13 Cal. 87, 95-96
The parties intermarried on September 22, 1857. They lived together as husband and wife until February 10 of the following year. On that date, four months and nineteen days from the date of the marriage, the defendant gave birth to a fully developed child.1
The plaintiff insists that this child was begotten by a stranger. He maintains that the defendant knew or had sufficient reason to believe that she was with child at the date of her marriage and concealed the fact from him. The plaintiff was ignorant of her condition and believed her at the time to be chaste and virtuous. He continued thus ignorant until the birth of the child. Upon this event happening, he repudiated the defendant and her child. So soon as her health would permit, he returned her with the child to her family and relatives.2
The plaintiff seeks a divorce a vinculo matrimonii on the ground of fraud. On the hearing before the Referee, the confessions of the defendant as to the father of the child were admitted in evidence against the objection of her counsel.3 The confession was made with reluctance under great distress of mind to her own brother. It fully exonerates the plaintiff and names the seducer of her virtue and the time and place of her seduction.4
The answer to the present suit, filed about six weeks subsequently, is itself an admission. In it the defendant avers that if she was then with child she had no knowledge of it and that it was the result of an act to which she never consented.5 The relatives of the defendant have recognized the repudiation and separation as justified. The child was begotten out of wedlock.6
Whether the confessions of the defendant as to the father of the child were admissible in evidence?7
The statute provides that no divorce shall be granted on the admission or statement of either party, but this rule is only affirmatory of the common law and does not exclude the introduction of confessions; rather, it provides that upon them the decree shall not be granted, and when freed from presumptions of collusion and sustained by circumstances the court may justly look to them as evidence.8
Yes. The statute affirms the common law rule that confessions alone cannot support a decree but are admissible when free from collusion and corroborated.9 The confession here was made with reluctance under great distress of mind to the defendant's own brother, fully exonerating the plaintiff and naming the seducer, time, and place, with no evidence of collusion as the brother had previously distrusted the plaintiff and only accepted the account after the confession.10
The confessions are admissible in evidence because the circumstances repel any presumption of collusion and the statute does not bar their introduction when properly corroborated.11
Related opinions on this issue
Baldwin, J. concurring.12
Whether the testimony as to the confessions, if admitted, taken in connection with corroborating circumstances, was sufficient to establish that the child was begotten by a stranger?13
Confessions, when perfectly free from all taint of collusion, when confirmed by circumstances and conduct, rank among the highest species of evidence, and where the circumstances repel all suspicion of collusion and leave no doubt of the truth of the confessions, the court should act accordingly.14
Yes. The confession is corroborated by multiple circumstances including the plaintiff's immediate repudiation of the defendant and child upon the birth after four months and nineteen days of marriage, the defendant's sworn answer evading any direct denial that the child was begotten by a stranger, the relatives' recognition of the repudiation and separation as justified, and the conceded fact that the child was begotten out of wedlock.15
The testimony as to the confessions together with the corroborating circumstances is sufficient to establish that the child was begotten by a stranger.16
Whether the condition of the defendant at the date of her marriage and her concealment thereof, the plaintiff being innocent and ignorant, constituted a sufficient cause for a divorce under the statute?17
A divorce may be granted when the consent of either of the parties to the marriage was obtained by force or fraud.18 Marriage as a civil contract is subject to avoidance for material and substantive fraud in its procurement.19 Concealment of pregnancy by a stranger at the time of marriage constitutes such a fraud going to the substance of the contract.20 This is because it imposes the burden of another's child.21 It renders the wife incapable of fulfilling the primary purpose of procreation with the husband.22 It necessarily leads to humiliation and degradation.23
Yes. The defendant's condition of being four months and nineteen days pregnant by a stranger at marriage and her concealment of that fact operated as a fraud of the gravest character upon the plaintiff.24 The plaintiff was ignorant of her condition and believed her chaste and virtuous.25 He continued in ignorance until the birth.26 At that point he repudiated the defendant and child and returned them to her family as soon as her health permitted.27
The fraud alleged goes to the substance of the marriage contract and vitiates it ab initio, warranting reversal of the judgment below with directions to enter a decree annulling the marriage.28