Concept
Effect on Other Doctrines
Comparative negligence (modern apportionment)
Effect on Other Doctrines
The typical comparative negligence statute is short, and it says little or nothing about last clear chance, assumption of risk, or the other doctrines that grew up around the contributory negligence bar. Courts therefore decide for themselves what becomes of each one.1
They decide by asking what job the doctrine was doing. The bar rested on the idea that a plaintiff could recover only if the defendant was at fault and the plaintiff had used ordinary care to avoid the harm,2 and that idea was hard to defend. It seemed unfair to impose liability on a defendant when the plaintiff's own negligence helped cause the injury, but it was just as unfair to relieve the defendant entirely for the same reason.3 Courts and legislatures responded with workarounds, among them last clear chance and the rule that a defendant whose conduct was willful and wanton could not invoke the bar.4 Apportionment makes workarounds of that kind unnecessary, because the plaintiff's negligence no longer ends the claim. A doctrine that rests on a different premise, such as advance consent to a risk or the way defendants divide a judgment, may survive untouched.
This section applies that test to five doctrines: last clear chance, assumption of risk, strict products liability, joint and several liability, and statutory violations. States answer these questions differently, so each subsection states the majority approach and flags the variations. When an exam stem names no jurisdiction, apply the majority approach and say that some states differ.
Last Clear Chance
Last clear chance, the best known of the workarounds, let a negligent plaintiff recover in full when the defendant had the final opportunity to avoid the harm and failed to use it.5 Tradition traces the doctrine to Davies v. Mann, an English decision of 1842. Jurisdictions disagreed about its reach. Some confined it to a plaintiff who was helpless to escape the danger, and others extended it to one who was merely inattentive. Some demanded that the defendant have actually discovered the plaintiff's peril, and others accepted a defendant who should have discovered it.6
Set beside the safety statute exception, the doctrine shows two ways of loosening the same bar. The safety statute exception asks what the statute does: contributory negligence bars recovery for a defendant's statutory violation unless the statute's effect is to place the entire responsibility for the harm on the defendant.7 Last clear chance asks about sequence, meaning whether the defendant's negligence came later and the defendant alone could still have avoided the injury.8 A negligent plaintiff might qualify under either, and neither calls for a comparison of fault. The doctrine has been called a “transitional doctrine,” a way station on the road to comparative negligence, though for many years it froze the transition more than it hastened it.9
Comparative negligence took away the doctrine's reason for existing, and the courts that adopted it said so. In the decision adopting comparative negligence, one court observed that last clear chance “was created to escape the harshness of the contributory negligence rule” and abolished its “vestiges” once the need for it disappeared.10 Another declared that the doctrine would “no longer have any application” in cases under the new rule.11 The California Supreme Court in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. abolished it outright, along with the part of assumption of risk that merely restates contributory negligence, and directed that both be “subsumed under the general process of assessing liability in proportion to negligence.”12
Li also explained why keeping the doctrine does harm. Once comparison replaces the bar, retention produces only “a windfall to the plaintiff in direct contravention of the principle of liability in proportion to fault.”13 Most courts agree that last clear chance should have no role as a separate doctrine, and admiralty reaches the same result because the doctrine is inconsistent with apportioning fault.14
The defendant's missed chance keeps a job, but a smaller one. A jury may count the defendant's failure to take the last clear chance toward the defendant's percentage of fault, since that failure may make the defendant more negligent than the plaintiff. The failure no longer decides on its own whether the defendant is liable or for how much.15
The arithmetic follows from the pure form, under which a plaintiff recovers with a reduction for his percentage of negligence.16 The second result follows because the few jurisdictions that still apply the contributory negligence bar also apply last clear chance in at least one of its forms.17
A modified bar adds a trap. About twenty jurisdictions bar a plaintiff whose fault is greater than the defendant's.18 In those states a plaintiff who is primarily at fault loses entirely, where under the pure form the same plaintiff would recover with a reduction.19 The tempting compromise is to abolish last clear chance for plaintiffs who can recover under the modified rule while keeping it to rescue plaintiffs the bar would otherwise defeat. That compromise rewards the plaintiff who proves more fault.20
