Concept
Other Special Classes
Professionals, skilled actors, and other special classes
Other Special Classes
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A holds one who undertakes to render services in a profession or trade to the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing in similar communities, unless he represents that he has greater or less skill.1 The formula is written for the individual who offers a service, and four kinds of case test its edges. A person with unusual ability may be doing an ordinary activity and offering no service at all. A manufacturer is an enterprise and not an individual practitioner, yet the law charges it with an expert's knowledge. Some occupations demand training and judgment but have never been recognized as supporting malpractice claims. And a professional who owes care neither promises a result nor answers for defects as a seller does.
Each case tests the reasons behind the formula and not its words. Lay jurors cannot judge technical work unless they can measure the defendant against other practitioners,2 so a professional standard works only where an occupation supplies a body of practice to borrow. Where a case offers skill without an undertaking, or an occupation without such a body of practice, ordinary reasonable care governs, and that standard already counts the actor's position among the circumstances that fix the competence required.3
Amateurs With Superior Skill
Section 299A reaches “one who undertakes to render services,” and a skilled person who merely does something, such as an expert skier on a weekend run or a veteran truck driver on the highway, undertakes no services.4 Whether such a person must use the ability that the ordinary person lacks is unsettled. The Restatements and the cases point both ways, and an exam answer should argue both.
One view starts from ordinary reasonable care and counts superior ability among the actor's circumstances. Restatement (Third) of Torts § 12 speaks of “skills or knowledge that exceed those possessed by most others,” and comment m to Restatement (Second) § 289(b) lists “superior attention, perception, memory, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment.” Both suggest holding the actor to a higher standard, although neither cites cases about superior physical characteristics as distinguished from superior skill or knowledge.5 The logic follows how a careful person behaves. An actor who sees that a latent defect is dangerous, or who knows how to avoid a collision, cannot act as though the knowledge were absent,6 and putting knowledge already in hand to use costs him little while protecting the people his conduct exposes.
The principle runs against plaintiffs as well as defendants. In Jackson v. Axelrad, a Texas decision, the patient was himself a physician, and the jury could weigh his superior understanding of a symptom's meaning in deciding whether he was contributorily negligent.7 Toth v. Community Hospital at Glen Cove carries the same logic into medicine. New York's highest court held that adherence to customary practice is not the sole test of malpractice and reasoned that “a physician would use his best judgment and whatever superior knowledge, skill and intelligence he has.”8
The competing view keeps the standard uniform for ordinary activities. Fredericks v. Castora refused to raise the standard for a truck driver with twenty years' experience, explaining that “to vary the standard according to the driver's experience would render the application of any reasonably uniform standard impossible.”9 The objection is practical. A jury applying the defendant's own measure would first have to grade him as expert, very good, good, or average before it could choose a yardstick, and a standard that rises for the able implies one that falls for the less able, a result the law refuses to accept.10 Holding the capable to more may also discourage people from acquiring skill, since greater ability would bring greater exposure.
Most decisions sort by asking whether the defendant acted as an expert or did an ordinary activity that many people perform with varying ability. An expert skier who collides with another skier on a moderate run is doing what skiers of every level do, and the better view holds him to the reasonable skier. The same skier acting as a member of the ski patrol during a rescue acts as an expert and is held to the expert's standard.11 Reliance explains the line: the patrol role invites the person being rescued to depend on expertise, while an open run invites no such dependence and draws skiers of every ability, so a uniform standard is workable and fair there. The line is a guide and not a rule. Some authorities would apply the expert standard even to the recreational skier, and a jury that sees a highly experienced defendant is likely to expect more of him whatever the instruction says.12
Both results are defensible on these facts, and the jurisdiction decides which one an exam expects. The uniform view protects him from a standard set by a talent he never offered to anyone, and the skill view asks only that he use a talent he has. An answer that states both rules and applies each to the stem handles an unsettled question well.
The question reverses when the actor has less skill than the activity demands, so that the issue becomes whether a layperson doing skilled work is held to the expert's standard.
