992 F.3d 44, 60–61 (1st Cir. 2021)
In April 2015, Kevin Carrozza, a Massachusetts resident, was prescribed the antibiotic Levaquin by his physician to treat a head cold and had the prescription filled at a CVS pharmacy in Bridgewater, Massachusetts.1 At the time, neither Carrozza nor his physician knew of any allergies or sensitivities to Levaquin or other quinolones.2
The pharmacist on duty, Richard Wokoske, received a computer-generated hard stop warning indicating that Carrozza was allergic to quinolones.3 Wokoske reviewed Carrozza's CVS Patient Profile, which contained conflicting information including prior prescriptions of Levaquin and other quinolones in 2008, 2009, and 2010, as well as statements by Carrozza that he had no quinolone allergy.4 Pursuant to CVS policy requiring the pharmacist to exercise individual judgment when confronted with such warnings, Wokoske dispensed the Levaquin.5
After taking the medication, Carrozza suffered an allergic reaction that required hospitalization.6 Hospital records noted a rash atypical for allergic reaction but possibly indicating erythema multiforme or very mild Stevens-Johnson Syndrome, and Carrozza claimed he sustained permanent ocular damage as a result.7
In May 2015, Carrozza sent CVS a Chapter 93A demand letter seeking $650,000 in damages.8 CVS challenged the letter, disclaimed liability, and offered a $5,000 settlement that Carrozza rejected.9 In October 2017, Carrozza filed suit against CVS in Brockton District Court in Massachusetts.10 CVS removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts on diversity grounds.11
Carrozza twice moved to remand the case to state court, but the district court denied both motions.12 The district court identified Carrozza's claims as negligence, a Chapter 93A claim, and breach of implied warranty.13 In 2019, the district court granted CVS's motion to preclude the testimony of Carrozza's expert Dr. Kenneth Backman under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, denied Carrozza's motion to depose another expert Dr. Stephen Foster, and granted summary judgment in favor of CVS on all claims.14
Carrozza appealed the district court's denial of his motion to remand, its discovery rulings, and its grant of summary judgment.15
Whether the district court properly denied Carrozza's motions to remand the action to state court?16
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), federal district courts possess original jurisdiction over civil actions in which the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs and the parties are citizens of different states.17 The amount demanded by the plaintiff in good faith generally controls the amount in controversy.18 A plaintiff's general allegation of damages meeting the requirement suffices unless questioned by the opposing party or the court.19
Yes. The district court properly denied Carrozza's motions to remand because his pre-suit Chapter 93A demand letter expressly sought $650,000 in damages, well above the jurisdictional threshold, while complete diversity existed between Carrozza as a Massachusetts citizen and CVS as a Rhode Island corporation with its principal place of business in Woonsocket. The demand letter was incorporated into the complaint, and Carrozza never disputed that this sum was the amount requested.20 Although Carrozza later contended that the demand was not a serious valuation because it stated no offer in that range was expected at the time, federal standards govern the calculation and the good-faith demand controls the inquiry.21
Carrozza's alternative reliance on the $5,000 settlement offer or on CVS expert damage assessments supplied no clear substitute figure, and his argument that CVS's Massachusetts locations destroyed diversity failed under settled corporate-citizenship doctrine.22
The district court properly exercised diversity jurisdiction and correctly denied the motions to remand.23
Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Carrozza's motion to conduct an audiovisual deposition of Dr. Foster?24
Yes. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the belated motion to depose Dr. Foster because Carrozza had known since at least August 2018 that Dr. Foster's testimony would be useful, had been twice informed that he must comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expert-designation requirements, and made no effort to depose Dr. Foster during the eight months between his first rejected attempt to admit the Foster Affidavit and the April 2019 motion filed after the close of both fact and expert discovery.28 Carrozza offered no showing of good cause to reopen discovery, and the district court reasonably concluded the request was improper.29
The district court acted within its discretion in denying the motion to depose Dr. Foster.30
Whether the district court abused its discretion in precluding the testimony of Dr. Backman under Federal Rule of Evidence 702?31
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, expert testimony is admissible only if the witness is qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, is the product of reliable principles and methods, and the expert has reliably applied those principles and methods to the facts of the case.32 District courts must ensure the proffered testimony rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant.33
Yes. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Backman's testimony because Dr. Backman admitted during deposition that he did not know the standard of care applicable to pharmacists, possessed no firsthand knowledge of Stevens-Johnson Syndrome or Carrozza's injuries, and based his causation opinion entirely on the previously rejected Foster Affidavit.34 These admissions demonstrated that Dr. Backman lacked the qualifications and reliable foundation required by Rule 702, rendering his opinions mere assumptions, speculation, and guesswork on the central issues of standard of care and causation.35
The district court properly precluded Dr. Backman's expert testimony under Rule 702.36
Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to CVS on Carrozza's negligence claim?37
A successful negligence claim under Massachusetts law requires proof that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of reasonable care, breached that duty, and caused damages.38 In professional negligence actions involving pharmacists, expert testimony is generally required to establish the standard of care because that standard is not normally within the experience of lay persons.39
Yes. Summary judgment was properly granted on the negligence claim because, after Dr. Backman's testimony was excluded, Carrozza presented no admissible expert evidence on the standard of care or causation.40 The central issue—whether pharmacist Wokoske breached his duty by dispensing Levaquin despite the computer-generated hard-stop warning after reviewing conflicting patient-profile information—requires expert testimony on the professional judgment expected of pharmacists under Massachusetts regulatory standards and is beyond the ken of a lay jury.41 Without such evidence, Carrozza could not create a genuine dispute of material fact on breach or causation.42
The district court correctly granted summary judgment to CVS on the negligence claim.43
Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to CVS on Carrozza's breach of implied warranty claim?44
Under Massachusetts law, a claim for breach of implied warranty arises only from a contract for the sale of goods governed by the Uniform Commercial Code.45 When a transaction involves a mix of goods and services, the court applies the predominant-factor test to determine whether the predominant purpose is the rendition of service, with goods incidentally involved, or a sale of goods, with labor incidentally involved.46
Yes. Summary judgment was properly granted on the breach of implied warranty claim because a pharmacist's dispensation of a prescribed medication under Massachusetts law is predominantly the provision of professional health-care services rather than a sale of goods.47 Wokoske exercised individual professional judgment required by CVS policy when confronted with the hard-stop warning and conflicting profile data; the physical delivery of Levaquin was incidental to that service.48 Because the transaction is not governed by the UCC, no implied-warranty claim lies.49
The district court correctly granted summary judgment to CVS on the breach of implied warranty claim.50
Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to CVS on Carrozza's Chapter 93A claim?51
Chapter 93A prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce.52 A plaintiff must show that the conduct falls within a common-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness.53 Where underlying negligence and breach-of-warranty claims fail as a matter of law, the Chapter 93A claim likewise fails.54
Yes. Summary judgment was properly granted on the Chapter 93A claim because Carrozza alleged no independent common-law, statutory, or established concept of unfairness once his negligence and breach-of-warranty claims were rejected.55 The failure of those predicate claims necessarily defeats the derivative Chapter 93A count.56 The predicate claims having failed, no separate basis for finding unfairness remained.57
The district court correctly granted summary judgment to CVS on the Chapter 93A claim.58