Under that rule a plaintiff's best strategy is to prove the greater share of fault, which turns the fault principle upside down. Two consistent rules avoid the inversion. If the doctrine is abolished for every plaintiff, the 49 percent cyclist still recovers $51,000 and the 51 percent cyclist recovers nothing, so recovery at least moves in the direction of blame. If the doctrine is kept for every plaintiff, both cyclists recover $100,000 and neither gains by being the worse of the two. Last clear chance must therefore be kept entirely or abolished entirely under a modified bar, and most courts choose abolition.21
Abolition is the majority view, not a universal one. Several states that apply comparative negligence still retain last clear chance,22 and the doctrine remains available where contributory negligence governs.23 Penn Harris Madison School Corp. v. Howard illustrates the second group. Indiana retains contributory negligence in cases against governmental entities, and last clear chance did not help the student, who had designed a rig for Peter Pan to fly in a school play and was hurt while testing it during rehearsal. Nothing showed that the school could have prevented the injury after he put himself in danger by jumping from a ladder.24
An exam stem that describes a plaintiff's negligence followed by a defendant's missed chance to avoid the harm often omits the governing rule, so it calls for two answers. Where contributory negligence applies, last clear chance may remove the bar if its requirements are met, and the plaintiff then recovers in full. Where comparative negligence applies, the majority view is that the doctrine no longer operates, so the plaintiff's own percentage still reduces the recovery and the defendant's missed chance can only raise the defendant's percentage. The usual slip is to let the defendant's last chance erase the plaintiff's share in a comparative state.
Assumption of Risk
Last clear chance turned on timing; assumption of risk turns on what the plaintiff knew and chose. Under the bar the label hardly mattered, because a plaintiff who deliberately met a danger that the defendant's negligence created lost whether the court called the conduct assumption of risk or contributory negligence.26 Comparative fault made the label matter. The same conduct would now be a complete bar if called assumption of risk but only a partial bar if called contributory fault,27 and courts had to decide how the comparative statute affected the older defense.28
In Li v. Yellow Cab Co., the California Supreme Court concluded that adopting comparative negligence “should entail the merger of the defense of assumption of risk into the general scheme of assessment of liability in proportion to fault in those particular cases in which the form of assumption of risk involved is no more than a variant of contributory negligence.”29 The holding states the result as an abolition of the defense “to the extent that it is merely a variant of the former doctrine of contributory negligence.”30
The qualifier matters because the label has covered more than one situation. The court drew on earlier authority that separated two of them. A plaintiff who unreasonably undertakes to encounter a specific known risk imposed by the defendant's negligence is engaged in conduct that is “in reality a form of contributory negligence,” while a plaintiff held to agree to relieve the defendant of an obligation of reasonable conduct presents a situation involving “a reduction of defendant's duty of care.”31 Only the first situation is plaintiff fault, so only the first belongs in the comparison. Sorting the common fact patterns by that test yields three: an express agreement to bear the risk, an injury from a risk inherent in an activity conducted with care, and a plaintiff who knowingly encounters a danger that the defendant negligently created.32
Express assumption of risk, an advance agreement in which the plaintiff gives up the right to sue the defendant for negligence, remains a viable defense.33 It draws its force from the plaintiff's consent, not from any carelessness, so a statute that tells the jury to reduce damages for the plaintiff's fault does not reach it. Courts still police these waivers. They decline to enforce them in certain contexts involving essential services, and they may construe the language narrowly, but usually they honor the agreement.34
A plaintiff hurt by a risk inherent in a carefully run activity stands in a different position. A skier struck by another skier, or a spectator hit by a foul ball at a baseball game, will likely lose because offering the activity was not negligent, even though such injuries occasionally happen.35 A court may still say that the plaintiff assumed the risk, but the real ground is that the defendant breached no duty. Comparative negligence divides fault among negligent actors, so it has nothing to divide when the defendant was not negligent at all. The team in the foul-ball case therefore still wins in a comparative negligence state, even where a statute says that assumption of risk is abolished.
