257 S.W.3d 701 (Tex. 2008)
On November 14, 1999, Rolando Domingo Montez was arrested for public intoxication and placed in the Port Isabel jail.1 The next day, Montez called his mother, Pearl Iriz Garza, from a telephone in his cell that JCW Electronics, Inc. had installed under a 1998 contract with the Port Isabel Police Department to arrange his bail.2
Tragically, on November 16, 1999, the day Montez was to be released, he was found dead in his cell, hanging from the telephone cord.3 Garza sued the City of Port Isabel for her son’s death and subsequently joined JCW as a defendant.4
The case was tried to a jury that found in Garza’s favor on claims of negligence, misrepresentation, and breach of implied warranty of fitness.5 The jury attributed sixty percent of the liability to Montez, twenty-five percent to the City of Port Isabel, and fifteen percent to JCW.6 JCW moved for judgment, arguing that Montez’s sixty percent responsibility barred recovery under Chapter 33.7 Garza moved to disregard inconsistent findings and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on breach of contract and fraud theories.8 The trial court granted Garza’s motions and rendered judgment against JCW on those claims.9
The court of appeals declined to affirm on the contract and fraud claims but upheld the judgment on the implied warranty finding, holding that Chapter 33 did not apply.10 The Supreme Court of Texas granted review to consider whether Chapter 33’s proportionate responsibility scheme extends to a breach of implied warranty claim.11
Whether a claim for breach of implied warranty under article 2 of the Texas Uniform Commercial Code is a tort claim to which Chapter 33’s apportionment scheme should apply?12
Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code applies to any cause of action based on tort.13 A breach of implied warranty claim alleging damages for death or personal injury sounds in tort rather than contract.14 Implied warranties are grounded more in tort than in contract, and the nature of the claim is identified by examining the damages alleged.15
Yes. Garza sought damages for the death of her son Montez under a breach of implied warranty claim against JCW.16 Because the damages sought were for death, the claim sounds in tort under Texas law as established by precedents recognizing that such claims grounded in personal injury or death are tortious in nature.17 Chapter 33 therefore applies to the claim under its provision covering any cause of action based on tort.18
The jury found Montez sixty percent responsible for his death. That percentage exceeds the fifty percent bar under the 1995 version of Chapter 33 applicable to this case that accrued in 1999, barring recovery on the implied warranty claim.19
The breach of implied warranty claim is subject to Chapter 33's proportionate responsibility scheme, and Garza's recovery is barred by Montez's percentage of responsibility.20
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Jefferson agrees that Chapter 33's proportionate responsibility scheme applies to a UCC-based implied warranty claim seeking damages for death or personal injury.21 He writes separately to address the proper submission of the issue to the jury.22
Jefferson observes that the apportionment question immediately followed the negligence question and was directed only to it rather than to the implied warranty claim.23 While the jury found that JCW breached an implied warranty and found Montez negligent with sixty percent responsibility apportioned to him, a buyer has not breached an implied warranty, so a question inquiring about the buyer's breach would be nonsensical.24
Instead, the buyer's negligence is the inquiry when apportioning fault for such a claim.25 Because the jury was asked about Montez's negligence and its finding bars the claim, Jefferson concurs in the judgment that JCW's percentage of responsibility for damages caused by the breach of implied warranty is immaterial.26