467 A.2d 129
The father and mother entered into a separation agreement dated October 7, 1981.1 Under the agreement, the father was to pay the mother $462 each week in unallocated alimony and child support plus an additional $1,000 every December.2 The agreement was incorporated into the divorce decree entered June 17, 1982.3 A stipulated order dated June 17, 1983, incorporated the agreement into the decree.4 Paragraph 7 of the agreement permitted either party to cause the agreement to be filed of record in any court of competent jurisdiction at any time.5
The father filed a petition seeking to modify the support provisions.6 He sought to reduce his obligation to $250 per week on the ground that his income estimations at the time the agreement was entered into were higher than his actual income has turned out to be.7 He also suggested that the Melson formula be utilized by the court if it should produce a lower support figure.8 The mother filed an answer opposing the relief requested by the petition.9 Although unwilling to relinquish any of her rights under the agreement, the mother admitted that the father is presently financially unable to meet his obligations under the agreement.10 She indicated a willingness to be satisfied presently with payment of $350 per week support.11
Under paragraph 19 of the agreement the father is obligated to pay $2,000 unallocated alimony and child support each month plus an additional $1,000 every December.12 On emancipation of each child there is to be a $4,000 reduction in the alimony payment.13 The mother may apply for additional child support should she decide that the support specified by the agreement is insufficient.14 Father's alimony obligation is to be reduced thereby dollar for dollar.15 The agreement bars either party from seeking any increase in alimony or support for two years from the date of the agreement.16
Whether the Family Court may modify the support provisions of a separation agreement that has been incorporated into a divorce decree?17
Where the parties have contracted with respect to their rights, privileges and obligations they are bound by their agreement and the court does not have the power either under 13 Del.C. § 1519, or independently, to modify the same.18 If the agreement is merely incorporated into the decree it retains, for all intents and purposes, its contractual character, and the decree is limited by the terms of the contract.19
No. The father and mother entered into a separation agreement on October 7, 1981, which was incorporated into the divorce decree entered June 17, 1982, and further incorporated by stipulated order dated June 17, 1983.20 The father petitioned to reduce his weekly support obligation from $462 to $250 on the ground that his actual income fell short of earlier estimates.21 Because the agreement was only incorporated and not merged, it retains its contractual character, so the court lacks authority to modify the support terms under the statute.22
The Family Court may not modify the support provisions of the separation agreement.23
Whether incorporation of a separation agreement into a divorce decree causes the agreement to lose its contractual character?24
If the agreement is merely incorporated into the decree it retains, for all intents and purposes, its contractual character, and the decree is limited by the terms of the contract. The purpose of incorporation by reference is to identify and verify the agreement of the parties, provide a basis for res judicata and, perhaps, promote enforcement in a foreign forum.25
No. The stipulated order of June 17, 1983, incorporated the October 7, 1981 separation agreement into the divorce decree.26 The court looks exclusively to the agreement itself for resolution of the parties' post-nuptial rights, privileges and obligations, confirming that mere incorporation leaves the contractual nature intact.27
Incorporation of a separation agreement into a divorce decree does not cause the agreement to lose its contractual character.28
Whether a court may order specific performance of an incorporated separation agreement by requiring payment of an amount different from the sum stated in the agreement?29
The court has the power to award specific performance on such terms and conditions as justice requires even though the performance ordered is not identical with the performance required by the agreement.30
Yes. Although the court cannot modify the incorporated agreement, it ordered the father to pay not less than $325 each week rather than the contractual $462 weekly amount.31 So long as the father pays the lesser sum ordered by the court he will not be held in contempt.32 Support arrears continue to accrue at the full contractual rate and remain enforceable by judgment in Superior Court.33
A court may order specific performance of an incorporated separation agreement by requiring payment of an amount different from the sum stated in the agreement.34