Concept
Lessor Exceptions
Harm to persons outside the land and related special rules
Lessor Exceptions
Under Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 355 and 356, a lessor is not liable to the lessee, or to others on the land with the lessee’s consent, for physical harm caused by a dangerous condition, whether the condition existed when the lessee took possession or arose afterward.1 Section 356 begins “Except as stated in sections 357 and 360-62,” and the Kansas court in Borders v. Roseberry collected the cases into six recognized exceptions for defective conditions existing at the time of the lease.2 The six, with the Restatement sections that state them, are these:3
- a concealed dangerous condition the lessor knows of (§ 358);
- a contract to repair (§ 357);
- negligent repairs the lessor undertakes (§ 362);
- premises leased for admission of the public (§ 359);
- parts of the building the lessor keeps under control (§§ 360 and 361);
- conditions that endanger people outside the land (§ 379), taught earlier in this chapter.
The baseline rests on two assumptions about a leased parcel. The first is that the tenant holds possession and control: a lease is the equivalent of a sale of the premises for a term, the tenant becomes owner and occupier, and the tenant alone has the right and the responsibility to keep the premises in repair.4 The second is that the tenant takes the premises as found, under the doctrine of caveat lessee, and tort liability is generally founded on possession and control.5
Each exception applies where one of those assumptions fails, and each rebuilds a reason for the landlord to answer. A landlord who knows of a hidden danger holds information the tenant lacks, so the tenant’s chance to inspect was empty. A landlord who promises or undertakes repairs has taken on part of the work of keeping the premises safe. A landlord who leases land for a purpose that admits the public exposes people who never had a chance to inspect or to bargain over the premises. And a landlord who keeps control of a stairway that every tenant uses retains the very power the baseline gave to the tenant.
The discussion takes up the five exceptions that protect the tenant and those on the premises with the tenant’s consent. The concealed condition comes first because it rests on the landlord’s knowledge, and the two repair exceptions follow because they rest on the landlord’s own commitments. The public-admission and retained-control exceptions turn on how the premises are used and held. The part closes with the modern trend: some courts have dropped the special categories and apply ordinary care to landlords, and many states imply a warranty of habitability in residential leases. On a fact pattern about an injured tenant or guest, begin with the baseline, then look for the fact that fits one of these exceptions. In a jurisdiction that keeps the baseline, the baseline controls when none fits.
Concealed Dangerous Conditions
Section 358 makes a lessor liable for a danger the lessor knew of and the tenant could not see. A lessor who conceals or fails to disclose a natural or artificial condition involving unreasonable risk of physical harm is liable to the lessee, and to others on the land with the consent of the lessee or sublessee, for harm the condition causes after the lessee takes possession. Two things must be true: the lessee does not know or have reason to know of the condition or its risk, and the lessor knows or has reason to know of the condition, realizes or should realize the risk, and has reason to expect that the lessee will not discover it.6
The exception repairs a flaw in the baseline. The baseline treats a tenant like a buyer who takes the premises as found, and that allocation assumes the tenant can look the premises over and decide whether to rent, what rent to pay, and what to fix. A danger known only to the landlord defeats the assumption, and the exception supplies what the tenant lacks, which is information.
Three features follow from that purpose. The condition must be latent, because telling a tenant about what the tenant can already see accomplishes nothing. The lessor must have the relevant knowledge, because liability for silence presupposes something to say. And the duty ends at disclosure, since repair stays with the tenant under the baseline. A lessor who knows of a concealed, unreasonably dangerous condition and says nothing has committed a species of fraud, and the exception covers natural conditions as well as artificial ones.7
The line between latent and patent defects decides most cases. Responsibility for conditions existing when the lease began reaches latent defects and not patent ones,8 and Kansas, in the decision that catalogued the exceptions, applied the concealed-condition rule only to latent conditions, not to those patent or reasonably discernible to the tenant.9 A condition is latent when the tenant may be expected not to discover it or the extent of its risk. Because the duty is only to disclose, an open and obvious hazard creates no liability however dangerous it is.10 A tenant who can see a danger can refuse the lease, price it into the rent, repair it, or warn guests; a tenant who cannot see it can do none of these.
