumes the risk that the description is wrong, so the buyer need prove only that the product did not match what was said.39 The seller need not use words such as “warranty” or “guarantee,” or intend to make a warranty, and advertising a feature of the product can create one.40 Statements of opinion, affirmations of value, and statements of commendation, a salesperson’s puffing, create none.41 In Lane v. C.A. Swanson & Sons, a can of chicken labeled boned supported an express warranty claim by a buyer hurt by a bone.
Baxter v. Ford Motor Co. shows a manufacturer’s own printed words binding it even when the dealer’s contract protects the dealer. A small rock shattered the front windshield of a car that Ford made and a dealer sold, injuring the buyer’s eye. The Washington Supreme Court let the dealer escape under a contract clause excluding all warranties, but held that Ford could be responsible for the statements in its catalogs and printed materials, distributed by the dealer, about the car’s “Tri-plex shatterproof glass windshield.”42
The implied warranty of merchantability arises without any statement from the seller. UCC § 2–314 implies it in a contract for sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind, meaning a person in the business of selling such products, so isolated sales fall outside the warranty; serving food or drink for value counts as a sale.43 It is the central and most important warranty in Article 2, and generally proof that a product is defective under strict liability in tort will establish that it is not merchantable, and vice versa, so in this fundamental way the contract claim and the tort claim are essentially the same.44 In injury cases, “merchantable” and “fit for ordinary purposes” mean that products are reasonably safe for their ordinary uses; the warranty is broader than a promise that the goods will do the ordinary job for which they were made.45
The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose rests on different facts. It arises when the seller, at the time of contracting, has reason to know a particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods.46 The buyer must therefore show a special, out-of-the-ordinary purpose and reliance on the seller’s skill or judgment in choosing a product for it, and by its terms § 2–315, unlike § 2–314, does not require a merchant seller.47 In Klein v. Sears Roebuck & Co., a verdict for breach of this warranty was affirmed after buyers bought a riding mower on a salesman’s recommendation for their hilly property. Where the seller had no reason to suspect reliance and the buyer did not in fact rely, no warranty arose: DuPont had no reason to suspect that its buyer, Vitek, was relying on DuPont’s skill or judgment, and Vitek did not in fact rely.48
Notice shows how poorly some sales rules fit injury claims. In some states the warranty claim requires timely notice of the breach to the seller.49 In Buford v. Toys R Us, Inc., the court ruled that the plaintiffs’ failure to notify the retailer until they filed a complaint two years after the accident was unreasonable as a matter of law, which barred the one claim against the retailer that surely would have succeeded: breach of the implied warranty of merchantability by the sale of a dangerously defective bike.50 Dean Prosser called such a requirement a “booby trap for the unwary.” Some of its commercial policies still apply to consumers and bystanders hurt in product accidents, but others do not, and two states have amended their versions of the UCC to ban the notice requirement in personal injury cases.51
Disclaimers and remedy limits compound the problem. In Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton, a steering defect caused a 14-month-old car to veer off a bridge and fall to the street below. The 12-month, 12,000-mile express warranty had expired, the contract of sale disclaimed the implied warranty of merchantability in accordance with § 2–316(2), and a one-year statute of limitations barred the tort claims. The court held that the properly drawn disclaimer barred the warranty claim, so the law gave a consumer severely injured by a dangerous defect in a nearly new car no redress.52 Section 2–719 adds that sellers and buyers may frame the remedies in their sales contract, subject to controls that help ensure their decisions are informed and free. One such control makes a limit on consequential damages for personal injury in consumer goods prima facie unconscionable, but a valid disclaimer of the warranty itself still defeats the claim.53
Who may sue is the third contract question. For warranty claims, privity divides into vertical privity, which asks what types of sellers are bound by warranties, and horizontal privity, which asks what types of injured parties obtain their benefits.54 The horizontal question turns on the state’s version of UCC § 2–318. One alternative limits recovery to members of the family or household of the buyer or the remote purchaser, or guests in the home of either; in a state that adopts it, injured employees, bystanders, and passengers in the buyer’s car fall outside the warranty. Other states have adopted broader versions that effectively allow any reasonably foreseeable plaintiff to recover.55
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. attacked the privity and disclaimer defenses together. A non-purchaser injured in an accident caused by a defective car sued the manufacturer in warranty, and the New Jersey Supreme Court allowed the claim despite both defenses.56 On privity, the court reasoned that mass marketing had made the manufacturer remote from the purchaser, sold goods through intermediaries, and created demand through advertising, so the “consumer” was a broader figure than the “buyer”: anyone who, in the parties’ reasonable contemplation, might be expected to use the product. Where defective goods endanger life or limb, society’s interests “can only be protected by eliminating the requirement of privity between the maker and his dealers and the reasonably expected ultimate consumer.”57 The implied warranty of merchantability, chargeable to manufacturer or dealer, therefore extends to the purchaser, members of his family, and others using the car with his consent, who “must be considered within the distributive chain.”58 On disclaimer, the court voided the clause as “not fairly obtained,” so the warranty benefited the plaintiff even without privity, so long as the defendant “puts a new automobile in the stream of trade and promotes its purchase by the public.”59