Each side has an argument. The neighbor says that society relies on trained people for dangerous work of this kind, that the professional standard attaches to the undertaking and not to a credential, and that a person who takes on the work should not escape the expert's measure by pointing to her own lack of training. The homeowner answers that it is unfair to hold her to a standard she could not meet and never claimed to meet, since she invited no one to rely on her expertise, and that § 299A speaks of one who undertakes to render services, which she was not doing.13
Even a court that will not apply the arborist's standard gives the neighbor a second route. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299 provides that an act may be negligent if it is done without the competence that a reasonable person in the actor's position would recognize as necessary to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm to another.14 A reasonable person looking at a heavy limb above a neighbor's roof would recognize that the job calls for competence she lacks, and the cheap precautions were to hire the service or leave the limb alone. On that theory the fault lies in deciding to do the work at all, so her lack of skill proves the breach and cannot serve as an excuse. The route depends on a finding that a reasonable person would have seen the gap, which makes it stronger against an amateur whose task announced its dangers than against one whose task hid them.
Manufacturers as Experts
A manufacturer is held to the level of an expert in its field.17 Because it designs, produces, and markets the product, it is presumed to know the field in which it chose to do business, and its conduct is measured against that of a reasonable manufacturer who knows how such a product should be made.18 The manufacturer is therefore charged with an expert's awareness of special dangers within the product's foreseeable environments of use. The rule runs opposite to the amateur cases, since it charges the manufacturer with knowledge it may never have gathered. Section 299 supplies the frame: an act is negligent when done without the competence that a reasonable person in the actor's position would recognize as necessary to prevent an unreasonable risk, and the manufacturer's position is that of one who chose to put the product on the market.19
An arsenic weed killer shows the rule's reach. Its manufacturer is deemed to know that the poison lasts a long time, that it cannot be seen, and that it endangers a homeowner who, several days after treating a yard, forgets to protect herself against it.20 Forgetfulness is a foreseeable feature of how a persistent, invisible poison is used, and an expert in the field would have designed the product and its warnings with that lapse in mind. The homeowner, by contrast, is judged in the ordinary way, as a reasonable person using a consumer product, and carries no expert's knowledge of arsenic.
Two features of the manufacturer's position explain the rule. The first is choice: having elected to design, produce, and market the product, the manufacturer is presumed to know its field.21 The second is information. The manufacturer can learn a product's properties and likely uses at the point where learning is cheapest, while a user cannot realistically find out how long a poison persists or how it behaves in a wet lawn. A rule that measured the manufacturer by what it actually knew would reward ignorance, because the less a company investigated, the less it would be charged with. That result would also contradict § 299, under which failing to acquire the competence a reasonable person in the actor's position would see as necessary is itself the fault.
The expert standard fixes what the manufacturer must be taken to know, and the other elements of negligence remain. A manufacturer need not guard against a risk or victim outside the realm of reasonable foreseeability,22 and foreseeability alone does not make a risk unreasonable, which turns on weighing the burden of the omitted precaution against the safety it would have bought. An exam answer should therefore use the expert standard to decide what the manufacturer knew, then run the usual foreseeability and risk-benefit analysis on that knowledge.
Critics press a cost of the rule. Large and experienced manufacturers are normally the true experts in their fields, so for them the standard amounts to ordinary care. A smaller or newer manufacturer may be unable to meet an expert's level of knowledge even when it exercises all due care as that phrase is ordinarily defined, and for that defendant the standard can operate as a kind of strict liability.23 Before strict products liability spread, the doctrine was also one of the devices courts used to stretch foreseeability toward its outer edge, and critics suggest courts rethink it now that products doctrines that look more like negligence have spread.24
Professions Without Malpractice
Courts decide occupation by occupation whether a distinct claim for professional negligence, commonly called malpractice, exists, even though § 299A speaks broadly of any “profession or trade.”27 The answers fall into three groups: occupations that clearly support the claim, occupations that courts have refused to treat as professions for this purpose, and pharmacists, who sit between. The sorting matters because a jury can apply a professional standard only where the occupation itself supplies a yardstick for measuring the defendant's conduct.