A condition can also fall outside the exception because it is not dangerous enough. In Rivera v. Nelson Realty, LLC, the court held that a radiator without a cover was not an unreasonably hazardous condition, so the landlord had no duty to supply one.11 The tenant’s own knowledge closes the exception for the same reason that visibility does. In Borders the tenant knew fully of the icy front steps, and the court found the first five exceptions inapplicable. In rejecting the sixth, it observed that the landlord could reasonably assume the tenant would tell his guest about the ice.12 Once the tenant knows, the tenant holds the information the exception exists to supply, and passing the warning to guests is the tenant’s job.
Courts state the knowledge requirement in more than one way, and an answer should name the standard in play. Section 358 asks whether the lessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and realizes or should realize the risk.13 Most courts do not demand actual knowledge; they find it enough that the lessor has information that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the danger may exist, and they require the lessor to disclose it.14 Some opinions nonetheless say the landlord must have actually known, as in Ortega v. Flaim, which read literally would make reason to know insufficient. The Restatement Third frames the duty as one to disclose a latent condition, unknown to the tenant, that the landlord knows or should know of.15
All of these formulations share one limit. Almost all courts agree that the exception creates no duty to inspect the premises to discover such conditions, and reason to know means possession of facts that would put a reasonable person on notice, not an obligation to go looking.16 Inspection duties come from other exceptions, such as land leased to admit the public and the parts of a building the landlord keeps under control, where the landlord must use reasonable care to inspect and repair.17
The exception protects the tenant and everyone on the premises with the tenant’s consent.18 That class includes the tenant’s family, employees, and social guests, and any subtenant,19 because the concealment kept the tenant from protecting them: a tenant cannot warn a guest about a danger the tenant cannot see. Courts accordingly treat a breach of the duty to the tenant as a breach toward the tenant’s guest, as in Shump v. First Continental-Robinwood Associates.20 People outside the premises are a different group. Their claim rests on the transfer rule taught earlier (§ 379), under which it is immaterial that the tenant knew of the condition.21 Under § 358, by contrast, the tenant’s knowledge defeats the claim, because the tenant must not know or have reason to know of the condition.22
Liability under the exception is temporary, and how long it lasts depends on what the landlord did. A landlord who merely stays silent is liable only until the tenant has had a reasonable opportunity to discover the condition and take precautions. A landlord who actively conceals the condition, for example by covering a defect so that it escapes notice, remains liable until the tenant discovers it and has a reasonable opportunity to take effective precautions.23 The difference follows from why the tenant missed the danger. Where the landlord only stayed silent, a tenant who overlooks what an ordinary look would have revealed has made a lapse of the tenant’s own, so the landlord’s responsibility shrinks as the tenant’s chance to learn grows. Where the landlord hid the defect, the tenant’s failure to find it is the landlord’s doing, and a cutoff keyed to what the tenant should have found would reward the concealment. In neither case does liability outlast the tenant’s actual discovery and a reasonable chance to act.24
Contract to Repair
A landlord who promises to repair takes on part of the work the baseline leaves to the tenant. Section 356 opens by excepting §§ 357 and 360 to 362 from the baseline of nonliability, and § 357 is where a promise to repair enters: the landlord is liable if he contracted to make certain repairs, failed to make them although he could have done so with reasonable care, and the plaintiff was injured because of the failure.26 Stated in terms of danger, the landlord is responsible for an unreasonably dangerous condition if he contracted to repair it and negligently fails to do so after he knows or should know of the danger.27 The rule protects the tenant, the tenant’s family, and their guests.28
The promise matters because it shifts work that the baseline leaves with the tenant. A tenant who holds the landlord’s promise has every reason to wait for the landlord, and some landlords tell the tenant to leave the premises alone. A covenant to repair, the landlord’s promise to keep the premises or part of them in repair, may even be inferred from that conduct. In Childress v. Bowser a covenant could be inferred from the landlord’s telling the tenant not to do anything to the apartment and later promising repairs.29 Once the landlord has taken over the job, the tenant stops guarding against the danger, and a guest who never saw the lease cannot know that promised repairs are not happening. Responsibility therefore follows the promise: the party who undertook to make the premises safe, and who was best placed to do the work, answers for failing to do it carefully. The exception reaches only the repairs the landlord undertook, which is why the Restatement speaks of contracting to make certain repairs.30
At one time courts treated the promise as a purely contractual matter. The landlord owed the cost of making the repairs or a similar measure of damages and nothing for the injury the disrepair caused, as in Leavitt v. Twin County Rental Co.31 Under that view neither the tenant, nor the tenant’s family, nor guests could recover for personal injuries.32 The gap was one of measure: the cost of repair compensates for a building worse than promised and does nothing for a fractured hip or a burn.