The situation that comparative negligence actually changes is secondary assumption of risk, in which the defendant was negligent and created a danger, and the plaintiff, aware of the danger, chose to encounter it and was injured.36 When that choice was unreasonable, most comparative negligence courts treat it as one more form of plaintiff fault. The jury assigns the plaintiff a percentage for the choice, the award shrinks by that percentage, and the jury is told nothing about a separate defense.37 Tanaka, who rides with Quentin while Quentin is obviously intoxicated, shows the result. If the jury puts Tanaka at 30 percent for the choice and Quentin at 70 percent for driving drunk, Tanaka recovers 70 percent of his damages, where at common law the same choice would have barred the claim.38 The phrase “assumption of risk” can also mislead jurors when it appears beside contributory negligence, so it may be prudent to leave it out of instructions that refer to contributory negligence.39
The merger follows from what an unreasonable choice is. A plaintiff who knowingly takes a risk that a reasonable person would not take has failed to use reasonable care, and unreasonable assumption of risk is by definition a form of negligence.40 A separate complete defense would make the label decisive: the plaintiff who noticed a danger and misjudged it would recover nothing, while the plaintiff who never noticed it would recover part of her damages. In Rini v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, a court applying Arkansas law confronted that anomaly and refused to keep the old bar. Retaining it would deny any recovery to a plaintiff “who happens to engage in negligent conduct of the peculiar form that overlaps with assumption of risk,” a result inconsistent with the legislature's choice of comparative fault.41 Florida's Supreme Court reached the same place by decision in Blackburn v. Dorta, holding that implied assumption of risk “is merged into the defense of contributory negligence” and that comparative negligence principles apply wherever the defense is asserted.42
A knowing choice that was reasonable is the harder case, because the choice is deliberate but not careless. Suppose Gallo stores goods in a warehouse without a sprinkler system. If a safer warehouse was available, a jury could find her choice negligent. If the unprotected warehouse was the only one within 75 miles of her home and she had to travel on business for three months, the same choice might well be reasonable.43 Comparative negligence reduces recovery for negligence, and reasonable conduct is not negligent, so most courts that apply comparative negligence allow a plaintiff in that position to recover fully.44 The rescuer in Eckert v. Long Island R.R. shows how deliberate and reasonable can coincide. The decedent was killed rescuing a child from an oncoming train, and the court held that a jury could find his conduct was not unreasonable and therefore not contributory negligence.45 Rini gave the underlying reason for refusing to treat reasonable assumption as a complete defense. The contrary rule would leave the plaintiff who acted unreasonably with a partial recovery and the plaintiff who acted reasonably with none.46 The Florida court put the point as a question, asking whether liability is equated with fault under a doctrine that would “totally bar recovery by one who voluntarily, but reasonably, assumes a known risk” while a plaintiff whose conduct was unreasonable recovers proportionately. Its answer was “Certainly not.”47
Not every jurisdiction follows this majority pattern, and an exam answer should say so. A few states that otherwise apply comparative negligence keep secondary assumption of risk as a separate and complete defense, so the plaintiff's deliberate choice bars the claim instead of reducing it.48 Rhode Island, a pure comparative negligence state, is one of them: a footnote in Sheehan v. The North American Marketing Corp. reports that the common-law defense of assumption of risk survives there alongside comparative negligence.49 On reasonable assumption, a few courts and the Restatement (Second) of Torts take the opposite view from the majority and treat it as a complete bar. They reason that the defense rests on knowing consent to the risk, while comparative negligence statutes speak only to fault.50 Where contributory negligence still governs, secondary implied assumption of risk may likewise remain a complete defense.51 Admiralty allows no assumption of risk defense, and risk-taking that amounts to fault is apportioned like any other fault.52
Statutes and opinions that declare assumption of risk “abolished” must be read for what the label covered. Li abolished the defense only to the extent that it merely varied contributory negligence, which leaves express agreements and inherent-risk cases outside its reach.53 A statute that treats the plaintiff's deliberate choice as comparative negligence, as the Massachusetts statute does, removes the separate defense and sends the conduct to the jury for comparison.54 Either way, abolition sends the old cases to one of three places: a comparison of fault, a finding that the defendant owed no duty, or a finding that the defendant did not breach it. A court's continued use of the phrase does not show that a complete bar survives, because the vocabulary may remain while the real ground is that the defendant was not negligent.55 The known-or-obvious-danger defense in premises cases belongs to the same family. In Steigman v. Outrigger Enterprises, Inc., the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the defense is not viable in Hawaii, rejecting the Restatement view that lets a plaintiff recover for an injury caused by a known or obvious danger only when the injury was foreseeable.56
Step 4 is where answers most often go wrong. The tempting response in a comparative negligence state treats the plaintiff's awareness of the danger as enough to bar the claim, when awareness only opens the question whether the choice was unreasonable. A plaintiff who knew and chose unreasonably is charged a percentage, a plaintiff who knew and chose reasonably usually loses nothing, and only an agreement or an inherent-risk setting ends the claim by itself.
