13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226
The accident occurred near the intersection of Alvarado Street and Third Street in Los Angeles.1 At approximately 9 p.m. on November 21, 1968, plaintiff Nga Li was proceeding northbound on Alvarado in her 1967 Oldsmobile in the inside lane.2 About 70 feet before she reached the Third Street intersection she stopped and then began a left turn across the three southbound lanes of Alvarado, intending to enter the driveway of a service station.3
At this time defendant Robert Phillips, an employee of defendant Yellow Cab Company, was driving a company-owned taxicab southbound in the middle lane on Alvarado.4 He came over the crest of the hill, passed through the intersection, and collided with the right rear portion of plaintiff's automobile, resulting in personal injuries to plaintiff as well as considerable damage to the automobile.5
The court, sitting without a jury, found as facts that defendant Phillips was traveling at approximately 30 miles per hour when he entered the intersection, that such speed was unsafe at that time and place, and that the traffic light controlling southbound traffic at the intersection was yellow when defendant Phillips drove into the intersection.6 It also found, however, that plaintiff's left turn across the southbound lanes of Alvarado was made at a time when a vehicle was approaching from the opposite direction so close as to constitute an immediate hazard.7
The dispositive conclusion of law was as follows: that the driving of Nga Li was negligent, that such negligence was a proximate cause of the collision, and that she is barred from recovery by reason of such contributory negligence.8 Judgment for defendants was entered accordingly.9
Whether the doctrine of contributory negligence should be judicially declared no longer applicable in California courts in favor of a system of comparative negligence?10
The doctrine of contributory negligence bars all recovery when the plaintiff's negligent conduct has contributed as a legal cause in any degree to the harm suffered.11 This all-or-nothing rule is inequitable because it fails to distribute responsibility in proportion to fault.12 Logic, practical experience, and fundamental justice therefore require its replacement by comparative negligence that assesses liability in direct proportion to each party's fault.13
Yes. The established facts show that Nga Li began a left turn across southbound lanes when a vehicle approached so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard.14 Robert Phillips drove the Yellow Cab vehicle at an unsafe speed of approximately thirty miles per hour through a yellow light and collided with the right rear of Li's automobile.15 Under contributory negligence Li's negligence, though partial, completely bars recovery despite Phillips's unsafe conduct also being a proximate cause.16
This rigid outcome contradicts the principle that liability should track fault.17 Juries already attempt rough apportionment in practice.18 Twenty-five other states plus Florida have adopted apportionment systems to achieve fairer results.19
The doctrine of contributory negligence should be superseded by comparative negligence.20
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Mccomb, J.
Justice Clark dissents, arguing that the majority's decision represents a gross departure from established rules of statutory construction and the constitutional separation of powers.21 He emphasizes that for over a century the court has held that Civil Code section 1714 codifies the defense of contributory negligence.22 The Legislature's intent was to enact that defense, and the court lacks authority to repudiate it by judicial fiat.23
Clark maintains that any change from contributory to comparative negligence must come from the Legislature, which is best positioned to evaluate the competing systems and manage the transition from one doctrine to another.24
Whether judicial action adopting comparative negligence is precluded by Civil Code section 1714?25
Civil Code section 1714 states the basic rule of negligence together with the defense of contributory negligence modified by last clear chance.26 The 1872 Legislature did not intend the section to insulate the rule from further judicial development.27 The code's character as a continuation of the common law permits liberal construction and ongoing judicial evolution of negligence concepts.28
No. The established facts of the Li-Yellow Cab collision present a classic instance of shared fault that section 1714 was never meant to freeze against judicial refinement.29 The code commissioners' note and the provision's language were designed to avoid the harshest New York version of contributory negligence while incorporating last clear chance.30 Nothing in the statute or its history indicates an intent to bar courts from later adopting apportionment when experience and reason demonstrate the original accommodation has become inequitable.31
Judicial action adopting comparative negligence is not precluded by Civil Code section 1714.32
Whether practical difficulties attendant upon the adoption of comparative negligence should dissuade the court from adopting it?33
Practical concerns such as multiple-party litigation, fact-finding challenges, the status of last clear chance and assumption of risk, and treatment of willful misconduct are real but not insurmountable.34 Trial courts possess broad discretion to manage these issues through special verdicts and other procedures.35 The existence of difficulties does not outweigh the need to replace an inequitable rule.36
No. The established facts involve only two drivers and present no multiple-party or willful-misconduct complications. The trial court's findings already isolate each party's negligence, demonstrating that apportionment is feasible.37 Last clear chance and assumption of risk can be subsumed under proportional fault assessment.38 Any remaining administrative questions are best resolved case-by-case at the trial level rather than used to perpetuate an unjust doctrine.39
Practical difficulties should not dissuade adoption of comparative negligence.40
Whether the doctrine of comparative negligence should be applied in its pure form?41
The pure form of comparative negligence apportions liability in direct proportion to fault in all cases.42 The fifty-percent system merely shifts the lottery aspect of contributory negligence to a different threshold.43 It distorts the principle that parties are responsible only to the extent their fault contributes to the result.44
Yes. The facts establish that both Li and Phillips were negligent and that their combined negligence caused the collision.45 Under a pure comparative negligence system Li's recovery would be reduced by the percentage of fault attributable to her regardless of whether her share equals or exceeds that of Phillips.46 By contrast the fifty-percent bar would arbitrarily cut off recovery once Li's negligence reached fifty percent, recreating the same inequitable all-or-nothing result the court rejects.47
Such a threshold invites endless appeals over marginal percentage differences and distorts the principle that parties should bear responsibility only to the extent their fault contributes to the injury.48
Comparative negligence should be applied in its pure form.49
Whether the new rule should be given limited retrospective application?50
Determinations of retroactivity turn on considerations of fairness and public policy.51 A rule of limited retroactivity applies the new comparative negligence standard to all cases in which trial has not begun before the decision becomes final.52 It also applies to the instant case while preserving judgments already rendered after trial.53
Yes. The established facts show that trial has already occurred and judgment was entered for defendants on contributory negligence grounds.54 Applying the new rule to Li provides incentive for litigants to raise important issues without imposing unfair burdens on parties who relied on prior law in concluded trials.55 Fairness supports giving the benefit of the new rule to the party who brought the issue forward while limiting further retroactivity to avoid disrupting settled judgments.56
The new rule should be given limited retrospective application.57
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Mosk concurs in the judgment but criticizes the majority's treatment of retroactivity.58 He argues that the court has effectively overruled Westbrook v. Mihaly and related cases by applying the new rule to the parties before it while denying the same benefit to other litigants who raised identical issues in earlier cases.59 Mosk maintains that the preferable approach is to apply a new court-made rule to the aggrieved party who brought the issue to judicial attention and thereafter apply it prospectively.60