Most jurisdictions have modified that rule, and the landlord’s contract to repair is now treated as creating a duty of reasonable care as well.33 A landlord who negligently fails to repair an unreasonably dangerous condition is liable for the harm caused by the disrepair as well as for the cost of bringing the premises up to the promised standard, as in Markarian v. Simonian, where a child fell from a window after screens were negligently installed.34 Many courts kept the contract-only rule until about 1965, although the first Restatement had adopted the tort position in 1934 and the later Restatements continued it.35 A student who sees a repair promise on an exam should therefore ask about injury and negligence, and should not stop at the cost of the repair.
The tort duty is one of reasonable care, so it does not make the landlord an insurer of the premises. Because the landlord is liable only for a negligent failure to comply with the contractual duty, he is not responsible under this exception unless he has been put on notice that repairs are needed and has had a reasonable opportunity to make them.36 Each limit has its own logic. Notice matters because a hazard inside the tenant’s space shows itself first to the tenant, and a landlord cannot be careless about a condition he has no reason to know exists. Opportunity matters because even a landlord who has been told of a problem needs time to hire someone and do the work, and a duty that expired the moment he was told would be liability without fault.
Notice is assessed condition by condition and place by place. In Charette v. Santspree the landlords lacked actual knowledge that lead-based paint was chipping or peeling inside the tenant’s apartment, yet a fact question remained about whether they had actual or constructive knowledge that paint was peeling in the common areas.37 Notice for one space says nothing about another, and the landlord never told about the inside of a unit stands differently from the one who walks past a common stairwell every day. Courts state the notice requirement for contractual and statutory repair duties alike, as in Juarez v. Wavecrest Management Team Ltd. and McKenzie v. Egge.38 Meier v. D'Ambose falls on the liability side of the line. The lease explicitly required the landlord to keep the furnace clean, and the court held that he owed the tenant a duty to maintain the furnace and to inspect it periodically for defects.39 A promise whose own terms call for regular upkeep gives the landlord a reason to look, so he cannot wait to be told.
Statutes can supply a similar duty without any promise. Some impose a duty of reasonable care on the landlord to remedy unsafe conditions on notice of them, and in Bishop v. TES Realty Trust the court extended a state statute of that kind to commercial landlords as well as residential ones, where ceiling plaster fell on a commercial tenant and injured her.40 The repair duty there comes from legislation, so no covenant is needed, but the notice logic is the same.
Negligent Repairs
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 362 supplies the sixth of the exceptions that Borders v. Roseberry catalogued,42 and its duty comes from a different source than the contract-to-repair exception. A landlord who made no promise, and who owes no repair at all under the baseline, takes on a duty of reasonable care once he voluntarily makes repairs after the tenant has taken possession.43 Borders states the rule for repairs of either kind: when the lessor attempts repairs, whether or not a covenant binds him, and fails to use reasonable care, he is liable for injuries to the tenant or to others on the premises in the tenant’s right, if the tenant neither knows nor should know that the repairs were negligently made.44 The protected class is the one the other exceptions protect: the tenant, the tenant’s family, and all others on the premises with the tenant’s consent.45
The baseline leaves a landlord free to do nothing about a defect, so the first question is why doing something changes the answer. Courts generally agree that a landlord who attempts repairs and fails to use reasonable care answers for the personal injuries his carelessness causes, whether the repairs were made as a favor or under an express or implied covenant, as in Youngset, Inc. v. Five City Plaza, Inc.46 The duty arises from the unreasonable risk of harm that the landlord’s own affirmative conduct creates, and the landlord-tenant relationship adds nothing to it.47 A careless repair is dangerous in a particular way. Once the landlord has taken over the job, the tenant ordinarily stops guarding against the problem and stops fixing it, and the tenant cannot see inside the work, while the landlord alone controls how well it is done. The party who chose to act, and who held all the information about the quality of the work, carries the responsibility for doing it with care.