The recognized group is long. In Advincula v. United Blood Services the Illinois Supreme Court explained that one standard, the knowledge, skill, and ability of an ordinarily careful professional under similar circumstances, measures the conduct of a wide range of medical and nonmedical professions, and it collected decisions applying that standard to attorneys, physicians, podiatric practitioners, dentists, accountants, social workers, and architects.28 Other authorities add nurses, physician assistants, physical therapists, mental health professionals, chiropractors, engineers, financial advisors, and even sports coaches.29 What these occupations share is a body of practice that members of the calling recognize and a jury can borrow. Advincula gave the reason: lay jurors are not equipped to decide what reasonable care means in professional work unless they can measure the actor's conduct against that of other professionals.30 A client who sues an architect over a defective design therefore proceeds as the earlier plaintiffs did, calling other architects to say what a competent architect would have done and asking the jury to compare.
The same reasoning marks the edge of the category. A professional standard borrows its yardstick from the occupation, so it has nothing to attach to when no neutral body of peer practice can say what reasonable conduct looks like, when the harm cannot be traced to the quality of the work, or when other claims already cover the wrong. Clergy, teachers, and computer consultants each fall short on a different one of these grounds.
Parishioners have repeatedly asked courts to recognize a separate tort of clergy malpractice, and none has yet succeeded, including in Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, where the claim rested on a failure to refer a son to a psychiatrist after he threatened suicide during pastoral counseling.31 Most other cases allege that a cleric entered a consensual sexual relationship with an adult parishioner, sometimes while counseling the parishioner's marriage.32 Courts hesitate for two reasons. Recognizing the tort would require a court to define reasonable conduct within the context of religious tenets, and the alleged acts often already support an existing claim such as counseling malpractice or battery, so a new tort adds little.33 The reluctance is not uniform across theories. A New York court in Lightman v. Flaum declined to recognize a fiduciary-duty claim over a rabbi's disclosure of confidences from spiritual counseling, fearing entanglement in sorting out whether the disclosure accorded with religious tenets, while a Florida court in Doe v. Evans allowed a fiduciary-duty claim to proceed against a priest over alleged abuse of a marital counseling relationship.34
Courts generally refuse to recognize educational malpractice for three stated reasons: it is hard to determine why a particular student failed to learn, hard to choose among competing educational theories to set the standard, and hard to finance an award.35 The first reason carries the most weight, because learning depends on the student's effort, background, and aptitude as well as on instruction, so a jury asked whether poor teaching produced a student's deficits would be speculating. The Michigan Supreme Court in Page v. Klein Tools, Inc. pointed to the practical reality that in the end the student is responsible for his own knowledge, including its limits, and the District of Columbia court in Brantley v. District of Columbia described overwhelming authority that a school's failure to educate a student, or to assign the student to the correct program, does not support a suit for money damages.36 The refusal reaches claims about the quality of teaching and leaves other complaints alone. An Iowa court held in Sain v. Cedar Rapids Community School District that a claim against a guidance counselor for negligently misstating NCAA regulations to a student athlete was not educational malpractice and should have survived summary judgment, and an Alabama court in Christensen v. Southern Normal School distinguished contract and fraud claims from educational malpractice.37
Computer consultants show that specialized knowledge alone does not make an occupation a profession for tort purposes. Courts have concluded that computer professionals are not subject to a higher duty of care based on their profession, as in Superior Edge, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., and the overwhelming majority of courts to consider the question have held that a malpractice or professional negligence claim does not lie against computer consultants or programmers.38 Where the client's grievance is that the consultant failed to deliver what the contract promised, the economic loss rule also keeps the dispute in contract: it bars a tort claim when the defendant's duty arose exclusively out of the contractual relationship and holds the plaintiff to the bargain it struck.39 Ordinary negligence law, with its single standard of reasonable care under the circumstances, remains the measure for any tort claim that survives that rule.