Strict Products Liability
Strict products liability makes a seller answer for injuries from a defective product without proof that the seller was careless, and that feature raises a puzzle once comparative negligence arrives: can a plaintiff's carelessness reduce a recovery against a defendant whose liability never depended on carelessness? Strict liability is the exception in tort law, not the rule. Judges have not generally adopted the view that compensation matters more than justice or that tort liability should be strict.58 Distribution arguments and strict liability have gone hand in hand, but only in certain kinds of cases, and they have not supplanted fault as the most common basis for tort liability.59 Compensation is nonetheless an important goal of tort law, which raises the question why courts do not adopt strict liability across the board.60 Products liability is one place where they do, and there the question about the plaintiff's own conduct has to be answered.
The first answer came from comment n to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, written when contributory negligence was still a complete bar. It ignored a plaintiff's contributory negligence but treated assumption of the risk as a complete defense to a strict liability claim.61 Early cases followed comment n and refused to bar plaintiffs even when their negligence was a factor in causing the injury.62 The drafters thought of strict liability as a different type of liability, one meant to place the risk of injury from defective products on the seller even when the plaintiff's negligence was also a cause.63 The comment made a subtle line critical, the line between a negligent failure to find a danger and a clear appreciation of it. Take Ortney, whose car had defectively designed brakes sold by Pretoria. If Ortney negligently failed to have the brakes checked, she recovered her full damages. If she fully appreciated the danger and drove the car anyway, she recovered nothing.64 In Kimco Development Corp. v. Michael D's Carpets, a case about a store that ordered carpet backing and piled it all the way to the ceiling, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court likewise ignored the plaintiff's fault on a strict products liability claim.65
Once states replaced the bar with apportionment in negligence cases, comment n looked increasingly odd. Plaintiffs commonly plead negligence and strict liability on the same conduct, and it seemed strange that the plaintiff's negligence would reduce her recovery on the negligence count but be ignored on the strict liability count of the same case.66 The California Supreme Court named a second anomaly in Daly v. General Motors Corp. After Li, negligent assumption of risk no longer defeated recovery in a negligence action, yet identical conduct still barred recovery in a strict liability action. Strict liability, developed to free injured consumers from the constraints of negligence, therefore left a consumer worse off than a negligence claim would, and it rewarded adroit pleading. The court applied comparative principles to strict products liability so that the defenses would be treated alike.67 A great majority of courts have since done the same, though some disagree.68
The most persistent objection is that a jury would be comparing apples and oranges. A seller's strict liability for a defective product arises without fault, at least in manufacturing defect cases, while the plaintiff's reduction rests on negligence, so the two seem to lack a common measure.69 One opinion pressed the point. No formula or standard, other than what jurors may concoct in their own minds, guides them in equating the plaintiff's negligence with the defendant's defective product so that the two together equal 100 percent of fault.70 Courts that apply comparative principles answer by describing what the jury actually compares. One explained that injured consumers are examined under contributory negligence standards, manufacturers under their significantly higher strict duty of care in production and design, and distributors under their higher duty to understand the product's nature and uses and to guard against injury by available methods, including appropriate warnings.71 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 1 follows the majority, allowing the trier of fact to apportion damages between parties liable in negligence and parties liable in strict liability, and it substitutes “comparative responsibility” for the terms comparative negligence and comparative fault.72
A second objection is that apportionment weakens the manufacturer's incentive to make safe products. The California court called that concern more shadow than substance. The manufacturer remains liable for a defective product whatever the plaintiff did, so its incentive to avoid and correct defects continues, and its exposure shrinks only to the extent that the trier finds the victim's conduct contributed to the injury. A manufacturer also cannot assume that the user hurt by a defect will be blameworthy.73