The decided cases cluster into two fact patterns, and each shows a different way for a repair to hurt someone.48 In the first, the work leaves the condition more dangerous than before, either because it weakened the structure or because it added a new hazard. In Durkin v. Hansen, a landlord’s carpet cleaning left slippery soap on the kitchen tile floor, a hazard the floor did not have before the work.49 In the second pattern, the work leaves the danger where it was but makes the premises look fixed. In Ginsberg v. Wineman the landlord’s agent purported to make a stair safe but only reinserted nails in loose holes, then told the tenant the stair was repaired, and the tenant’s employee, badly injured when the stair gave way, was allowed to recover.50 The two cases injure through different channels. The soap added a hazard, while the nails added nothing and the assurance did the harm, because a tenant told that a stair is repaired has no reason to warn employees away from it or to fix it.
Courts disagree about whether those two patterns mark the outer edge of the exception. On one formulation, the landlord is liable for actual harm if he negligently repairs a condition so that it is more dangerous, provided the tenant neither knows nor should have known of the increased danger.51 A few courts hold that a landlord is liable for negligent repair only if the negligence worsened the condition or left the premises looking deceptively safe, as in Baker v. Pena. A greater number hold that the landlord must use reasonable care in making repairs whether or not the work made things worse or looked safe. In those jurisdictions the plaintiff needs to prove only that the landlord attempted the repairs, that the defect was not corrected, that prudent work would have eliminated it, and that the negligence caused the harm, as in Lian v. Stalick.52 Under either approach the two classic patterns support liability. The jurisdictions diverge on a repair that simply failed, such as a patch that leaves a rotted board exactly as dangerous as before and disguises nothing. The minority would deny recovery on those facts, and the majority would let the claim proceed on proof that prudent work would have fixed the defect.
The rule carries a limit in its own text. The landlord is liable only if the tenant neither knew nor should have known of the negligent repair, and a landlord whose tenant knew or should have discovered the negligence often escapes liability for injury to the tenant.53 The reason is the tenant’s reliance on proper repair: a tenant who knew or should have known of the negligent work could not have relied on it, and recovery is denied.54 A tenant who watched the work and saw it fail has not been deceived and can warn guests, fix the problem, or stay away from the spot, which are the very steps the landlord’s takeover of the job might otherwise have suppressed. In Borders the plaintiff was the tenant’s guest, and the court explained that the exception comes into play only when the lessee lacks knowledge that purported repairs have not been made or have been negligently made. The tenant there knew fully of the icy condition on the front steps created by the absence of guttering, and the landlord could reasonably assume that the tenant would tell the guest.55 Whether the tenant’s knowledge also defeats a guest’s claim varies. Under the majority view, third persons are not barred by the tenant’s knowledge of the landlord’s negligence. But where liability rests on a deceptive appearance and the tenant knew better, some courts, as in Parrish v. Witt, deny recovery to the injured third person on the theory that the tenant’s knowledge is imputed to those on the premises with the tenant’s consent.56
The timing of the repair supplies the last limit. The exception reaches repairs the landlord makes after the tenant has taken possession, and a repair negligently completed before the lease begins does not bring the landlord under this rule, as in Casey v. Estes.57 Before the lease begins, the landlord is the possessor working on his own property, and what he later hands over is a condition that existed at the time of the lease. Those conditions are governed by the rules already taught, under which the tenant takes the premises as found and the landlord answers only through an exception such as concealment of a known danger.58 A landlord who patches a stair carelessly the week before the lease starts and a landlord who patches it the week after the tenant moves in have done identical work, yet only the second faces the negligent-repair rule, because only then has possession passed and the landlord intervened on premises the tenant controls.
