511 S.W.2d 690, 14 UCC 312 (Tenn. 1974)
Moulton and his wife Pauline sued Ford Motor Company and the retail dealer Hull-Dobbs for personal injuries and loss of consortium.1 Moulton purchased a 1969 Ford LTD from Hull-Dobbs of Knoxville that was delivered on April 30, 1969.2 On July 5, 1970, while driving westbound on Interstate 40, the vehicle suddenly veered right, jumped the guard rail, and fell twenty-six feet to the street below, allegedly because of a defect in the steering mechanism.3 Moulton suffered serious injuries.4
Mrs. Moulton asserted the same facts and theories in her separate action for loss of consortium.5 On May 13, 1971, Moulton filed his complaint alleging negligence, breach of express and implied warranties, tortious misrepresentation based on public advertisement, and strict liability in tort.6 Both defendants moved for summary judgment or dismissal.7
The trial judge dismissed the warranty counts for failure to state a cause of action and ruled that the remaining counts were barred by the statute of limitations.8 The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the warranty counts but reversed on the statute-of-limitations issue, holding that the other counts were timely.9 All parties petitioned the Tennessee Supreme Court for certiorari; the court granted the petitions of Ford and Hull-Dobbs and denied those of the Moultons.10
In their petition, Ford and Hull-Dobbs challenged the Court of Appeals' reliance on unauthenticated affidavits and depositions contained in the technical record.11 They also contested the retroactive application of a 1972 amendment to T.C.A. Section 28-304 that extended the limitations period in products-liability cases until one year after the date of injury.12 The amendment took effect April 11, 1972, after the one-year anniversary of the vehicle purchase had already passed.13
Whether the disclaimer clauses in the vehicle sales contracts satisfied the conspicuousness and merchantability requirements of T.C.A. 47-2-316(2)?14
T.C.A. 47-2-316(2) provides that implied warranties of merchantability and fitness may be disclaimed if the disclaimer is conspicuous and mentions merchantability, and if it is in writing with reference to the fitness warranty.15
Yes. The Court of Appeals concluded that the requirement of T.C.A. 47-2-316(2) had been complied with; and, consequently, the disclaimers were validly drawn.16 The Supreme Court agreed with this conclusion.17 The disclaimers in the contracts between Moulton and Hull-Dobbs and Ford met the statutory criteria for conspicuousness and explicit mention of merchantability, rendering the implied warranty claims properly dismissed.18
The disclaimer clauses satisfied T.C.A. 47-2-316(2) and were valid.19
Whether the one-year or twelve-thousand-mile limitation on Ford's express warranty was unconscionable under T.C.A. 47-2-719(3)?20
No. The Court of Appeals rejected respondents’ reasoning stating that this provision has to do with limitation of remedies, and not with a limitation on the time within which a claim may be asserted.23 The one-year or twelve thousand mile limitation on the express warranty given by Ford to Moulton was a valid time limitation on asserting claims rather than an unconscionable exclusion of personal injury damages.24
The one-year or twelve-thousand-mile limitation was not unconscionable under T.C.A. 47-2-719(3).25
Whether the Court of Appeals properly considered affidavits, exhibits, and depositions that were part of the technical record but not authenticated by the trial judge or included in a bill of exceptions?26
Yes. The record reveals the trial judge personally authenticated the affidavits and exhibits thereto and also the deposition of Mr. Moulton.29 In his order dismissing the suit, he specifically identified the affidavits, exhibits thereto, and the depositions as having been considered in arriving at his decision.30 Thus, the rule in Bryant v. Central Motor Co. was complied with and the documents were properly before the court.31
The Court of Appeals properly considered the authenticated documents.32
Whether the 1972 amendment to T.C.A. Section 28-304 could be applied retroactively to revive a cause of action that had already expired under prior precedent before the amendment's effective date?33
No. The statute of limitations ran on April 30, 1970 under Jackson v. General Motors Corp. and Bates v. Shapard.36 The amendment took effect April 11, 1972 after the one-year anniversary of the vehicle purchase had already passed.37 Applying the 1972 amendment retroactively would revive an otherwise barred cause of action and violate the state constitution as held in Girdner v. Stephens.38
The 1972 amendment to T.C.A. Section 28-304 could not be applied retroactively.39
Whether a cause of action for personal injuries arising from an alleged product defect accrues on the date of purchase or on the date the injury is sustained?40
Under prior precedent a cause of action of a purchaser against an automobile manufacturer for negligence in the manufacture of an automobile accrued on the date the purchaser bought the car from the manufacturer's dealer.41
Yes. Prior to the effective date of the amendment to T.C.A. Section 28-304 it was the law of this State that a cause of action accrued on the date the purchaser bought the car.42 The complaint filed on May 13, 1971 was therefore barred because the action accrued on April 30, 1969 when Moulton purchased the vehicle and the one-year period ended April 30, 1970.43
The cause of action accrued on the date of purchase.44
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Fones dissented from the ruling that Moulton's cause of action was barred on April 30, 1970 although his injury did not occur until July 5, 1970.45 He argued that a cause of action accrues when a suit may be maintained upon it.46 He further argued that two elements must coalesce before a cause of action can exist: a breach of some legally recognized duty and legally cognizable damage.47
To hold that a products liability action is barred before any injury is sustained deprives a person of the opportunity of redress for an injury done him in his goods or person by due process of law, contrary to our Constitution.48 Article 1, Section 17 of the Constitution of Tennessee provides that all courts shall be open and every man shall have remedy by due course of law.49 On April 30, 1970 Ford had acquired no vested right to the repose of a cause of action that did not come into existence until July 5, 1970.50