Where comparative principles apply, the jury answers the same questions it would answer in any apportionment case. It decides whether the product was defective and whether the plaintiff was also at fault, and it assigns percentages to the seller for selling the defective product and to the plaintiff for the plaintiff's own conduct. If the jury finds Ortney 20 percent at fault and Pretoria 80 percent, Ortney recovers 80 percent of her damages.74 The effect on plaintiffs is the reverse of what apportionment did in ordinary negligence cases. There it gave a partly at-fault plaintiff a reduced recovery in place of nothing. Here comment n had let the negligent plaintiff recover in full, so her negligence, ignored before, now reduces her award, and the same merger that operates in negligence cases means that an unreasonable use of a product known to be dangerous becomes fault to be compared and no longer bars the claim.75
Comparative principles do not reach every kind of plaintiff carelessness. Comment n protected a plaintiff who merely failed to discover a defect, and almost every court to face the precise question has kept that protection, holding that a careless failure to discover that a product is defective lies outside damages apportionment. A number of states avoid the question by directing that all fault be compared.76 Ortney's unchecked brakes sit on this disputed edge: courts that keep the protection would not reduce her award for the lapse, and courts that compare all fault would. Limits of the same kind appear elsewhere in tort law. Numerous jurisdictions hold that when a patient seeks medical treatment for a condition that may have arisen in whole or in part from the patient's own negligence, that negligence is not a defense to a claim alleging malpractice in the subsequent treatment.77
The answer also depends on the wording of the state's comparative fault statute. Ohio's comparative negligence statute is limited to negligence actions, and in Bowling v. Heil Co. the Ohio Supreme Court held that it does not apply to a products liability action grounded on strict liability.78 A separate opinion called the rationale “veneer-thin” and noted that only one other court had refused to apply comparative principles by narrowly construing the words “negligence action.”79 Pennsylvania, as Kimco showed, also ignores the plaintiff's negligence on a strict liability claim.
Apportionment brings the state's threshold with it. Where a modified bar applies, a plaintiff whose share exceeds the threshold recovers nothing. In JCW Electronics, Inc. v. Garza, for example, the jury assigned the decedent 60 percent of the responsibility for his death, and that share barred recovery.80 In the states that still reject comparative fault, the traditional user conduct defenses continue to bar recovery, and even in comparative fault states much of the traditional doctrine surrounding contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and product misuse has survived the conversion.81
When a stem names no state, answer under the majority approach and say that some states ignore plaintiff negligence in strict liability claims. The usual errors run in two directions. One treats a plaintiff's knowing use of a dangerous product as a complete defense in a state that has merged assumption of risk into comparative fault. The other reduces the award of a plaintiff whose only lapse was failing to notice the defect, in a state that keeps comment n's protection for that conduct.
Joint and Several Liability
Everything so far has asked how far the plaintiff's own fault shrinks the award. A second question arises once the judgment has been reduced: how do the defendants divide what remains? The traditional answer is joint and several liability, under which each of several tortfeasors is liable for the full amount of the plaintiff's damages, so the plaintiff may collect from any one of them, or from any group of them, up to the full judgment.83 The rule usually applies in three kinds of situations, and the first is tortfeasors who act in concert.84 In an old English case, three defendants set upon the plaintiff. One held him, which was false imprisonment, another battered him, and the third stole his silver buttons. All three were held liable for the entire damages.85
The question for comparative negligence is whether the plaintiff's own fault should displace that rule, and the California Supreme Court said it should not. In American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, the court held that after Li a concurrent tortfeasor whose negligence is a proximate cause of an indivisible injury remains liable for the total amount of damages, diminished only “in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.”86 Comparative negligence therefore supplies a formula for reducing the plaintiff's damages and leaves the rules on joint and several liability and contribution as they were, unless a court or legislature changes them separately.87
The Rousseau collision from the multiple-defendant discussion earlier in this chapter shows the rule at work. His damages, reduced for his own fault, come to $55,000. Where joint and several liability still governs, he may collect the entire $55,000 from either Locke or the City, and whichever defendant pays may seek contribution from the other.88 The City is not ordered to pay only its own percentage, because the reduction for the plaintiff's fault and the division of the loss among defendants are separate operations, and the traditional rule performs only the first.