Premises Open to the Public
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 359 states the exception for land leased for a purpose that involves admitting the public, which Borders v. Roseberry listed as the third recognized exception to the lessor’s general freedom from liability.60 In that setting the cases usually agree that the lessor must use reasonable care to inspect and repair the premises before possession is transferred, so as to prevent unreasonable risk of harm to members of the public who may enter.61 Stated as a duty, the lessor must discover dangers to the public and correct them if the lessor has reason to think the tenant will admit the public before the premises are put in reasonably safe condition.62 The Restatement (Second) of Property: Landlord & Tenant § 17.2 breaks that duty into three conditions. The lessor is liable to a person who enters for the purpose the public was invited when a condition existing at the start of the tenancy creates an unreasonable risk that the lessor knows of or could discover with reasonable care, the lessor has reason to expect the tenant to admit the public before the condition is made safe, and the lessor fails to use reasonable care to discover or remedy the condition or otherwise to protect entrants against it.63
This duty asks more of the lessor than the concealed-condition exception does. Under § 358 a landlord who knows of a hidden danger must disclose it, and the exception creates no duty to go looking for one. Here the lessor must look, because the duty covers dangers the lessor could discover with reasonable care. The duty does not end with a warning, since it extends beyond discovery and disclosure to correcting the defective condition.64 A warning to the tenant would accomplish little in any event, because the people at risk are the tenant’s customers, who will never see it.
The reason for the heavier duty lies in who is exposed. The baseline rests on the tenant’s possession: the tenant can inspect before signing, bargain over the rent, and repair what breaks, so the tenant takes the premises as found.65 Those facts describe the tenant and say nothing about a customer who walks into a shop and had no chance to inspect the premises or bargain over their condition. By leasing for a purpose that involves admitting the public, the landlord has in a sense invited the public in along with the tenant, and when public safety is at stake the landlord should not be able to shift complete responsibility to the tenant.66 Timing supplies a second reason. Before possession passes, the lessor is the only person who controls the premises, so a duty to inspect and repair at that moment falls on the one party able to find and fix a defect before any customer is exposed to it.
Even where the exception applies, it imposes no strict liability, and the lessor owes reasonable care and nothing more.67 Johnson County Sheriff's Posse, Inc. v. Endsley illustrates the standard, because the lessor of a rodeo arena was held not negligent for failing to pick every rock from the arena’s dirt floor.68 A rule demanding perfection would make the lessor an insurer of the public’s safety on land the lessor no longer occupies, while the standard of reasonable care still requires the lessor to deal with dangers a careful inspection would reveal.
Students often read this exception as reaching any rented property that visitors happen to enter, and the premises limit corrects that error. Early authority confined the exception to places where large numbers of people gather. Today, by the strong weight of authority, it also reaches places that admit small numbers of the public, such as stores, shops, restaurants, motels, and professional offices, but it does not reach dwellings or the private portions of commercial premises.69 The plaintiff class narrows the rule in the same way. The lessor’s liability runs to members of the public who enter for a reason related to the purpose for which the public was invited and who are hurt on the part of the premises open to the public, and it usually does not extend to the tenant or the tenant’s employees.70 The tenant and its staff could inspect and bargain, and the duty exists for the public, who could not.
The exception is also confined to defects that existed when the tenant took possession. A cracked entry step that was there when the restaurant’s lease began is covered, while the same step cracked by a delivery truck in the tenant’s third year is not, apparently because the landlord is no longer in control of the premises when a later defect develops.71 That result matches the general rule that a landlord out of possession is not liable in tort for conditions that develop after possession passes to the tenant.72 The landlord may still be liable under another theory, such as a covenant to repair or a negligent repair, both taught above, or retained control of part of the building, which comes next.73
The last limit concerns what the tenant knows and promises. The tenant’s mere knowledge of the defect does not relieve the lessor, because the duty is owed to the public and not to the tenant, and knowing about a hazard does not keep customers away from it.74 A promise is different. If the tenant promises to repair the condition and not to admit the public until it is repaired, the promise relieves the lessor, provided it is a credible one in the circumstances.75 The reason follows from the second condition of the rule, which requires the lessor to have reason to expect admission before the premises are safe. A believable commitment to repair first and open later removes that reason, while a tenant who says only that it is aware of the problem has given the lessor no reason to expect anything different. Credibility depends on the surrounding facts: a tenant with a licensed contractor already scheduled and an opening date months away offers more assurance than one that plans to open next week and promises to fix the defect eventually. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 53(d) frames the same point as a duty of reasonable care for any dangerous condition existing when the lessee takes possession, if the lease is for a purpose that includes admitting the public and the landlord has reason to believe the lessee will admit people without rectifying the condition.76
Retained Control Areas
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 360 and 361 cover the part of a leased building that never passed to any tenant. When a building such as an office block or apartment house is leased in pieces to several tenants, the approaches and common passageways normally stay in the landlord’s possession and control. The landlord must therefore use reasonable care to inspect and repair them for the protection of each tenant, the tenant’s family, employees, invitees, and guests, and others on the land in the tenant’s right.78 Borders v. Roseberry lists this as the fourth of the recognized exceptions to the lessor’s baseline freedom from liability.79 The exceptions taught earlier each repair a different gap in the baseline. Concealment closes an information gap, the repair exceptions attach to the landlord’s own undertaking, and the public-admission exception protects customers who could not inspect. This exception rests on a simpler fact. The baseline assumes that possession passed to the tenant, and in a hallway, stairwell, or lobby it did not, so the assumption that justified nonliability is missing.