Pharmacists sit in the middle. They resemble service providers such as doctors more than retail merchants, so liability for harm from prescription drugs lies in negligence and not in strict liability, and courts have dismissed strict liability claims against pharmacists while allowing negligence claims, as in Carrozza v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.40 In filling a prescription a pharmacist is held to the highest standard of care, so one who fills it incorrectly is almost certainly responsible for the resulting harm.41 The traditional duty stops there. A pharmacist must dispense accurately according to the terms of a valid prescription and has no general duty to warn patients of hazards or side effects, even by passing along the package insert.42 Courts have given four reasons for the no-warning rule:
- Warning would burden pharmacists with second-guessing the decisions of prescribing doctors.
- Patients would be confused by conflicting information from their doctors and their pharmacists.
- The learned intermediary doctrine places the duty to warn on the prescribing practitioner, the one party at least theoretically aware of both the drug's dangers and the patient's particular characteristics.
- Doctors are assumed to be better skilled than pharmacists at evaluating what a medication may do.43
The rule weakens where the pharmacist has special knowledge. Courts have found a duty of reasonable care to warn where the prescription shows a clear error on its face, or where the pharmacist knows the drug is contraindicated for this customer, as when the customer is known to be an alcoholic, to have an allergy, or to take an incompatible drug.44 A pharmacist who undertakes to collect allergy data or to monitor prescriptions for interactions is bound to perform that undertaking with reasonable care, and legislative requirements that pharmacists monitor and counsel clients have encouraged the trend.45 In Correa v. Schoeck the Massachusetts court recognized a limited duty to notify an epilepsy patient and her physician, each time she tried to fill a prescription, that the insurer required prior authorization, relying on the pharmacy's specific knowledge of the requirement, industry practice, and the foreseeability of harm.46 The states do not line up. Illinois in Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. found a duty to warn the customer or her prescribing physician that a drug was contraindicated for allergies the pharmacist knew about, Arkansas in Kowalski v. Rose Drugs joined the majority that imposes no general duty to warn, and Massachusetts in Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy held that a pharmacist who gives a customer a list of some side effects assumes a duty to warn of all of them.47
The negligence-only treatment attaches to the dispensing role. A pharmacist who moves into diagnosing and prescribing has taken on a physician's work and answers as a physician would, so the question on an exam is always which role the pharmacist was performing when the harm occurred.
A stem that pairs a teacher, a pastor, or an information technology consultant with careless work invites the quick answer that a skilled occupation owes a professional standard. Because the outcome varies by occupation and by state, the stronger answer runs in sequence.
The boundary matters most for what comes next, because even within the recognized professions the standard requires care and does not require a guaranteed result. The next subsection takes up that limit and the related rule that professional services are not subject to strict liability.
No Guarantee, No Strict Liability
The professional standard measures the quality of the work and says nothing about the result the work produces.51 Two limits on professional liability follow. A professional promises care and not a result, so a bad outcome does not show breach, and courts broadly decline to hold professionals strictly liable for the services they supply.
The duty of care arises from the undertaking itself, so a professional need not promise ordinary skill for the law to require it, and the service does not come with a guaranteed result. Ordinarily the professional is liable only for negligence.52 In Tarrant v. Ramunno a client complained that her personal injury case settled after mediation for much less than the initial demand, and the court dismissed the malpractice claim, reasoning that no one can guarantee the outcome of litigation, whether before a jury, in negotiations, in mediation, or before a judge.53 The reasoning rests on what a result can and cannot show. Factors outside the professional's control join the professional's own choices in producing the end result, so a poor outcome can follow careful work, as when an aggressive disease outruns proper treatment or a weak claim fails despite skilled advocacy. A poor outcome can follow careless work as well, so the outcome alone cannot tell the two apart. If a bad result counted as a breach, the professional would become an insurer of success, and the safest course for any practitioner would be to avoid the hard cases, leaving the people with the most difficult problems without help. The usual exam error is to treat the unfavorable result as proof of negligence, when the question is what the professional did and how that conduct compares with the standard developed earlier in this chapter.