Percentages make the rule look blunt. Nell proves $100,000 in damages, and the jury finds her 20 percent at fault, Fagan 70 percent, and Twist 10 percent. Her recovery is $80,000, and under joint and several liability Fagan and Twist are each liable for all of it. Under traditional pro rata contribution, whichever defendant pays recovers half, or $40,000, from the other.89 Twist can object twice. He was only 10 percent at fault, yet he may owe $80,000 to a plaintiff who was twice as faulty as he, and if Fagan pays the judgment, Fagan recovers only half of it from Twist even though Twist was one-seventh as faulty as Fagan.90 Proportional contribution answers the second objection, since Fagan then bears 70/80 of the judgment, or $70,000, and Twist 10/80, or $10,000. Some statutes direct that relative fault be considered when joint tortfeasors' fault is disproportionate,91 and one pairs proportional contribution with continued joint liability by providing that each “shall remain jointly and severally liable for the whole award.”92 Contribution of that kind redistributes the judgment after the plaintiff has been paid, and Nell's right to demand the whole $80,000 from Twist is unchanged.
Courts that kept joint and several liability reasoned from the rule's purpose. Under contributory negligence only a plaintiff free of fault could recover at all, so placing the risk of one defendant's insolvency on the other negligent defendants was sound when the alternative was to place it on an innocent plaintiff.93 Comparative negligence removes that premise, because the plaintiff may now share the fault, and defendants argued that the rule should fall with it. The California court gave two answers. A defendant whose negligence is a proximate cause of an indivisible injury remains liable for all of it,94 and the rule lets an injured person recover fully when a responsible party lacks the means to pay, because the wronged party should not be deprived of redress and the wrongdoers should work out any apportionment among themselves.95 Another court added an argument from the bargain that comparative negligence strikes. In return for allowing a negligent plaintiff to recover, fairness requires that the damages be reduced by the plaintiff's percentage of fault, and eliminating joint and several liability would push the burden of an insolvent or immune defendant onto the plaintiff and reduce the damages beyond that percentage.96 Liability for the whole also presupposes that each defendant's negligence is a legal cause of the harm, because negligence cannot be apportioned to a defendant whose negligence was not directly a legal cause of the result complained of.97
Other courts weighed the same considerations and ended elsewhere. In Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., the jury found the plaintiffs free of negligence, the defendant truck driver 30 percent at fault, and an unknown lead driver 70 percent at fault, on damages of $100,000.98 Joint and several liability would have let the plaintiffs collect the whole $100,000 from the one defendant who could be found, and the New Mexico Court of Appeals instead limited recovery to that defendant's 30 percent share. Tennessee likewise abolished joint and several liability when it adopted comparative fault in McIntyre v. Balentine.
Beneath these decisions lies one policy question: who bears the risk that a defendant cannot pay? Three answers are in use.