The reason follows from what a tenant actually receives. A tenant takes exclusive possession of the leased unit, and the baseline puts inspection and repair on the tenant because the tenant is on the spot with the right to do the work. Halls, stairs, lobbies, and similar areas are not part of the property leased to any one tenant, and they remain in the landlord’s possession and control.80 No single tenant can rebuild a stairway that serves the whole building, and none may even be entitled to touch it, so the only party able to find and fix a defect there is the landlord. Tort liability for land has traditionally followed possession and control, and the common-area rule applies that principle to a landlord who still holds both.81 The duty reaches everyone who enters in the normal, expected use of the leased property, including the tenant, family members, employees, guests, and invitees.82
A tenant’s own knowledge of the danger does not relieve the landlord of this duty.83 That feature separates this exception from the concealed-condition exception, where the tenant’s knowledge ended the landlord’s liability because the tenant then held the very information the exception exists to supply. Here the information gap is not the problem. A tenant whose only route to the apartment is a defective stairway knows exactly how dangerous it is and must still climb it, since the tenant has a property right to reach the home and no power to repair a stairway the landlord controls. A warning to that tenant, or to the tenant’s guests, protects no one. The duty stays with the landlord because the landlord alone can make the stairway safe.
The cases are often called the common passageway rules, but the label can mislead, because the source of the duty is the landlord’s retained control and tenant use is secondary.84 Similar rules therefore reach parts of the land that tenants are not meant to use, so long as those parts must be safe if the leased premises are to be safe.85 A landlord must not negligently allow the roof to collapse, a point § 361 makes, and the same logic covers wiring within the walls or ceiling that becomes a fire hazard, as in Leavitt v. Glick Realty Corp., where a subtenant died of smoke inhalation from a fire caused by wiring in the ceiling of the apartment.86 Coleman v. Steinberg arose from a heating system serving all of the tenants that harmed a child in one apartment, the same kind of building-wide equipment.87 Windows can fall on either side of the line. In Chiu v. City of Portland, whether the landlord controlled an acrylic window fitted so that it would easily pop out was a jury question, since a window’s safety may depend on fittings installed outside the building and not in the leased space.88 Wiring in a tenant’s wall may sit physically inside the tenant’s unit, yet the tenant can neither inspect nor repair it, and it belongs to the building’s systems, which only the landlord can manage.