Later courts read Henningsen to hold that a manufacturer’s implied warranty of merchantability could never be disclaimed in connection with bodily injury, however clear the disclaimer. A cause of action for breach of an implied warranty that cannot be disclaimed, running from a manufacturer to an injured party who is not in privity, is simply strict liability in tort masquerading under another name.60 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products made the step explicit by imposing the liability as tort law and not as implied warranty, so privity was unnecessary and contractual disclaimers did not bar the claim.61 Section 402A(2)(b) carries the idea forward by applying strict liability although the user has not bought from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.62 Warranty nonetheless remains in the pleadings. Article 2 requires an action for breach of a sales contract to begin within four years after the cause of action accrues,63 a period that usually exceeds tort law’s two or three years from discovery, which is one reason warranty claims remain an important part of modern products liability litigation.64
Misrepresentation Claims: Section 402B
Section 402B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts imposes liability for a seller’s false public statements about a product, even when nothing is wrong with the product itself. One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising, labels, or otherwise, makes to the public a misrepresentation of a material fact concerning the character or quality of a chattel is subject to liability for physical harm to a consumer caused by justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation, even though the consumer has not bought the chattel from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.66 Unlike deceit, the liability is limited to representations made to the public at large, as in labels and advertisements, and to physical harm, which excludes pure economic loss.67
The doctrine grew out of Baxter, the windshield case introduced above as a warranty case. The rule in such cases, as the cases put it, “does not rest upon contractual obligations, but rather on the principle that the original act of delivering an article is wrong, when, because of the lack of those qualities which the manufacturer represented it as having, the absence of which could not be readily detected by the consumer, the article is not safe for the purposes for which the consumer would ordinarily use it.”68 That reasoning moved the claim out of contract.69 By holding that liability for misrepresentation was truly strict, as in express warranty, while ignoring warranty’s rules on privity and other contractual limits, Baxter in effect created a new tort, which eventually became § 402B.70
On a second appeal in Baxter, the court showed how strict the rule is. It held immaterial whether any better shatter-proof glass existed, because it was the seller’s duty to know that its representations to purchasers were true, and a seller who states as true a material fact susceptible of knowledge, to one who relies on it to his injury, answers for its falsity whether or not he knew it was false or believed it true.71 Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories applied the same logic to a painkiller. The manufacturer had no reason to believe the drug was addictive, and the jury found the addiction not reasonably foreseeable, yet the Texas Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal: the manufacturer was liable not for failing to warn of a risk it could not have known, but for affirmatively and falsely representing that the drug was not addictive, and, citing § 402B, the court held that a misrepresentation that causes reliance produces liability.72
Because the claim turns on words and not on the condition of the product, the plaintiff need not prove a defect; she must show that the seller communicated false and material information on which she reasonably relied.73 The remedy therefore reaches cases the other theories miss. If an all-terrain vehicle tends to tip in certain situations but the seller represented that it would not, the buyer may sue for misrepresentation even though the vehicle has no defect, provided she was actually aware of the representation and relied on it in deciding to buy or use the vehicle.74
A plaintiff can lose a misrepresentation claim at any of six points, so run the analysis as a sequence of questions:
The third question separates fact from sales talk. Section 402B reaches only a misrepresentation of a material fact, and the UCC draws a parallel line for express warranties by excluding statements of opinion, affirmations of value, and statements of commendation.81
The fourth question demands close reading. The claim hinges on particular words written or spoken by the seller, so it requires precise identification and close scrutiny of the offending language.82 General Motors Corp. v. Howard illustrates why: whether the claim succeeds depends on what the advertisement actually promised. A false statement supports recovery only if it concerns the characteristic that caused the injury; if no relevant representation was made, the plaintiff has no claim.83
The physical-harm limit has drawn one notable exception and many rejections. Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon allowed recovery for pure economic loss on a claim of strict liability in tort for misrepresentation, relying on § 402B and its reference to a then-proposed § 552D.84 The ALI never adopted § 552D, the Tennessee Supreme Court later repudiated Lonon, and courts everywhere else have rejected claims for pure economic loss based on § 402B.85 The Third Restatement’s counterpart reaches harm to persons or property.86
Section 402B overlaps heavily with express warranty under UCC § 2–313, because each makes the seller answer for a false statement about the goods without proof of fault. Because § 402B sounds in tort, it also escapes warranty’s privity rules and other contractual limits.87 Few states have adopted it. Courts in a few states, notably California, Texas, and Pennsylvania, and Ohio’s legislature adopted § 402B, but most states have left strict seller liability for misrepresentations to contract law and UCC § 2–313.88 Section 9 of the Third Restatement therefore states tort law more boldly than it exists in most states, even though almost everyone agrees that sellers should be strictly liable for physical harm from misrepresentations.89 A plaintiff in a state without § 402B pleads the same advertisement as an express warranty.