- Joint and several liability places the risk on the solvent defendants, who cover the insolvent defendant's share, so the plaintiff collects the entire reduced judgment.99
- Several liability places the risk on the plaintiff, because each defendant pays only its own percentage of the fault and the plaintiff absorbs any share that cannot be collected.100
- Reallocation spreads the risk by redistributing the uncollectible share among the plaintiff and the solvent defendants in proportion to their fault.101
A separate opinion argued for reallocation, and its numbers separate the three approaches cleanly. Suppose the plaintiff is 30 percent at fault, one defendant is 60 percent at fault and cannot pay, and the other defendant is 10 percent at fault and solvent, on damages of $100,000. Joint and several liability lets the plaintiff collect $70,000 from the solvent defendant, and several liability limits the recovery to $10,000. Reallocation divides the insolvent defendant's 60 points between the plaintiff and the solvent defendant in their 3-to-1 ratio of fault, so the solvent defendant adds 15 points to its own 10 and the plaintiff recovers $25,000.102
Legislatures have written all three approaches into statute, so no single rule can be assumed. A minority of states, eight at one count, still follow joint and several liability in its original form, about sixteen have adopted several liability with some exceptions, and most use hybrid systems that combine features of both and vary widely.103 One common hybrid sets a threshold: a statute may provide that a defendant found less than 15 percent at fault for the economic damages awarded is liable severally only.104 Another splits the difference differently. Each defendant is liable for the proportion of the total award that matches its causal negligence, yet the plaintiff may recover the full amount from any defendant against whom the plaintiff is not barred, and a defendant compelled to pay more than its percentage may seek contribution.105 A third reallocates uncollectible shares, and Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability reaches a very similar result by starting from several liability and then providing for reallocation.106 Counts of the states differ with their dates and with how a state's rules are classified, so the pattern is worth more than any number.107
A stem with a negligent plaintiff and several defendants calls for two computations in order. The first reduces the damages by the plaintiff's percentage and, in a modified jurisdiction, tests that percentage against the bar, as the earlier sections taught. The second asks how the reduced judgment is divided. When the stem is silent about the state's rule, the traditional answer is that each liable defendant owes the whole judgment, with contribution among the defendants, accompanied by a note that many states differ. The note matters when a defendant cannot pay. Take a plaintiff 25 percent at fault, one defendant 25 percent at fault, and the other defendant 50 percent at fault and judgment-proof, on damages of $100,000. Joint and several liability lets the plaintiff collect $75,000 from the solvent defendant. Reallocation splits the shortfall, so the plaintiff collects $50,000. Several liability limits the plaintiff to the solvent defendant's own 25 percent, or $25,000.108 The usual slip is to divide the reduced judgment among the defendants by their percentages as though comparative negligence required it. That division follows only where the jurisdiction has adopted several liability, and the plaintiff's own reduction is the same under every approach.
Statutory Violations
Negligence per se treats the violation of a safety statute as negligence in itself, and under the bar the doctrine ran into the plaintiff's own carelessness. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 483 provides that the plaintiff's contributory negligence bars recovery for a defendant's statutory violation unless the effect of the statute is to place the entire responsibility for the harm on the defendant.110 A violation counted as one more way to be negligent, and the plaintiff's carelessness answered it as it answered any other negligence. The exception at the end of that section, the safety statute exception discussed earlier in this chapter, was a device of the bar era. Comparative negligence replaces that system, so the question that remains is what a per se finding accomplishes once the jury must divide fault instead of choosing a winner.
At common law, negligence was an all-or-nothing decision, and the per se doctrine had particular force because in many cases it required the jury to find a party negligent.111 Comparative negligence loosens that connection. A finding of negligence now admits a party to the comparison and nothing more, because the jury must still say how much of the total fault belongs to each negligent actor. The per se instruction settles whether the violator was negligent and leaves the violator's percentage to the jury, which can weigh how serious the violation actually was.
The standard illustration involves Cheever, who violates a lighting statute by failing to replace a lightbulb, and O'Connor, who sues him. Even if the jury must find Cheever negligent, it sets the percentage. A jury that does not think his lapse was particularly serious might assign him 3 percent and O'Connor 97 percent, which comes close to letting Cheever off the hook entirely.112 Under the pure form O'Connor's damages would shrink by 97 percent, and under a modified bar O'Connor would recover nothing. The same violation produces the opposite result when no one else is on the verdict form. If O'Connor was not negligent at all, Cheever is the only negligent actor, and because the percentages must total 100, the jury must assign all of the fault to him even if it does not think he was very negligent.113
Between those two poles the doctrine keeps a persuasive effect. A party who ignored an established statutory standard is easy to portray as the more careless of the two, so a per se violation can lead the jury to a large percentage even though it cannot dictate the figure.114 In a jurisdiction that still applies the bar, the violation does not stop the plaintiff's own carelessness from defeating the claim, unless the statute places the entire responsibility for the harm on the defendant.115 In a comparative negligence state the usual error is to treat a per se finding as the end of the analysis. The finding gets the violator into the comparison, and the percentages decide the result, so the next question is whether the other party was also negligent. If so, assign and explain the percentages under the state's form. If not, the violator bears the whole loss.