Because control carries the weight, the first practical question is who had it, and the lease is the first place to look. The areas the landlord keeps are often listed in the lease or in a collateral agreement.89 Most jurisdictions also presume that the landlord keeps control of areas that are outside every individual lease and used in common by different tenants, and entryways, hallways, lobbies, stairs, elevators, yards, basements, and porches typically fall within that presumption.90 When the lease is silent, ambiguous, or uncertain, control is a question of fact, and the way the tenants have actually used the area is given great weight.91 In Forgang v. Universal Gym Co., a guest was injured during a party at a racquetball club leased to a fraternity, and whether the landlord retained control was a question of fact.92
Some kinds of landlord involvement fall short of control, and the decided cases show where. A tenant’s girlfriend tripped on a sewer cleanout pipe in the front yard of a duplex in Dildine v. Frichtel, and a directed verdict for the landlord was proper because the facts did not establish that the landlord controlled the yard.93 In Settles v. Redstone Development Corp., the court treated an explicit reservation of authority to enter and make repairs as insufficient to show retained control, and it treated the landlord’s prior repairs and a right to approve the air conditioning contractor the same way.94 Nearly every landlord reserves a right to enter for inspections and emergencies. If that reservation alone amounted to control, every landlord would owe a duty of care for every defect inside every unit, and the baseline of nonliability would disappear. A landlord’s prior repairs have their own rule, the negligent-repair exception taught above, so they do not need to double as proof of control. The duty also follows the use for which the landlord furnished the area. It does not extend to portions the tenant or the tenant’s invitees are not reasonably expected to frequent, and it does not cover injuries from an improper or unauthorized use of the premises.95
Once control is established, the standard is reasonable care, which the landlord can meet only by looking. In these areas the lessor owes a duty of reasonable care to make the premises safe for the tenants and others lawfully on the land, a duty that § 360 states and that Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 53(a) carries forward.96 Reasonable care requires inspection from time to time and a reasonable effort to make dangerous situations safe.97 That inspection duty marks a contrast with the concealed-condition exception, which imposes none, and the contrast follows from control, since the landlord who keeps the area is positioned to inspect it. The landlord must usually have actual or constructive knowledge of the defect, meaning the knowledge a reasonable inspection would have produced, and in Charette v. Santspree there was a fact issue about whether the landlords had actual or constructive knowledge that lead-based paint was peeling in the common areas.98 A landlord with that notice must either warn well enough for the risk to be avoided or repair the defect within a reasonable time, and the landlord is not an insurer.99
Some courts have dropped these special categories and substituted ordinary care for landlords generally, and the next subsection takes up that trend.100
Habitability and the Modern Trend
The exceptions taught above leave the landlord’s baseline freedom from liability standing and carve out the situations in which it fails. Some courts have gone further and discarded the baseline itself, and the leading decision is Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America. A tenant’s invitee was injured when a balcony railing gave way, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a landlord must exercise ordinary care toward his tenant and others on the premises with permission, abrogating the landlord’s general immunity at common law.102
Under the traditional approach the case would have ended once the court found that no exception fit. The court said as much: if it followed the traditional rule, the plaintiff was not entitled to an instruction that the landlord owed him a duty of ordinary care. It concluded, however, that the better public policy lay in abandoning the general rule of nonliability and adopting a duty to exercise ordinary care in maintaining the premises.103 That conclusion follows from what the old premise assumes. The baseline treats the tenant as a possessor who can see and fix everything on the parcel,104 and that fits poorly when a tenant rents one flat in a building the landlord owns and is better placed than the tenant to maintain. As the exceptions multiply, the baseline describes less of the law, and a single standard replaces it: the jury asks what a careful landlord would have done about a railing that was rotting, and the plaintiff no longer has to fit a category first.
Other courts have taken the same step. Favreau v. Miller in Vermont substituted ordinary care for the special rules, and in Tagle v. Jakob New York treated a claim by a tenant’s guest as part of the reasonable-care regime it had adopted for landowners generally.105 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 53 gives the approach a textual home, since it places a general duty of reasonable care on lessors, owed to the lessee and all other entrants on the leased premises, with narrow exceptions.106 Wisconsin’s later lead-paint decision, Antwaun A. v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., shows the standard at work: once a landlord learns that paint is peeling in premises built before lead paint was banned, the landlord must test for lead paint and take appropriate steps to prevent harm to a tenant’s child.107 A plaintiff in that position needs no category of exception. The question is what a reasonable landlord does after seeing the warning sign.
Borders v. Roseberry sits on the other side of the divide. A social guest slipped on the front steps of a single-family house where water dripping from the roof had frozen, and the plaintiff argued that the landlord owed a duty to remedy the known condition.108 The Kansas court worked through the six traditional exceptions, found the first five inapplicable, and rejected the sixth, negligent repair, because the tenant knew fully of the icy condition and the landlord could reasonably assume that the tenant would tell the guest.109 The plaintiff urged a rule making landlords liable for known defects, but cited no authority and did not say how existing law should be modified, and the court declined to depart from the established rules.110
In neither case did an exception apply, so each result turned on whether the court was willing to treat the baseline itself as open to revision. The Wisconsin court answered yes on policy grounds and sent the question of ordinary care to the jury, while the Kansas court answered no on a record that offered no authority and no concrete proposal for change. Where a problem leaves the jurisdiction unspecified, the traditional exceptions supply the analysis, and the answer should add the result under an ordinary-care approach, which would let the claim reach the jury on whether the landlord acted reasonably.