A professional can, of course, choose to take on the risk of the result. A service provider may give a guarantee, and a guarantee is enforceable through contract law, while absent an express contract for a particular result the cause of action stays in tort.54 In Sciacca v. Polizzi the plaintiff worded the complaint in contract terms, yet the injuries from an IUD were treated as a tort claim because the physician had made no specific guarantees.55 Sullivan v. O'Connor illustrates the contract side: the plastic surgeon there promised the plaintiff Hedy Lamarr's nose, a specific result, and a promise of that kind is the guarantee contract law enforces.56 In Haase v. Starnes the promises appeared in advertisements for a full, growing head of hair for life.57 A lawyer's reported assurance that he would fight aggressively on appeal if the client's liquor license was denied landed on the other side of the line. The attorney denied making the statement, and the court held that, if he had made it, it was a gratuitous prediction that gave him no contractual duty to produce that result.58
The requirement that the promise be express follows from how the duty arises. The law supplies the duty of care without any bargain, so words of optimism from someone already bound to use care add no obligation. A separate duty to deliver a result has to come from a separate undertaking, and what separates a promise from a prediction is whether the professional committed to the outcome or only forecast it.
The second limit arises when the injury comes from a product the professional used while rendering a service. Strict liability makes a seller answerable for a defective product without proof of carelessness, and implied warranty writes a promise of quality into the sale. Courts have broadly refused to apply either rule to doctors, dentists, hospitals, and other health care providers, or to architects, engineers, and other design professionals, for harm caused by the professional services they provide.59 Four early decisions, running from Gagne through Newmark, resolutely rejected strict liability for doctors in particular and professionals generally, and later decisions have adhered closely to them.60
Two reasons recur, and the first is the one behind the no-guarantee rule. In City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi, a suit over building defects against the architects and engineers who designed the building, the court explained that professionals of every kind are exempt from strict liability largely because they deal in “inexact sciences” involving “random factors which are incapable of precise measurement” and requiring skilled judgment.61 The indeterminate nature of professional decisions precludes consistently perfect results, so a rule that charges a seller for any defect regardless of care has no stable footing when the work itself cannot promise perfection.62 Implied warranty fares no better. In Audlane Lumber & Builders Supply, Inc. v. D.E. Britt Associates, Inc., a suit against an engineering firm over design specifications, the court saw no room for implied warranty, because engineers and other professionals do not warrant the quality of their work as sellers warrant goods. The only warranty a professional gives is that skill was exercised according to the standard of care, and a warranty defined that way is the negligence standard under another name.63
The second reason concerns the role the professional plays, and the cleanest illustration is a pair of New Jersey Supreme Court decisions. In the first, a dentist was held not subject to strict liability for a defective syringe needle because he was essentially providing a service to the patient. In the second, a customer whose hair fell out after a beauty parlor applied a defective permanent-wave solution sought strict liability, and the court imposed it.64 Both defendants rendered a service that required a product for which no separate charge was made, so the line between product and service does not explain the different results. The court located the difference in the defendants' roles: “The beautician is engaged in a commercial enterprise; the dentist and doctor in a profession.”65 It reasoned that the paramount function of doctors and dentists is furnishing opinions and services, that their obligation should be grounded in a duty of reasonable competence and care, and that the importance of those services to the health and even survival of many people outweighs any need for strict liability.66 The beautician, by contrast, caters to a form of aesthetic convenience or luxury and applies products for which a charge is made.67
The pair also shows where a plaintiff may look for a way around the exemption. If the defendant is classified as a non-professional, like the beautician or a plumber or an electrician, strict products liability may apply to a hybrid transaction that combines a sale and a service.68 A second proposed route separates simple, routine, mechanical tasks from discretionary judgments, but most courts refuse strict liability against providers of pure services even for simple mistakes, reasoning that ordinary professional negligence adequately protects the people harmed by errors of that type.69 An exam answer should therefore ask what role the defendant occupied when the harm occurred. A professional furnishing judgment-based services answers in negligence, and a commercial provider who happens to use specialized skill may not enjoy the same protection.
Both limits push the injured plaintiff to the same place. Without an express promise of a result and without strict liability, the claim against a professional rests on proof that the professional's conduct fell below the professional standard, which is the subject of the next section.