The implied warranty of habitability loosened the baseline from a different direction. Most states, by statute or judicial decision, now recognize it in residential leases but not in commercial ones.112 Statutory warranties likewise generally do not extend to commercial tenants.113 A warranty in this sense is a guarantee the law reads into the lease even though the landlord never gave it. By leasing the premises, the lessor is treated as guaranteeing that there are no defects, or at least no latent ones, and no housing law violations in facilities vital to the use of the premises, and in many states that those essential features will stay in that condition during the lease.114 Recognition is not universal. A few states, including Alabama, Nebraska, and Wyoming, have refused to recognize the warranty, and the Alabama court in Murphy v. Hendrix concluded that adopting it is a task for the legislature.115
The word warranty suggests strict liability, as if a landlord might owe damages for any injury from a danger on the premises whether or not the landlord was at fault. Courts that heard personal injury claims under the theory found otherwise: the warranty requires only that the landlord keep the premises in reasonable repair when the landlord knows or should know of the defect.116 The warranty is a rule of law imposed by the court, and the landlord never impliedly promised anything, so its scope is a question of what the law requires.117 Courts sometimes make the point by saying the landlord’s obligation arises only when he has notice of the defect or should have discovered it by reasonable care. Negligence in some form is therefore required, although actual notice is not always necessary.118 Where liability rests on negligence, the landlord must have had notice of the defect that caused the injury and a reasonable opportunity to repair it.119 That is the same notice-and-opportunity safeguard the contract-to-repair exception carries, and it suits the purpose of getting defects fixed. Liability for a defect that no reasonable care could have revealed would give the landlord nothing to do differently, so it would operate as insurance and would produce no repairs.
An older doctrine reflects the same reasoning about inspection. A number of jurisdictions that otherwise follow caveat lessee, the rule that the lessee takes the premises as found, imply a warranty of habitability in a short-term lease of a furnished dwelling, because the parties usually intend immediate possession with no time for the tenant to inspect.120 Courts divide on whether breach of an implied warranty of habitability supports recovery for personal injury and property damage, and the division appears to come from the warranty’s hybrid origins in tort and contract.121 The same division runs through the modern habitability warranty.
Decisions on whether a breach of an implied or statutory warranty produces tort liability for personal injury fall into three positions. They are easiest to keep straight as answers to two questions: whether the breach supports a tort claim at all, and, if it does, who may bring the claim. The positions are these:
- A court may deny tort liability altogether, refusing to create a new exception to the common-law rule that landlords are not liable in tort, as in Isbell v. Commercial Investment Associates, Inc. and Dapkunas v. Cagle.122
- A court may impose tort liability measured by negligence, so that the breach gives rise to liability if the landlord negligently made or unreasonably failed to make the required repairs. Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc. was the first decision for this position, and it is limited to residential premises.123
- A court may treat the warranty as imposing a tort duty that lawful visitors, as well as tenants, can enforce, as in Scott v. Garfield and Reyes v. Egner.124
The second and third positions can combine, since a court can require negligence and also let guests sue. What distinguishes the third is who may bring the claim, and that turns on how the court classifies the warranty. If it is contractual, only a party to the contract can sue, and a tenant’s recovery for injuries rests on consequential damages limited to what was foreseeable.125 A guest has no contract with the landlord, meaning no privity, and Scott observed that to the extent a residential lease is a contract, only a tenant and not a guest can recover for economic loss from its breach. The same court acknowledged that the warranty sounds in both contract and tort and held that lawful visitors may recover for personal injuries under a tort theory.126 Even where privity bars the guest, the landlord may pay indirectly. The tenant, as possessor, is liable to third persons for injuries from defects on the premises, and if the tenant’s payments were foreseeable they are consequential damages recoverable from the landlord.127